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The theme of this collection of essays by prominent West Berlin educators and government officials is not only that Berlin is the pivot upon which the destiny of Germany as a whole turns, but that what happens to Berlin will affect what happens to the entire Western world. And what happens to the Western world will ultimately affect the welfare and development of the rest of the world.

To the memory of
OTTO SUHR

BERLIN

PIVOT OF GERMAN DESTINY

Translated and Edited by
CHARLES B. ROBSON

Introduction by
WILLY BRANDT,
Governing Mayor of Berlin

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Preface

WHEN PREMIER NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV TOOK HIS ABRUPT departure from the stillborn summit conference in Paris, he flew directly to East Berlin. There he made a speech outlining the policy the Soviet Union proposed to follow in the new phase of the cold war. The place and circumstances of his statement, as well as its specific content, indicate that the status of Berlin is to continue to be a focal issue in world politics.

The most surprising features of Mr. Khrushchev's address are the mildness of its tone and the moderation of its diction, and its acceptance of the need for time in order to work out solutions of the issues now causing tensions between the East and West—including the issue of the status of Berlin. In these particulars the speech of May 19, 1960, in East Berlin contrasts sharply not only with Khrushchev's blustering utterances made just previously in Paris, but with his note of November 27, 1958. That document had the character of an ultimatum because it made positive demands and set a specific time limit for acceptance. Later this blatant threat was transformed into the more moderate attitude displayed intermittently by Khrushchev on the path to the summit, especially at Camp David. Apparently this gain was not altogether lost in the resounding collapse of the latest summit conference.

The prudent restraint detectable now and then even through Khrushchev's blustering is significant to the extent that it arises out of the Soviet realization that communism does not have the power to achieve its objectives by overt use of force. One of the factors that has produced and deepened this kind of sobering realization in the Kremlin is the character and behavior of the people of Berlin. Despite all its advantages in the location of military contingents in and around this isolated community, the Soviet Union hesitates to force a solution upon Berlin which the people who live there refuse to accept. Equally, the calm and courageous behavior of the Berliners during

the blockade and their sustained determination to live and conduct their civic affairs as a free and democratic people have made West Berlin a force in the balance of power between East and West which the West is unwilling to surrender—indeed, cannot afford to surrender. Berlin, then, has acquired a position of strength in international affairs and can in no sense be regarded as a pawn to be traded back and forth in the hope of concessions on one side or the other.

As the cold war enters a new phase it becomes increasingly important for the Free World to know more about the people of Berlin and how they are responding to the challenges of the crisis which continues to revolve about them. Some ten years after the blockade and the division of the city, this crisis was intensified by the Soviet demands of November, 1958, just as reconstruction and economic recovery were permitting a more nearly normal rhythm of existence to emerge in West Berlin. How are the normal problems of Berlin as a giant metropolis complicated by its division and isolation? What is being done to meet these problems through the usual organs of government and civic life, which now must operate under extraordinary stresses and pressure? How are these efforts and the aspirations that sustain them affected by the uncertainties of life at the vortex of an international crisis? What, in sum, are the present problems, plans, hopes, and fears of the people whose stubborn fortitude amid the ruins of their destroyed city provided the cause and the goal for the airlift—the only clear-cut triumph of the West over the Kremlin in the entire course of the cold war?

This book is offered to the American reading public as a source of information on these points. The discussions which it contains had their origin in a series of public lectures delivered at the Otto Suhr Institute of the Free University of Berlin during the summer of 1959. The lecturers were and are leaders in the public and academic life of West Berlin. Each of the contributors discusses that aspect of the history or current life of the divided city which lies within the field of his particular public responsibility or scholarly competence. The original lectures had the character of reports by prominent leaders in Berlin rendered to audiences composed of their fellow-townsmen at a time when the future existence of their city appeared

to hang in the balance at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva.

The chapters of this book present these lectures in a form that is an adaptation as well as a translation. The attempt has been made to preserve as far as possible the intimate, almost conversational flavor of the oral discussions, but, of course, the appropriate American idiom has been employed throughout. In addition, it has been necessary to insert some explanatory material, either into the text or in footnotes, in order to make references that were readily understandable to the original audiences clear to readers not as familiar with the Berlin scene. Great care has been exercised, however, to maintain complete fidelity to the statements of fact and of opinion by the authors. In citations from official documents, the text conforms to that appearing in standard English-language publications whenever the documents in question have been so published. A list of the English- and German-language publications used may be consulted in the Select Bibliography at the end of the book. The bibliography also contains certain relevant non-documentary material both in English and in German.

Two essays included in the present volume were prepared especially for it and for German edition of the series of lectures which is published under the title *Berlin—Brennpunkt deutschen Schicksals*. Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1960. These are "The History of Berlin as Germany's Capital," by Dr. Wolfgang Haus, and "The United States and the Berlin Problem: an American view," by Professor Edgar R. Rosen. The latter essay was written by the author in German and in English as well, so that no translation was needed for either edition.

It should be noted, furthermore, that the essay "The Berlin Situation as a Socio-political Problem," by Professor Otto Stammer, has been adapted and translated from the form in which it was published in *Soziologie und moderne Gesellschaft*. Verhandlungen des 14. Deutschen Soziologentages vom 20. bis 24. Mai 1959 in Berlin. Herausgegeben von Dr. Alexander Busch. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1959. The English translation is published here with the kind permission of the author and the publisher. A somewhat abbreviated version of the lecture delivered by Professor Stammer in the Otto Suhr

Institute series under a similar title is published in the German edition.

It is particularly appropriate that the Otto Suhr Institute of the Free University should be the instrument through which these discussions of the civic life of Berlin are brought to the attention of the American public. This institution, previously known as the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, was the most influential center for the study and teaching of the principles and practices of democratic government and politics in Germany in the days of the Weimar Republic. One of the members of its distinguished faculty before it was closed during the National Socialist period was Professor Theodor Heuss, subsequently the first President of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the year of blockade and division, 1948, the Hochschule was reopened with Dr. Otto Suhr as its Director. A prominent leader in the Social Democratic Party, Dr. Suhr was then the speaker of the Berlin City Assembly, and in 1950 he became the first President of the Berlin House of Representatives under the city's new constitution. In 1955, he was elected Governing Mayor of Berlin and remained in that office until his death in 1957, when he was succeeded by the present Governing Mayor, Willy Brandt.

Under the dynamic leadership of Otto Suhr, the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik again became an important agency for he advanced education in the principles and practices of democratic government. It was largely due to his vision and initiative that the Hochschule became affiliated with the Free University and has now been merged into it as an inter-faculty teaching and research institute. It is appropriate that this institute commemorates his name.

Through its assumption of a new relationship with the Free University in the spring of 1959, the Otto Suhr Institute enlarged its opportunities and responsibilities. This positive development is typical of Berlin's response to the intensified crisis. The Free University was established and the Hochschule reopened in the darkest days of the blockade year. It is somehow fitting that one should be joined to the other during this new period of challenge.

The Otto Suhr Institute performs the usual functions of academic teaching and research in the field of political studies—the latter being shared with the Institute for

Political Science, also founded through the initiative of Otto Suhr—and, in addition, assumes a growing task in the field of extensive education in government and political science. At present, the chief emphasis in this part of the program is upon in-service training for teachers of civics in the secondary schools. It is one of the more constructive indications of the faith and interest of the American people in the future of Berlin that the United States government has made funds available for a new building suitable for the expanded activities of the Otto Suhr Institute. This building is now under construction in the vicinity of the principal buildings of the Free University in the Dahlem section of Berlin.

The translator of the essays which comprise this volume is particularly indebted to the Berlin colleagues with whom he worked in the year of transition from the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik to the Otto Suhr Institute when he was a guest professor at the Free University on a Fulbright grant. In his work with them, he learned something of the calmness with which the Berliners go about their daily work, refusing to be diverted by uncertainties and dangers which are the ordinary atmosphere of their life. As a result of this experience, he came to believe that the secret of the strength of Berlin is that its people regard the challenge they face not merely as a struggle for immediate and bare survival, but as a preparation for a future which seems to them eminently worthwhile. It is because the lectures which he heard in Berlin in the summer of 1959 reflected so faithfully this spirit of resoluteness and hope that he undertook to make them available to American readers.

The translator wishes to express his thanks first of all to Governing Mayor Willy Brandt for his introductory essay, which represents the time, effort, and interest of a man whose office makes extraordinary demands upon him. Particular acknowledgement and thanks are due also to Professor Gert von Eynern, present Director of the Otto Suhr Institute. Not only did he plan the original series of lectures and supervise their publication in German, but his assistance and advice have been constant and indispensable in the course of the preparation of the English version. The translator is also grateful to the staff of The University of North Carolina Press for encouragement and help in the preparation of the manuscript for publication.

He is especially indebted to Mr. Howard Webber, whose sympathetic and skillful assistance did much to give the translation whatever merit it may have in clarity and grace of English diction. Several members of the faculty of the University of North Carolina have read parts of the manuscript and made helpful suggestions. To these colleagues the translator also is grateful.

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Introduction

WILLY BRANDT

IN 1945 THE MORAL POSITION OF BERLIN AS THE CAPITAL of Germany was shaken to its foundations. The city had also lost its functions as the center of government and administration. The political prestige that it had won through centuries of development had been gambled away; at the end of the war there were even those who believed that the concentration of the spiritual and political powers of a people in this city was the result of artificial processes compelled by military might alone. The collapse of the German people appeared to some observers so complete that they did not think it necessary that the capital of a regionally diverse and thoroughly clan-conscious people, which could also point to other centers of its national and cultural existence, should retain its functions under all circumstances. In the millennium before the "Thousand Year Reich," after all, German destiny had been shaped not in Prussian Berlin alone, but at least as much in the Rhenish imperial and ecclesiastical cities, and, somewhat later, in Hapsburg Vienna.

The political and historical, the sociological, economic and cultural studies that are brought together in this book present—each in its own field—the essence of Berlin's story by means of a comprehensive account of its development and clear analyses of its current problems. It is in no way a disparagement of these discussions if I plead that it is extraordinarily difficult to explain the miracle of the present position of Berlin even through the most competent description and analysis. If today the moral and political claim of Berlin to be the capital of Germany is no longer seriously disputed, if Berlin is now in many ways actually prepared to accept this role again, if it has preserved the strength of a capital city, this is

not to be explained merely as the inevitable consequence of a chain of historical events. Neither the political nor the economic constellation of forces could have produced the result that is now so widely recognized, without the people who live in the entire city—not just those in its free part alone.

Since the days of the revolution of 1848, the Berliners have remained a politically conscious and freedom-loving people. They have now cleared away the material and psychological rubble of 1945. Without them and their determination to be independent, it would have been impossible to have found and to have aroused all those forces in the world with whose help the freedom and the reconstruction of this city have been assured.

Berlin continues to be a center of strength in Germany. The attempt of the East to conquer it or to rule it only proves once again the significance of this German and European metropolis for all the world.

Berlin has become a challenge and an obligation not only for those who live in the city, but for everyone to whom freedom and the right to self-determination are more than empty phrases.

May this book, for which our thanks are due to the authors and to the Otto Suhr Institute of the Free University of Berlin, be received as a witness for the past, the present, and the future of the capital of Germany—Berlin.

The History of Berlin as Germany's Capital

WOLFGANG HAUS

CENTRALIZED POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER, AND the capacity to focus and represent—these are the characteristics of a modern capital city. Where a center of population has become a point of integration for the people of a state or of a union of states, and a hob of political, economic, and cultural activity, there we can conclude that a genuine capital exists. To a greater or lesser degree, significant developments in all parts of the country converge upon the capital and come to fruition there.

For Germany, the problem of creating a true capital—of achieving centralization in the most inclusive sense—remained for many centuries unsolved. Not until long after the Kingdom of Prussia entered the ranks of the great powers did its chief city become the capital of the German Reich. It was only after 1871, when Berlin began to assume functions affecting Germany as a whole, that the city acquired something more than the special position which had belonged to it for centuries as the residence of the King of Prussia. Those aspects of Berlin's early history that influenced its development after 1871 are of special interest to us. With this historical background, we shall be able to decide whether Berlin did succeed in becoming the capital of Germany actually as well as nominally, and what the degree of that success was—a decision full of implications for the modern political situation.

I

Medieval Berlin, which grew up at the ford of the Spree about 1200, had—like its neighbor across the river, Cölln—important functions as a center of communication. Among the explanations of its origin advanced by histo-

rians, Berlin's location at the junction of the main roads of Northern and Central Europe running southward between the Elbe and Oder towards Saxony and Bohemia is regarded as the most significant. Despite its remoteness, the twin city was more notable for trade and traffic than for its military functions as an outpost on the eastern frontier. For our purposes, however, the period when Berlin was a member of the Hanseatic League and temporarily occupied a leading position among the cities of the frontier is not so interesting as the period succeeding it, which began with the subjugation of Berlin-Cölln by the Hohenzollerns, who became Electors of Brandenburg and established their residence in Berlin-Cölln about 1450.

The independence typical of the medieval city came to an end as the power of the new territorial state began to increase. At the moment of its birth as the capital-to-be, Berlin ceased to exist as a city-state. Thereafter, the character of Berlin-Cölln was conditioned by the residence in it of the Electors of Brandenburg. Even so, for another two centuries its trade and cultural life were overshadowed by other cities like Frankfort on the Oder. The decline in population during the Thirty Years War and the slow growth of the city on the Spree before the eighteenth century hardly presaged a bright future for Berlin-Cölln. About the middle of the seventeenth century, however, the Hohenzollerns began to place particular emphasis upon the improvement and development of their residence city. Berlin had become a major fortress and the garrison of one of the earliest standing armies in Europe. In 1709, a few years after his acquisition of the title of "King in Prussia," Frederick I consolidated the administration of the "Royal Prussian Court," uniting Berlin and Cölln with the neighboring towns that had in the meantime sprung up on the western side of the river.

The founding of the Berlin Academy of Science by Leibnitz in 1700 is properly appraised as the single event in the early history of the city which had major significance beyond the borders of Prussia itself. The Academy, though it was a city institution, was established by the state rather than by the city. In fact, the rise of Berlin to become one of the chief cities of Germany is, as we have already gathered, intimately interwoven with the history of the Prussian state. The importance of Prussia established the importance of its capital city.

In the age of Frederick the Great, the attention of Germany and of all Europe was more intensively focused upon Berlin than ever before, especially while the city was struggling for its existence in the Seven Years War. Post-war efforts to improve the economic position of the city were quite effective, though some of these amounted to a "forcing" of the economic organism in an artificial hothouse. Berlin's function as a center of traffic had already been improved by the construction of a system of canals. Now it became a city of factories established by the Prussian royal family and operated for the state, although this latest economic venture was confined to a few specialties (textiles, for instance). At the same time, Berlin was increasingly a city of military and administrative officialdom.

Significantly, Berliners themselves were excused from the requirement of military service, as it existed at the time, specifically so that they could more effectively promote the development of their city.

For Germany as a whole, Berlin was located quite far to the East, and, even within Prussia, Potsdam and Königsberg were also residences of the Hohenzollerns. It was scarcely possible at the time to recognize in Berlin, which was still rustic and provincial in comparison with London or Paris, a city which in the future would surpass in importance every other in middle Europe. It is true, however, that Andreas Schlüter, Eosander von Goethe, Nering and Knobelsdorff had given Berlin some features of a well-planned city, and even some elegance. And it is also true that the enlightened rule of Frederick the Great encouraged a modern civic consciousness and sophisticated tolerance that prepared Berlin for its role as catalyst in the developing conception of the secular, sovereign state.

After the Middle Ages, in fact, religious influences were never very profound or partisan in Berlin, a city that had not grown up in the shadow of a cathedral. Brandenburg-Prussia, and especially Berlin, had by the eighteenth century become a refuge for religious emigrants from half of Europe. Though the people who made up Berlin's growing population came chiefly out of East Prussia, many came also from southwest Germany, from the Netherlands, from Switzerland and Bohemia, and most of all from France. In 1700, out of a population of 25,000 Berliners, about 5000 were of French origin. During this period the population of Berlin had come to be an unusual but effective amalgam of

various national strains. The achievements of the Prussian state, which won the genuine respect, if not the affection, of the Berliners, encouraged them to acquire a certain confidence in their fitness as citizens of a capital city.

II

The fortitude of the people of Berlin in dealing with the hard experiences of the years 1806-15, and the rise of the city to political leadership in Germany during the Wars of Liberation from Napoleonic rule and the chief elements of the next stage of Berlin's progress towards full recognition as the capital. Two-thirds of the volunteers who responded to the general call to arms in 1813 came from Berlin, and we need only mention the names Fichte and Schleiermacher as examples of national spokesmen who resided in Berlin at this time.

In 1800 Berlin's population was 170,000 (including military personnel), and it ranked sixth in size among the cities of Europe. During the preceding century, not only had the city administration been brought under the direction of the Prussian state, but the city government actually became an integral part of the government of the state as a whole. With the promulgation of the Municipal Ordinance issued from Königsberg in 1808 under the direction of the Baron vom und zum Stein, however, a significant reform was achieved. That ordinance provided for the participation of the citizens in all the affairs of the city. This innovation was the beginning of a remarkable upsurge in civic development, which in the course of time was more and more inspired and controlled by the citizens themselves and by their representatives on the elected City Council (Magistrat).

When Wilhelm von Humboldt took office as the Prussian Minister of Culture in 1809, he wrote that the city was a "mere village" in which a wagon could scarcely be found, and which was eclipsed even by Erfurt. Von Humboldt's observations serve as a kind of marker against which the rapid development of the following period may be measured. Politically, this period of the Restoration and of the Biedemeier style was not so quiet as it may have appeared on the surface. Indeed, the Berlin city prison, the "Hausvogtei," attained at this time a certain notoriety as the "prison of demagogues"—a rather dubious distinction, of

course, because it reflects the suppression of the popular movement for freedom and German national unity. Whatever the implications of the Hausvogtei may be, the cultural achievements and economic development of Berlin were enough to give it an increasing prominence in Germany as a whole.

Before the middle of the century, in the brilliance of its literature, music, and intellectual salon-society Berlin had come to equal and in some respects to surpass every other German city. In great part this eminence was due to the favorable influence of progressive Jewish culture. It was above all, however, the University of Berlin—founded in 1810 by the government through the leadership and guidance of Wilhelm von Humboldt—with its succession of distinguished scholars during the next decades, that raised Berlin to a position at the head of the leading cities of Germany. Tieck, Wackenroder, Arnim, Schlegel, Chamisso, and Hoffman may scarcely be remembered by many now, but they played perhaps an even more important role in enhancing Berlin's reputation than the city's better known representatives of the Age of Reason: Nicolai, Moses & Mendelssohn and, for a time, Lessing.

In economics, also, the first two or three decades after 1815 saw new strides made. The fact that Berlin lay about halfway between Cologne and Königsberg, and was approximately the same distance from Munich, had a significant effect upon its economy. With the establishment of the German Customs Union in 1834, Berlin became the center of an economic region which extended far beyond the borders of Prussia. Industry was stimulated, and the large business enterprises which sprang up contributed to the city's prestige. Unfortunately, developments in the field of municipal political affairs did not keep pace with this economic expansion, for Baron vom Stein's Municipal Ordinance, while it promoted the growth of the older Berlin, proved to be unsuited to the demands of the newer, larger Berlin. Only very slowly and gradually did the city administration assume those essential functions which had previously been exercised directly by the government of Prussia.

III

The revolution of 1848 turned the attention of all Germany, as in 1813, to Berlin, and this new enthusiasm,

coming only a generation after the old one, suddenly made the city's elevation to the role of imperial capital seem very near. Like the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation that disappeared in 1806, the German Confederation established in 1815 had no capital city. As Pufendorf and Leibnitz had earlier agitated for the creation of a capital, but without success, so after 1815 the similar demands of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and Friedrich List went unanswered. There were, indeed, at least as many voices raised to charge that a "rapacious" and "tyrannical" capital could well be dispensed with. Despite them, however, by 1848 the feeling that a focus for Germany's political development was desirable had spread rather widely. When, on April 2, 1849, a delegation from the National Assembly then in session in Frankfort arrived in Berlin to offer the imperial crown to the King of Prussia, the moment of fulfillment seemed at hand. Berlin, now a city of 400,000, after dissipating its initial revolutionary achievements, seemed at this juncture to be on the verge of acquiring unexpectedly what it had sought so long. As things turned out, of course, Berlin did not become the imperial capital under the black, red, and gold flag, and, in fact, the years that followed were characterized by an abrupt spell of political reaction. At mid-century, the retreat of Prussia before Austria brought with it a temporary frustration of German hopes.

There followed a short period of stagnation. Berlin's basic economic strength, though, made itself felt, and before long the city surpassed in population Vienna, the residence of the old emperor. Whether capital or not, Berlin was a city of intellectuals, of industry, and of commerce. Notable among the eminent professors at the University after the death of Hegel were Alexander von Humboldt, Savigny, and Ranke, to name only a few. As early as 1844, one of the first German industrial expositions had been held in Berlin; there was a moderately successful congress of German industrial workers in 1848; a mammoth gymnastic festival in 1861 attracted representatives from more sections of Germany even than had been expected. The development of long-distance transportation was of particular importance to a Berlin which was becoming more and more orientated towards the Western Europe in which it had only a peripheral position. When rail links were established in all directions, the central location of Germany in Europe as a

whole became a decisive factor in the city's development, while the eccentric location of Berlin in Western Europe was compensated for by a technical progress which measured kilometers in terms of mere minutes.

In politics, the "three-class" system of elections, established by the Prussian Constitution granted by the King in 1850, at first insured the domination of the city assembly by the conservatives. The three-class system confined suffrage to taxpayers, and, moreover, favored large taxpayers over median and small ones. By 1862, however, the new and liberal Progressive Party was in the majority. The parochial, petty attitudes of conservative circles gave way to a vigorous spirit of civic enterprise that, on account of its liberalism, became known as "municipal free-thought." As a result, Berlin was, in the realm of municipal politics as in every other, ready to enter upon the role of the nation's capital.

It was also in 1862 that Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia. For years he ruled in deliberate conflict with the Prussian House of Representatives, and in consequence he did not have the sympathy of the liberals. The Berlin City Assembly declared its complete solidarity with the Prussian parliament, but this did not alter the fact that, especially in west and south Germany, post-revolutionary but still authoritarian Prussian had little popularity. Even Berlin was at best suspended between sympathy and antipathy.

Nevertheless, events were marching towards the long-awaited climax. Ahead were the wars of 1864 and 1866, which resulted in the formation of the North German Federation, with Berlin tacitly the capital. And, four years afterwards, following victory over France, the German Empire was created (but now without Austria). Berlin became at last "the Emperor's city."

IV

The Frankfort Constitution of 1849 expressly provided that the seat of the imperial government should be determined by law. One may seek in vain for such a provision in the new constitution drawn up by Bismarck in 1871. The empire was a Federation of Princes, and the residence of the King of Prussia, who was assigned the presidency of the federal state, was automatically the capital of the em-

pire. The only mention of Berlin by name in the constitution is quite incidental. One of the passages taken over verbatim from the 1867 constitution of the North German Federation specifies that the laws of the empire will be published officially in Berlin.

At first Berlin remained for all practical purposes the capital of Prussia only, and many of the imperial administrative offices were not set up until much later. Sometimes the contention is advanced that according to some explicit assumption the Prussian capital was destined in the nature of things to become the capital of a renewed German empire. But there is no justification, either in the attitude of the people or elsewhere, for this conclusion. The city's position as imperial capital was clearly looked upon as something subsidiary, not worthy of particular notice.

At any event, the Berliners came to enjoy the privilege of representing the citizens of the empire as a whole on festive occasions—the welcoming of the first Reichstag in 1871, the receptions for the numerous official visitors, the ceremonies surrounding the convocation of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, that great international conference which demonstrated that Bismarck had reached a peak of influence in Europe. There was more military pomp and circumstance in the Prussian residence city, too, and the citizens of Berlin were pleased by the new grandeur of their city.

Berlin had a population of 825,000 when it came to be the capital of the empire, but its municipal problems had become aggravated out of all proportion to the rise in the city's size. The blessing (or perhaps the curse) of billions in French reparations flowed in large part into Berlin, where for years, along with normal business expansion, speculation in real estate and construction accounted for a large part of the city's economic activity. Nevertheless, the rapid increase in population—between 1870 and 1880 Berlin grew by 60 per cent—produced a housing shortage so acute, and so unprecedented, that the city was unable to deal with it. After the municipal customs duties had been abolished and the economic boom began, many of the older buildings in the inner city (Berlin proper) were torn down in order to make room for the new business houses and for endless rows of barracks-like workers' flats with wretched little courts behind them. Berlin was bent upon separating itself from the pattern of its past and from its old memories, and in its eagerness to take the

plunge into its destiny as a world-city, it had no patience with moderation.

Administrative organization and municipal home rule were other problem areas. For two decades the city government had operated under the provisions of the Municipal Ordinance issued by the government of Prussia in 1853 for the eastern provinces. The Ordinance provided for a bi-cameral system in which every decision of the City Assembly required the concurrence of the City Council (Magistrat). Moreover, even such matters as the choice of the Chief Mayor required express confirmation by the authorities of the Prussian government. As a consequence, in conducting their affairs the city officials were of necessity guided not by their own opinions, but by an external authority. Even as much as two generations after the Stein Municipal Ordinance of 1808, the scope of self-government was largely restricted to the limited range of activity permitted by that decree. Other Prussian cities had progressed to a greater degree of self-government, but Berlin itself was generally quite satisfied to have the Prussian government perform—and finance—a great many tasks that are looked upon now as the normal province of any municipality.

From their offices in the new city hall that had been completed in 1870, the city authorities proposed as early as 1875 that Greater Berlin be constituted as a separate province in order to adjust its political administration to the realities of population distribution. Conservative circles in the Prussian government took this plan as an attempt to set up a city-republic and blocked it. Another cause of its defeat was the failure of the Berlin City Assembly to support its Chief Mayor, the principal advocate of the province proposal. The entirely uncoordinated complex of independent suburbs continued, therefore, to produce all the difficulties incident upon municipal fragmentation and rivalry, and, indeed, those grew worse with time.

Some progress, however, was made in expanding the functions of the municipal government. In 1875 the city was for the first time given real ownership of its public streets, together with the responsibility of maintaining them. Public welfare activities, with some exceptions, also came into the hands of the city, although the independence of the Berlin authorities in these matters was by no means complete at first. In education, substantial progress of benefit to all the inhabitants was made by the city

about this time, and the construction of city hospitals was undertaken, as well.

By strenuous effort, the new capital, which as late as 1860 had been occasionally described as dirty and unsanitary, was rapidly transformed into an extraordinarily clean city. Berliners still remember the great physician and liberal, Virchow, who for more than forty years was a member of the representative assembly and worked tirelessly for municipal development, and particularly for high standards of public sanitation.

When Berlin became the capital of the empire, Karl Seydel, Chief Mayor after 1862 and an energetic, resourceful man, still headed the city administration. Among his successors, Arthur Hobrecht, Max von Forkenbeck (long the President of the Prussian House of Representatives and of the Reichstag), and Martin Kirschner were the most distinguished. All these men were representatives of the liberal upper-middle class, which in the so-called classical period of German municipal self-government was predominant in city affairs throughout Germany. In this connection, it should be noted that under the "three-class" system of elections only about one-fifth of the population of Berlin at this time was eligible to vote. Furthermore, the less than 2000 voters who at the turn of the century comprised the first class had exactly the same weight in any election as the 336,000 voters of the third class.

As the largest industrial city, Berlin naturally became the center of the German labor movement. In 1868 a German workers' congress met in Berlin for the purpose of establishing a general trade union, and the city became the headquarters for many units in this organization. Lassalle made his first address to the workers in Berlin. While Saxony and Thuringia also played important roles in the rise of the Social Democratic Party, the total number of organized workers in Berlin was much greater than in any other city. Moreover, though the Socialist Law of 1878 required that the city assembly be "freed of socialists," by 1890 there were eleven Social Democratic assemblymen. Ever since the 1880's, in addition, the socialists were also very successful in the elections for the Berlin representatives to the Reichstag, particularly because in these contests universal and equal suffrage prevailed. With some exaggeration on both counts, therefore, it can be said of this period in

Berlin's political history that the city of Bismarck was also the city of Bebel.

Because the development of formal political institutions in both city and nation did not keep pace with economic progress and with changes in population concentration which resulted from it, there was a good deal of partly latent, partly open, tension among the great masses of workingmen gathered in Berlin. This tension at times extended into the politics of Prussia and of the empire as well. A housing program controlled exclusively by the profit motive led, as we have seen, to a barracks-like existence for the working people, and intensified the basic restlessness among them. It is worth noting that, even before 1900, Berlin's population density was six times greater than London's.

In 1861 the incorporation within the city of a few of the settlements to the north and south of it increased its area by two-thirds. The growth of the other suburbs, however, which soon expanded into an almost unbroken succession of settlements around the old city, proceeded so rapidly that the administrative difficulties due to municipal fragmentation were not noticeably relieved by the incorporation of 1861, and in fact became more serious as the years passed. Berlin was removed from the province Mark Brandenburg and given a special status in the Prussian system of local government under the Chief President (Oberpräsident) of Brandenburg, but the fact that countless communal boundaries cut up the area occupied by the city was not thereby altered. The unhealthy competition between local authorities continued and, what is worse, there were sharp differences in the economic and social conditions within the various independent communities. In 1890 there were already two million people living within the area of what was later Greater Berlin, and in 1910 some 3,730,000—which seems to justify references to the "American" nature of Berlin's expansion at this time. Berlin was the point of convergence for all the population growth trends in Germany and became for a period the most rapidly growing city in Europe.

That in the City Council of old Berlin special interests sometimes triumphed over general ones is indicated by the failure of this body in the early 1890's to approve a comprehensive incorporation of outlying areas—some poor and some wealthy—into the city, even though the Prussian

government at the time was willing to accept this expansion of municipal authority. The Council's rejection of the proposal was largely due to the influence of the Chief Mayor, and the opportunity was soon lost, for it was not long before the attitude of the Prussian government changed and it became energetically opposed to the creation of a single governmental area in Greater Berlin, believing that such a large, populous political unit would tend to acquire too much power and to become a stronghold of radical sentiment.

The uneven distribution of social responsibilities among the various communities rapidly became intolerable, as the barriers to the unified municipal action necessary to cope with the problem became more numerous and more formidable. Finally, in 1911 a compromise was reached which resulted in the establishment of a "functional union" in Berlin and the region surrounding it. To this functional union was assigned the responsibility for certain housing and transportation problems. From the outset, however, it was clear that the union was a partial and inadequate solution.

For all this, there were benefits, of course. Particularly notable were the new facilities for internal transit. The interurban railroad (Stadtbahn), bisecting the city on an east-west axis, was put into operation in 1882—an accomplishment much more impressive to contemporary eyes than to our own. The military value of the system encouraged the government of Prussia to participate in the enterprise through a ministerial military and construction commission which administered other construction projects of similar interest to the state in Berlin.

The surface streetcars were finally electrified throughout the city at the turn of the century, and soon thereafter elevated and subway systems were also put into operation. Berlin had therefore acquired the external features of a metropolis. Looking back on these tasks of municipal development, it is a temptation, in the light of recent economic complications, to underestimate their magnitude. A fixed, secure budget seems in itself a major simplification of those tasks. The fact is, however, that the municipal achievements of the period before the First World War were the results of a tireless devotion to the public good. Relative financial stability contributed to the achievements, but it did not automatically produce them.

In some areas, in addition, Berlin did not keep pace with other European cities. Berlin's problems of municipal administration increased geometrically, rather than arithmetically, with every increase in Berlin's rapidly expanding population. And the "canalized" citizens of that giant metropolis required many more communal services than the citizens of smaller cities, which were growing in a somewhat more leisurely fashion. About 1910, the city budget of three hundred million marks was already larger than the budgets of most of the states in the empire.

Despite municipal problems, Berlin rose to such prominence among the cities of Germany that the Assembly of German cities (Städetag), which was founded in 1905, and the Assembly of Prussian Cities, founded ten years earlier, had their central offices jointly there. The Chief Mayor of Berlin was *ex officio* the permanent chairman of both these organizations. Now that the territorial limits of Berlin had been extended so far, possibilities of further growth seemed unlimited. Before 1914, estimates of its future occasionally went so far as to envisage a city, composed of endless rows of rental flats, containing twenty million inhabitants.

Soon after Berlin became the capital of the new empire, it rose to unrivaled economic leadership in Germany, because more financial power was concentrated in the city than anywhere else. At mid-century, Frankfurt on the Main had been the center of commercial and banking activity, but now this activity was concentrated in Berlin. It was the city on the Spree that profited the most of all the cities of Germany from the prosperity that followed the establishment of the empire. In the year 1872 alone, some 175 joint-stock companies were founded in Berlin. Factory installations circled the city on all sides except the south and the southwest. The names Borsig, Siemens and Schwartzkopff became known throughout the world. German business relations with foreign countries were directed more and more from Berlin, so that it became a center for international economic activity as well. Whatever provincial, small-town characteristics still remained disappeared rapidly. Berlin's economic life gave the city a profusion of energy, a tempo, which was thereafter to characterize it. Not only vagabonds streamed into the city from the German countryside, but also the alert and the

enterprising who were not afraid to take up the economic challenges of the time.

Berlin became a city of producers and consumers as well as of buyers and sellers (in the sense Max Weber later gave to this distinction), and both to a degree Germany has never known before. In the central section of the city, there occurred that kind of urban development which has come to be characteristic of the twentieth century. Business houses and government buildings crowded out most of the private dwellings. In four decades the "royal capital and residence city"—Berlin's official designation even after the establishment of the empire—had become a real metropolis.

But this transition did not necessarily mean that Berlin had achieved recognition as the cultural center of Germany. In spite of contributions in the theater, music, and painting, in spite of the literary authority of a few authors, in spite of the completion of the Berlin museums, this Athens-on-the-Spree was by no means the glass that drew to a focus all the rays of German aesthetic life. Even in the easiest and most obvious kind of development, such as the architecture of official buildings, Berlin was lacking. The new City of the Emperor did not develop a style that was any more graceful or dignified than the design of an electric power station, though there were a few isolated architectural achievements that were worth a look. Ostentation and overdecorated façades characterized the architectural bankruptcy of the age, which suffers severely in comparison with the period that produced a Langhans, Schinkel, Schadow, or Rauch. The building boom stripped the city of the architectural style that had been relatively consistent in previous years—and did not produce a new one.

Berliners themselves perhaps lacked the polish that goes with refined, developed aesthetics. The creative, the gracious, the contemplative, and the religious had at first no real home in this new Berlin. The court circle—the nobility and the officer corps—continued to set the tone in social affairs and fashion, but kept aloof from the deeper life of the emergent city. The traditional aristocratic exclusiveness, broken if at all only by the admission of leaders in business and science to aristocratic circles, was maintained as completely as possible. The "new German," all too brash and self-satisfied, the pretentiously arrogant

dandy, the bumptious upstart, were too often found, therefore, among the ordinary citizens of the city. All Berliners, of course, were not to blame. Nevertheless, the attitude of some of them worked out to the detriment of Berlin, especially in western and southern Germany, where it was thought that these attitudes were representative of the unattractive features of Prussianism.

On the other hand Berlin's distinction in the fields of scholarship and science was extraordinary. Its university ranked as the best in Germany, and through the years there was an unbroken succession of great names among its faculty. Friedrich Julius Stahl, Helmholtz and Mommsen, Schmoller and Robert Koch, Adolf Harnack and Ulrich von Wilamowitz deserve special mention. Perhaps at the head of this list, however, should be the famous liberal Rudolf von Gneist, professor of administrative law, who participated in the beginnings of the revolution of 1948 in Berlin and later served for many years as a member of the City Assembly, the Prussian House of Representatives and the Reichstag. His efforts in behalf of municipal self-government are particularly notable.

As early as 1890, the University of Berlin had 300 professors and almost 6000 students—approximately one-fifth of the total number of university students in Germany. Berlin's importance as a center of learning is apparent from the number of scholarly societies and scientific institutes that were established there, among which the Emperor William Society for Promotion of the Sciences (*Die Kaiser Willhelm Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften*), founded in 1911, was first in importance.

Insofar as Berlin was regarded with antipathy, scorn, or even hatred in the rest of Germany, these reactions were the result chiefly of political factors. In this respect, Berlin was no different from Paris, towards which all France felt a similar political aversion. With three parliamentary bodies meeting in the city—the Reichstag or National Assembly, the Landtag or Prussian State Assembly, and the City Assembly—and with the corresponding offices of the civil and military administrations located there also, Berlin after 1871 became in a remarkably short time the decisive arena in German politics. As early as 1882, it was asserted in the Prussian House of Representatives that the degree of centralization of civil authority present in Berlin was hardly desirable from the point of view of

the Prussian government, and that Berlin should not be allowed to become a kind of political Hydra. This criticism is eventually brought against all national capitals, which soon outgrow the characteristics they had as simple provincial centers, losing their national identity as they become cosmopolitan. The charges directed against Berlin from all parts of Germany, then and later, were based on the contentions that the city had not experienced a healthy, natural growth, that it lacked historical legitimization as the capital, and that, as a frontier city and an "East-Elbian Capital," it had no solid national tradition. This parvenu among capitals, it was said, encouraged the pernicious illusion of big-city grandeur, and glorified "efficient inefficiency," or bureaucratic busy-work. Its only criterion was quantity and it was "immoral to the core."

Many of these charges, which were repeated again and again with variations, and which made Berlin the most controversial capital in Europe, arose from an uneasiness traceable to the pure size of the giant city. Berlin had, after all, outgrown all Prussian or German standards of comparison. There was a constant failure to make any allowances for the legitimate pretensions which arose naturally out of the real importance of the city. And above all, there was an emotional reaction against the city as a new center of control, as the focal point of the image of empire created by Bismarck—an image which year by year drew more power to itself. To outsiders, at least, Berlin represented the less pleasant side of the new centralization and, as well, the unpopular aspects of Prussianism.

What is very odd, and most important, however, is that this Berlin was just as violently disliked by the Prussian conservatives. Its huge agglomeration of men and wealth was an unpredictable mass-phenomenon. Still worse, that great concentration showed signs of being progressive, and even radical. It was fear of Berlin that was at the root of Bismarck's anti-socialist law, which was renewed many times and for a decade after 1878 denied freedom of the press and of association to the Social Democrats (aided in this, of course, by the declaration of a "limited state of siege").

Even so, it was precisely in Berlin that the education of public opinion took place and the necessary groundwork was laid for the modern social welfare legislation in the empire in the 1880's. Bismarck, founder of the empire

and after 1871 an "honorary citizen" of Berlin, never became completely reconciled to the city politically. Even though he was to refer to himself as a "half-Berliner," it is quite possible that at one time he entertained the idea of removing the seat of government from Berlin.

It will never be known whether Emperor Frederick III, who reigned only a few months in 1888, would have introduced some of the liberalism of Berlin into the politics of Prussia and of the empire. His successor, William II, in clear contrast to his grandfather, the unpretentious William I, who was deeply respected by broad sections of Berlin's population, had little contact with the real life of the people of Berlin. William II, did, it is true, promise to make Berlin "the most beautiful city in the world," but, even from this point of view, was not able to achieve anything very striking.

In general, it was the foreign policy of the German Empire, rather than its internal politics, that brought the capital the kind of recognition which led people to refer to it as the "capital of Europe." The Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, where the foreign office was located, became famous throughout the world, first as a symbol of Bismarck's statesmanship, and later, during the chancellorships of Bülow and Bethmann-Hollweg, as the symbol of a trend leading to disaster.

As the principal city of the Central Powers during World War I, the German capital came inevitably into an even more commanding position. The organizations and administrative offices that sprang up on account of the war economy were legion, and they did turn Berlin into the long-feared Hydra. It was equally inevitable that, with its millions of inhabitants, Berlin would become the center of whatever distress befell the nation. It was no accident that the government of Berlin took the lead in perfecting rationing methods for bread and other foodstuffs. The knack of administrative improvisation played a large role in Berlin's success on this score, and a great part of the recognition which German cities later received for their achievements in economic organization rightly belonged to the capital.

Adolf Wermuth was the Chief Mayor after 1912, having come to the Berlin City Hall from a high position in the financial administration of the empire. He had a tremendous burden of work to carry, because in the last years

of the war Berlin was the first to face all those manifold tasks associated with maintaining the existence of a mass community in times of crisis. A great service was rendered by Berlin in those days, for its precedents and solutions were examples to the rest of Germany. The extent of the service was not recognized everywhere in Germany, but more and more, Berliners showed that behind the pretentiousness and brashness for which they had so often been criticized there was a solid capacity to see things through, to bear up under difficult conditions.

In the last year of the war, sporadic strikes occurred and a quasi-revolution against the imperial government began to take form, but this belongs historically to another epoch.

The German Republic was proclaimed in Berlin on November 9, 1918. The name which has usually been applied to it—and to the whole period in Germany history down to 1933—was derived from the central German city of Weimar. When the time came to summon a national assembly to draw up a new constitution for the Reich, over the protests of the Berlin city government it convened in Weimar, since revolutionary unrest and street fighting dominated the scene in Berlin. Since 1871 the conflict between Berlin and those old-Prussian conservative circles that for the most part controlled the politics of Prussia and the Reich had grown more and more lively. Less Prussianized than was generally assumed, the city quickly rejected whatever had been associated with the politics of imperial Germany. In Berlin the people rallied to the new political forces somewhat sooner than they did in other German cities, and they were later much criticized for their willingness to embrace the new political creeds. Wermuth, one of the few Chief Mayors in all of Germany who remained in office throughout the revolution, did much to preserve the continuity of the Berlin government but so identified himself with the "independent" Social Democrats in the City Assembly that he was on this account overthrown at the end of 1920.

The difficulties arising from the lack of a unified administration in Greater Berlin increased so much during the war that they became absolutely unbearable. The nec-

essary reforms, therefore, came very quickly in 1920. The administrative consolidation of Berlin, which had been described as "a pile of suburbs heaped on the core of a city," was at last effected. In all, one hundred villages, manorial estates, and metropolitan areas were removed from their administrative isolation and united. Some decentralization was, of course, not only allowable but necessary, and to achieve it the total area of the city was divided into twenty districts, each allowed a limited amount of self-government. Whereas the old city had contained 24 sq. mi., the area of the new Berlin was 340 sq. mi., compared with contemporary New York's 309 sq. mi., London's 116 sq. mi., and the 185 sq. mi. of Greater Paris (the Department of the Seine). A comparison such as this must be tempered, of course, by the reflection that the matter of incorporation is handled in different ways by different cities, and that the formal area of a city may undergo day-to-day alteration. However this may be, Greater Berlin, with a population of over four million, was now the third largest city in the world and the second largest in Europe. One-fifteenth of the population of Germany, in fact, lived in Berlin and the length of the city's boundary was 144 miles—relatively, a very large figure.

The new system of city government was not really very different from the one specified in the Prussian Municipal Ordinance of 1853, and the city administration remained under the supervision of provincial authorities who were not always progressive. Nevertheless, contrary to some opinion at the time, the municipal government functioned very well. The city had, after all, been impoverished by the war and in some respects had actually become quite backward, and the achievements of its government must be appraised in this light.

As soon as the administrative consolidation had been accomplished, there were heated charges that the city had extended its area too much, and that too much freedom of action was given to the administrative districts, which the central city administration looked upon as mere parade grounds for municipal politics. On the one side there was talk of the obstinate temper of the districts, while on the other there were complaints about the complexity of the gigantic central apparatus. The adjustments required by

the new set-up inspired a welter of demands for "reform" under the slogan "Away from Berlin."

But the substantial achievements of the government of Greater Berlin, even in the years of inflation, continuing political restlessness, extensive unemployment, and strikes, offer emphatic evidence that the new governmental structure, which would be taken as a model for the reconstruction after 1945, was not so bad after all. It is quite obvious that no startling progress in the performance of municipal services was possible in the years of economic distress right after the war. The real gains that were made after 1924-25 are, therefore, all the more remarkable. Advances in the area of housing, which at long last were inspired by a consciousness of social responsibilities, are especially noteworthy. More than 150,000 dwellings were built in Berlin before 1930, and this on the basis of city planning and architectural design that avoided the mistakes of the era of William II. The extensive housing developments, which appeared for the most part in the outskirts of the city, have remained models for decades. Likewise, the success of Berlin in the expansion of its school system set the pace for most of the rest of Germany. The city could also take pride in its generous provisions for athletic grounds, parks, and public bathing places, as well as in its efforts in the interest of public health and welfare.

In the field of public transportation, the extension of the subway system was a substantial undertaking; reconstruction of the harbors and construction of new power stations were carried forward simultaneously. Only the acquisition of rights of way in anticipation of the traffic of a distant future went somewhat beyond what was justifiable even in a time of economic optimism such as 1927 and 1928. The capital expenditures of Berlin were in fact so much increased by the major public projects the city undertook that a quite burdensome floating debt was acquired. The need to make up for lost time was obvious, and it is understandable that, especially in the center of the new democracy, there should be a determination to provide modern and magnificent solutions for the problems of the masses in a period of reasonable economic prosperity.

Unfortunately, the financial powers permitted to the cities under the state regulations in Germany after 1912-

20 were inadequate. The right to levy a supplementary tax on incomes, which the Prussian cities had formerly possessed, had been removed from them. This curb occurred at a time when the host of extraordinary difficulties arising directly from the war, and from the period of economic collapse which followed it, were falling with greatest impact upon the cities—and especially upon Berlin because of its great size. The Reich did not extend financial assistance to its capital in this emergency. Actually, Berlin was at a disadvantage on account of the vast amount of tax money that had to be collected within the city for the national government. During the Weimar period, neither the Reich nor Prussia succeeded in producing an even half-way satisfactory regulation of municipal financial affairs, and Berlin suffered from this situation perhaps the most of all the German cities.

The capital had only five short years to work out a reasonably systematic plan for its development. The year 1929, begun with high hopes for Berlin's future, brought the beginning of the great economic crisis. Although the statisticians gradually came to the conclusion that the growth of Berlin would slow up, over-optimistic observers still talked about a Great Berlin that one day would extend "in the east to Küstrin and in the west to Brandenburg"—a projection based, of course, upon the modern "green-belt" type of urban development.

The economic and political debacle after 1930 soon banished such visions. The political struggle between the extremist parties, now becoming ever more bitter, extended to the representative assemblies of the city as well as to the national legislative bodies, where for years the German Nationalists and the National Socialists on the one side, and the Communists on the other, had made constructive efforts the more difficult by their anti-republican demands and violent agitation. Gustav Böss, a liberal Democrat and former city treasurer, held the office of Chief Mayor after 1920. Now the cry of scandal, which the extremists transformed into a political weapon, was directed against him with full force. At the end of 1929 he had to retire because he had become indirectly involved in certain corrupt practices.

Following Böss's retirement, so many problems arose at one time that a general state of panic ensued. In part the scandals were manufactured and in part they were real,

but uniformly they were blown up out of all proportion by the enemies of democracy. The result was that after a time a great many people came to believe that democratic government as such was unable to function efficiently and unselfishly, and that in the city government a kind of "socialistic mismanagement" prevailed. It has been contended that petty politics in the city assemblies delivered the management of city affairs into inexperienced hands after 1920, and was to blame for the whole mess. The contention persists to the present time—but without any convincing proof.

Much more important were those genuine difficulties that arise in the administration of every metropolis, difficulties that were putting all the big cities of the world to a severe test at the very time. Much thought was given to a reduction in the number of administrative districts in Berlin, to the improvement of their integration with the central administration and to limitations upon partisan political conflict in the various municipal representative assemblies.

But the principal cause of the unfortunate situation was not to be found in these doings. The decisive factor in Berlin's internal crisis was the severe economic distress after 1930. The world-wide depression hit Germany and its capital, already burdened with reparations payments, particularly hard. By 1932, as a result, one-fourth of the city's inhabitants were on public relief. The number of unemployed who had to be cared for out of the city's welfare funds because their scheduled unemployment insurance payments had terminated increased steadily.

Because of the additional welfare burden, and because a number of the city's short-term obligations became due simultaneously, it was impossible to avoid a severe crisis in the city's finances. The upshot was that, like a great many other Prussian cities, Berlin was temporarily placed under the supervision of a state commissioner who took some steps in the field of finance with which the city officers were in disagreement—in part as a protest against the inadequacy of the provisions made by the Reich and the state of Prussia for the financial stability of the city. If it is true that municipal self-government had come to be equated with financial independence, then the Reich and the Prussian government showed in these years that they did not approve of the one any more than of the

other. Berlin, then, suffered the fate of city government as a whole in Germany. That more was made of what happened in Berlin is attributable only to the fact that the magnitude of the problems there led to greater distress. It was for this reason that the attention of the German public was concentrated on Berlin as a particularly terrifying example of the dangers of municipal autonomy. So great were the problems that even the sale of the Berlin Municipal Electric Company (BEWAG), which was undertaken in 1931 in order to avoid bankruptcy, did not provide the expected relief.

Berlin had to face all the problems of a welfare state and mass democracy quite alone. Even those who sympathized with democracy came to doubt that the affairs of so large a city could be conducted effectively in conformance to the traditional pattern of municipal self-government. In 1931, at about the same time that Heinrich Sahm, a conservative professional city manager, was installed as Chief Mayor, a limited constitutional reform was put through. The influence of the city representative assembly and the City Council was reduced, decision-making was placed in the hands of a new City Committee (which, together with the district councils, was allowed to meet in secret), and the Chief Mayor was given full power in many matters. It was thought that these changes would eliminate "politics" and strengthen the city government.

Like most emergency improvisations, this arrangement failed to bring about any real improvement, especially in the face of the continuing economic crisis. It would, however, be fairer not to judge the achievements of the city government in Berlin in the period after the First World War entirely on the basis of the abnormal situation before 1924 and after 1929, and particularly not by this final debacle, but rather on the basis of what was accomplished between 1924 and 1929. In 1933—to the infinite consternation of the critics of democratic Berlin—what the city had to expect at the hands of the new masters of Germany was to appear all too forcefully: everything from the political exploitation of the tragic burning of the Reichstag building to the dismissal and arrest of high-ranking officials and employees of the city government.

In perspective, although the economy of Berlin had exhibited all the signs of complete collapse at the end of the

war in 1918, it recovered quickly and reached a new high in the good years after 1924. Berlin became in this period more than ever the economic capital of the country. The concentration of business establishments in the city increased; characteristically metropolitan office buildings, some in the new "Bauhaus" style, and modern factory installations sprang up. At this time, 41 per cent of the German electrical industry, about one-fourth of the stock companies, and 11 per cent of all German business firms were located in Berlin.

The accomplishments of the municipal public services were impressive, despite contemporary criticism. The city transportation system and the public utilities served the population efficiently and relatively economically. The equipment these enterprises employed was the finest of the day, and much of it set international standards. The influence of Ernst Reuter as an administrative officer in the city government at that time will be long remembered, chiefly because he created a unified organization for the management of all the city transportation services. The transportation unification was taken by some as evidence of socialist influence in favor of limitless expansion of municipal economic activity. Though it is true that at times during the economic crisis the city used income from its own municipal enterprises rather than levy new taxes, the extreme, parochial socialist position never guided the municipal government. If the city sank into serious economic difficulties, in 1930 there was simply no way to prevent the economy of Berlin—where even in years of prosperity there was always an extraordinarily large number of unemployed—from being drawn immediately into the vortex of the crisis.

In that postwar period of which we have been speaking, Berlin again had to put up with extremely vehement though quite contradictory criticisms. The giant metropolis, now as large as the Ruhr area, with boundaries extending ever farther into the province of Brandenburg, seemed somehow sinister to those who did not live there. The really hectic and ruthless mood of Berlin's growth, the skeptical rather than enthusiastic attitude of its people, their tendency to irony and negative criticism—actually, it was as often as not directed at themselves and their own city—and the cool, detached big-city atmosphere made it difficult for outsiders to muster any real

affection for Berlin. Even before 1914, a Berlin mayor, George Reicke, who was also a well-known author, had cried out, "Berlin is not loved enough!" Now it seemed really to be the most "unloved" city in Germany.

Frequently, for instance, the "night-life" and the most unattractive features of the amusement district were taken as characteristic of the city as a whole. It was even charged that the motto of the city was "the materialization of the human spirit according to the theories of Ford and Lenin." In spite of their genuine humor, the drawings of Heinrich Zille, that great caricaturist of the "fifth estate," the Berlin slums, appeared to many observers to typify all that was evil and unattractive in Berlin. The hostility and suspicion with which Berlin was regarded in the first decades after the founding of the empire had changed somewhat in form, but had perhaps become even more intense. Especially in aesthetics, everything that came out of the city was looked upon as "democratic," "socialistic," and "left-wing," and these for many of the Germans of the time were derogatory epithets. There was scarcely any appreciation of the positive characteristics of the city and its people—their generosity, for instance, their energy and progressiveness, and their remarkable capacity to assimilate people of differing social and geographical origins. There was, above all, no comprehension that Berlin might produce a kind of catalytic disturbance in the clockwork that was Germany—a role that the country could ill afford to dispense with.

Despite this lack of sympathy, Berlin did retain and even enhance its earlier position as an intellectual and cultural center. It was the proving-ground for many new movements in the creative arts. In the period after 1919, some fifty theaters played constantly, though the great volume of the offerings as well as the unrest of the time prevented full recognition of what was achieved in this field. Only after the glorious period of Max Reinhardt and Leopold Jessner was long past did people realize that nothing quite equal to it existed any more in the Berlin theater. Max Liebermann and Käthe Kollwitz were at that time members of a committee of the City Assembly which was authorized to purchase works of art for the city museums. Connoisseurs still recall the musical life in the Berlin of the twenties with enthusiasm. The university, the school of engineering, and innumerable

other institutions for special artistic or professional education compared favorably with those to be found in other German cities. The Berlin press, which could boast of a membership of more than a hundred newspapers, including those published in the suburbs, exerted a great influence in Germany, and the leading papers were for the most part liberal or "leftist." There was really nothing at all provincial in the life of this city and, what was of great significance, very little that was Prussian, either.

In Germany, generally, these two facets of the city's character were rather reluctantly admitted and a certain preëminence was conceded to the city on the Spree. Of course, uncontested leadership in the cultural affairs of the Reich was never conceded to its capital, at least by the south and the west. This may have been just as well, as far as the development of culture in the nation as a whole is concerned. Nevertheless, the calumnies directed against Berlin, in part before 1933 but more particularly under the rule of the National Socialists, as a center of "disruptive elements," the slanders charging that in the city forces of disintegration and "foreign poisons" were at work, that its immorality compelled it to a "dance of death," are hardly worth, of refutation. Whatever the contemporary evaluation may have been, history has for the cultural achievements of the Berlin of the twenties a high regard.

Politically, the capital of Germany after 1918 had to put up with being branded "the Red Berlin." This epithet summed up the antipathy of many Germans not only for the Communists and Social Democrats, but also for emergent democracy and "party politics" in general. The Berlin of the period after the war had, indeed, become predominantly republican, and it was not altogether wrong that it came in the course of time simply to be regarded as identical with the democratic republic—with the "system," as its enemies called it. The *Putsch* attempted by the East Prussian General Kapp ran aground largely because of the general strike called in Berlin. Communist revolutionary uprisings found no widespread response in the city, either. But the republican steadfastness of Berlin did not receive blanket approval in Germany as a whole. A typical reaction to the politics of the city is the resolution passed in 1921 by representatives of the greater number of German city officials, seeking to alter the automatic

choice of the Chief Mayor of Berlin as the permanent chairman of the Assembly of German Cities. (Of course, it is also notable that this resolution was never put into effect.)

There is no doubt that Berlin did substantially buttress its position of leadership in Germany after 1919. In contrast to the situation that existed in the early decades of the Hohenzollern empire, by the end of the Weimar period it had become impossible to think of a Germany without Berlin. The mere fact that this city was the seat of the parliament, of the principal ministries, of the central offices of the political parties, and of various economic organizations as well, was in itself sufficient to make Berlin the political, social, and cultural arena of the democratic and increasingly centralized state.

For this very reason Berlin had to accept as directed against itself the mounting antipathy towards the party politics associated with democracy. It is the fate of the genuine capital to experience the good and also the evil days of the state with particular intensity; thus all the political difficulties of the "unloved" Weimar Republic were most acute in Berlin. When anyone inquires who it was that really defended the democratic state in those days, it must not be forgotten that the chief opponent of the growing National Socialist Party was the Berlin police! The dispatches of Joseph Goebbels vibrated with his rage over the intolerable difficulties that he encountered as the ringleader of Hitler's gang in his repeated attempts to get control of Berlin. National Socialism was "hammered into" and "forced upon" the Berliners; and at last Goebbels was forced to overpower this "giant city of millions" with "streams of blood and tears." So wrote Herr Goebbels later in self-glorification. In so doing, he inadvertently gave powerful testimony to the republicanism of Berlin.

With the cry, "Who has Berlin, has the Reich," the National Socialists set themselves to the task of becoming masters of the "monster city." When they finally succeeded, it was through the power they had gained in national politics. In the Berlin city elections of March, 1933, only 86 National Socialists were elected to the City Assembly that had 222 members, among them a particularly large number of Communists. After this, it is understandable that the National Socialists not only slandered Berlin more than ever, but tried to make it appear that their "January revolution" constituted a decisive turning point in the his-

tory of the city, that now a new Berlin with enthusiasm for the cause of National Socialism had come into existence.

In the practical administration of the city, the seizure of power does not appear to have been such a glorious affair after all. It was necessary in March, 1933, to install a "state commissioner for special purposes," who at once became the man with the power to make decisions in the place of the Chief Mayor, and with the commissioner's help the city was finally forced to accept the new political leadership. For more than a decade afterwards, Berlin enjoyed no municipal autonomy at all. Whatever policies the city was allowed to pursue were expressly "derived from the leadership of the state," as it was put. This seizure by the Reich of complete control over its capital in the interest of the dictatorship was by no means clandestine—it was openly defended by the arguments of power politics.

It is not to be denied that with the gradual improvement of economic conditions, the increasing effectiveness of political repression, and the elimination of opposition, a quiet and an order such as had been unknown in the years of economic and political crisis returned to the capital, as well as to the other parts of the country. Measures designed to increase employment and social welfare, borne along from the outset by an exaggerated emphasis upon the concept of national unity, characterized the first years. From 1935 through 1937, the years in which the National Socialists still were proclaiming their love of peace and the Germans were beginning to adjust themselves to a regime which seemed to be achieving stability, the capital of the Reich presented the appearance of a well-ordered and healthy community—and this, indeed, was the impression many foreign visitors received as well. But the political sterility and the artificiality of the quiet became more apparent as Berlin year by year came to be the chief stage for the increasingly frenzied official demonstrations of the National Socialists, and the chief object of their increasingly brutal policies.

Despite its importance as a center of what we might call commercial politics, step by step the capital of the Reich lost its cosmopolitan character. In addition, the administrative reorganization imposed upon Berlin by the new rulers was uncertain and unclear because the National Socialists were entirely without any experience or background in municipal affairs and self-government. By creating a large number

of state commissioners, they attempted at first to distribute functions among the Reich authorities, the state, the Party and the city, at least provisionally, but withal to increase the National Socialist influence. And of course, even at this time, they discarded the elected representative bodies, at district- as well as city-level.

Later, however, the formal pretense of a dualism between the state supervisory authorities and the city administrative agencies was terminated. In the place of the German Municipal Ordinance of 1935, which was uniform for other cities but was not fully applicable to Berlin, a special law altering the constitution and administration of the capital was promulgated in 1936. Under this law, the Chief Mayor was made at the same time City President, and as such an official of the state. Without realizing how reactionary this alteration was, the National Socialists revived a situation that had existed at the height of the absolutism of the eighteenth century, when there had also been a City President who was an official of the Prussian state. Under additional provisions of the law, aldermen (*Ratsherren*) were resurrected from the late middle ages, becoming under the new regime members of advisory bodies attached to the central and district administrations as a bit of window-dressing. The "harmony with the leadership of the state" that dictators always insist on was ensured—as in all the other German cities—by giving to a "Deputy of the NSDAP" a large voice in municipal government. In Berlin this personage was none other than the "Gauleiter" and Reich Minister for Propaganda, Herr Joseph Goebbels. Chief Mayor Sahm remained in his down-graded position until the end of 1935, but discovered more and more every month how little he could do about the plans of the National Socialists. In any case, the people of Berlin were paying little attention to this municipal tug-of-war, knowing very well—regardless of what the forms were and who were the personalities—who it was that really governed the city.

Nevertheless, the undeniable organizational achievements—the expositions, the various assemblies and celebrations, and particularly the Olympic Games of 1936—did not fail to make an impression both at home and abroad. Furthermore, a grandiose building program for the city was announced. "Thank the Führer that we build here!" was the propaganda slogan adorning the scaffolding

even of private buildings. In 1937, a general building inspector was named and the transformation of Berlin into the show-place of the Third Reich was inaugurated with great fanfare. On account of the war, this development program was never carried any further than the erection of a few buildings and the hasty preparation of a few blueprints. What did come to completion was said to exhibit "a sound feeling for style," but in reality was so huge and ostentatious that its kinship with the architectural tastes of Mussolini's Italy and Stalin's Soviet Union could scarcely be concealed. There were a few impressive achievements, such as the Olympic Stadium, the superhighway extension which enlarged the road-circle around Berlin, Tempelhof Airport, and the East-West thoroughway for intracity traffic. Achievements in construction of private dwellings and in most of the other areas of city planning and private development, however, fell off considerably in comparison with the period before 1930.

After 1939 the efforts of Berlin were more and more directed into programs made necessary by the war. A host of special authorities and countless interventions by the state made the city's administrative organization ever more complex, so that in the end the administration of Berlin could very well be spoken of as organized chaos. The climax was reached when, in the spring of 1944, Joseph Goebbels was made City President as well as party deputy for the city, and was thereby charged with the entire responsibility of directing the city administration.

At about the middle of World War II, the population of Berlin reached some four and one-half million—the largest figure it ever attained. In the preceding decade, however, growth had been slow, and subsequently, the bombardment from the air and the storming of the city by Soviet troops reduced many parts to rubble and ashes.

Despite all their success in the niceties of political contrivance, the National Socialists never were able to make Berlin in any genuine sense their capital. The countless mass parades and torchlight processions, the constant cries for military and political discipline, and the ever more penetrating efforts to achieve uniformity, in the long run failed to impress the Berliner, who is fundamentally averse to pompous exuberance. At least in whispers, the man in the street reacted with biting sarcasm to the abuses of the overbearing and applause-hungry National Socialist gov-

ernment. As little as the stage-property pasteboard columns that were used to decorate Unter den Linden at the time of every Third Reich festival belonged to Berlin, just so little did the fanatical National Socialist regime really represent the people of Berlin, though the Party did have a considerable number of adherents among them. Those who know Berlin felt all along that National Socialism remained something imposed from the outside as far as this city was concerned. The cult of Germanism and extreme anti-Semitism simply could not find the response in a cosmopolitan city that those who exercised the power wished. Even a chronicle of the capital for the years 1936 and 1937 written by a historian chosen especially because of his loyalty to the party had to refer to events in the Reich as a whole in order to bring those which took place in Berlin into any kind of close connection with National Socialism.

There were some cultural achievements in the city even in the thirties. One may well be at a loss to know to what to attribute these achievements, but the official version was that art, literature, the theater, and the cinema were now "rescued from fragmentation and filled with the spirit of unity," that all these modes of expression no longer served as the "playground of diseased minds" and had found at last their roots "in German blood and German spirit."

As time went on, the Berlin press was completely "coordinated," and the atmosphere of the city became gradually narrower and unnatural. It was inevitable that, in such a highly centralized regime as the Hitler state, the capital city was even more than before the center of attention—here being regarded with fear and hate, there with hope. So, for instance, Prince Albert Street became infamous as the location of the chief security office of the Reich, the central administration of the Secret State Police (Gestapo). The harangues of thousands of National Socialist puppets, who, under the direction of Joseph Goebbels, by 1943 were still demanding total war, were carried by radio far and wide, giving to Berlin's Sports Palace, where they originated, a large if questionable political fame. On the other side of the picture, the central planning for the resistance attempted on July 20, 1944, took place at the headquarters of the army high command in Bendler Street. In the Berlin prison on Plötzen Lake many of Hitler's

opponents were murdered, and still more in the concentration camp in the northerly suburb, Sachsenhausen, where a few months before the end of the war Fritz Elsas, Mayor of Berlin from 1931 to 1933, was executed. It was in Berlin, also, in one of those macabre episodes so characteristic of the last days of National Socialism, that Goebbels, not long before the entrance of Soviet troops into the city, made a major address in connection with an order announcing a competition for the design of the future capital city that was to have ten million inhabitants. Even as he spoke, Berlin stood on the threshold of the most difficult period of its history.

VI

When the battered city set itself to the task of reconstruction, at first under Soviet and then under Four Power occupation, nearly half its buildings were destroyed or badly damaged, and its population had been reduced by more than a third. Berlin had been at the center of the outrageous political regime of Hitler; now it had to bear a large share of the suffering which resulted from that regime.

For three-quarters of a century Berlin had been the capital of the German Reich. Even now people continued to refer to it as the "capital of Germany," though the headquarters of the new supra-regional authority for the three western zones, set up by the occupying powers in order to provide a counterbalance to Soviet politics of aggrandizement and later taken over by the civil powers, was established first in Hamburg and Frankfurt on the Main, and then in Bonn. The only central offices left in Berlin were those administering affairs in the area under Soviet control.

When Berlin was divided into "sectors" for purposes of occupation, the old center of the city had been assigned to the eastern sector, which, with 155 sq. mi. and 1.1 million inhabitants, was under Soviet occupation; the three western sectors comprised the remaining 185 sq. mi. with 2.2 million inhabitants. The Brandenburg Gate, Berlin's traditional landmark, situated now on the border between the eastern sector and West Berlin, became year by year the symbol of the distress of divided Berlin and divided Germany. Soviet policy forced Berlin to exchange its historic function as a bridge between East and West

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for a new posture of defense. The state of Prussia had disappeared, the German Reich was without power to act. In spite of its earlier vindication as the capital, Berlin—since 1949 represented by West Berlin—once again has had to defend its role as the capital of the whole of Germany.

In material things Berlin has certainly suffered irretrievable losses; politically its fate is even more severe. It has had to adjust to its situation as an island 100 miles from the borders of the emerging German Federal Republic. It has had to struggle constantly for the very means of its existence and the preservation of its political freedom in the face of Communist attacks. But it is precisely in this most difficult period that the city has won that undivided recognition throughout all Germany that it strove for in vain as the capital of the Reich for the seventy-five years after 1871.

The Splitting of Berlin in 1948

HANS HERZFELD

THE SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF BERLIN since 1945 are inextricably interwoven with the general history of the period after World War II—with developments in Germany, in Europe, and in the world at large. Berlin became the capital of the Bismarckian empire late in the nineteenth century, without the benefit of a long historical tradition. Even in Germany itself, Berlin's new role did not go unquestioned. In periods of great catastrophe, in 1918 and again in 1945, Berlin, the capital, came to be the object of vehement controversy within its own nation. Nevertheless, in the decade after 1945, this "interned capital" became so quickly and so decisively the crux of the great questions of Germany's fate that few capital cities of modern history have emerged so starkly as the symbol of a nation's assertion of its right to exist.

Months before the beginning of the blockade in June, 1948, General Lucius D. Clay, the American Military Governor in Germany, had formulated in classic terms the grounds which made it impossible for the West to surrender its already bitterly contested position in the German capital. This he did at the moment in which he came to realize that a head-on collision with Russian policy in the struggle over Berlin was unavoidable. That was the moment in which the Prague *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia had exposed the ultimate purposes and the total dimensions of the Russian methods. At the same time, Finland appeared to be acutely threatened and endangered through Russian policy. In France and in Italy the issue of the participation of the Communist parties in the govern-

ments of these Western European states had not yet reached the point of final settlement. It was, then, a moment in which the fate of all Europe hung in the balance.

At this moment, General Clay, in a message to Washington on April 16, 1948, summarized the reasons why he believed it necessary that the United States should refuse to surrender its Berlin position. Even now, his words epitomize the historical significance of the topic of our discussion:

We have lost Czechoslovakia, Norway is threatened. We retreat from Berlin. When Berlin falls, western Germany will be next. If we mean . . . to hold Europe against Communism, we must not budge. We can take humiliation and pressure short of war in Berlin without losing face. If we withdraw, our position in Europe is threatened. If America does not understand this now, does not know that the issue is cast, then it never will and communism will run rampant. I believe that the future of democracy requires us to stay. . . .

Perhaps no one can appreciate today the full historical significance of this decision, made only three years after capitulation was forced upon Germany by the entire world. To the United States this decision meant the resolve to place itself at the head of a Western European coalition that was yet to be built, and thereby to take upon itself a policy of calculated risk of the highest degree—for its material posture in power politics was weaker than we can today appreciate.

It is true that the United States, in the sea power that had conquered Japan, and in the air power that stood ready to exploit a still existing monopoly in atomic weapons, might have felt itself somewhat superior. What these elements of superiority amounted to in the estimation of the Russian opponents we cannot say, but it can too easily be forgotten that the American land forces, after the abrupt demobilization in the years after 1945, had at this time a total strength of only 242,000 men. Of these, because of the deployment of occupation troops all over the world, only 155,000 were available in the continental United States. The hard military realities were, therefore, extremely grave. If it had come to an actual military encounter—and no one could exclude the possibility of such a conflict when the decision to withstand the blockade and to build up the

airlift was taken—the United States would have had only one division ready for duty in Europe.

One must also keep in mind the local military situation. At the height of the controversies of 1947, the Russians themselves had pointed out that they had 300,000 men in the Soviet Zone of Germany. According to their own assertion, they would have been able to put 100,000 from this source alone in action to hold Berlin. In the Russian-occupied eastern sector of Berlin, there were 18,000 Russian troops, whereas up against these there was only a handful of about 3000 American, 2000 British and 1500 French soldiers, as a token protection for West Berlin.

Directing American foreign policy at that time was Secretary of State George Marshall, himself an outstanding professional soldier. He characterized the situation succinctly when he said in one of the secret discussions of the matter in Washington that the difficulty of the Berlin situation was that "we are playing with fire when we have nothing at all to put it out with."

Only in the light of these considerations can one understand the full significance of the decision that President Truman had to make between June 24 and 26, 1948, on his own personal responsibility as Chief of State. It was on June 26 that he declared at a meeting of the American National Security Council that the assumption on which Council discussions would be based was "that we must remain in Berlin; we have only to discuss the ways and means through which this purpose can be accomplished."

It is no accident, then, that American memoir literature discloses that the American diplomats who returned from Europe in the ensuing weeks were of the overwhelming opinion that what was being pursued was a policy of bluff that could only be sustained for a short period—perhaps eight weeks, perhaps three months. In their view, the Berlin operation was an experiment, which the United States should be prepared to bring to an end at the proper time.

Even the American Ambassador to Moscow, General Bedell Smith—the former chief of staff of General Eisenhower, a diplomat, and also a professional soldier of first rank—as late as September, 1948, as it gradually became apparent that a Russian retreat in the contest over the blockade wasn't impossible, had reservations. He represented the cautiously formulated opinion that, even if the

calculated risk of the airlift came out well, Berlin would continue to be a burden and a liability. A sober and realistic American policy could not unconditionally reckon that that burden could be sustained indefinitely.

Had not Ernst Reuter shown sufficient resolution in spring, 1948, to declare that the Berlin population must and would pledge its very existence on the preservation of its freedom and that it had no choice but to accept this challenge, even alone if necessary, the decision of Washington to undertake a struggle for Berlin of unpredictable magnitude would possibly not have been made at all—or held to with the same determination. It was this attitude and this behavior of the people of Berlin, which characterized them from the outset, that decisively strengthened the conviction of the United States that, in case of retreat, the military surrender of Europe would have been made the more embarrassing by the moral ignominy of having deserted a people who, in the American opinion, were “astonishingly courageous.”

II

There have been few instances in history in which the intermingling of moral and material factors in a developing historical situation, and the effect of these factors on critical decisions, can so clearly be seen. There are, however, two considerations which somewhat temper the apparent inevitability of the process and are essential to a correct understanding of it. First, progress towards an alliance of the Western Powers with Germany—towards the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949 and the establishment of NATO—was not simple and direct. Second, the Berlin situation in the years immediately following the catastrophe of National Socialism was not at all characterized by the German population and the Western occupation forces' falling at once into each other's arms, nor was there any sudden conviction that the two groups were destined henceforth to mutual harmony and cooperation in the common crisis.

Historians have in some instances erred in neglecting these two considerations. A rather cocksure Englishman who wrote of the beginnings of the occupation regime in Germany and Austria, Michael Balfour, ventured to stage epigrammatically the obviously questionable opinion that

after the First World War conquered Germany had to create sympathy for itself in the outside world by conscious effort, while after the Second World War the conquerors from the East and from the West had to compete for German support.

This kind of thing is often asserted, but it must be accepted with scrupulous chronological and factual qualifications, if it is found to contain any truth at all. What we may call the formal decencies of solemn alliance required that at least the appearance of unity among the conquerors should not be prematurely abandoned. Consequently, right up to the final break between East and West, the Allies zealously concealed their fundamental differences from the Germans, and with considerable success. An experience of Ernst Reuter's in 1947 may illustrate this point. He was trying to make it clear to a high official at the Allied command, a French officer, that the international situation was developing in such a way that the West would be forced to enter into economic competition with the East precisely in Berlin. The answer was a clear-cut warning that he had overstepped the bounds that were not to be crossed even in conversation: "I am not of the opinion that we should enter into a competition with the Soviet Union for your sake."

It is true that the common front which later developed between conqueror and conquered was indeed prepared in Berlin. The relaxation took place, however, first of all at the level of the younger officials and employees of the German government and the American and English commands, who were joined by some of the younger and more receptive journalists. At this level the restriction of communication began to break up much earlier than at high-command levels. Until late in 1947, however, it is possible that a great deal more might have been learned from the records of the Inter-allied Kommandatura than was made accessible to the public at large. It was only the absolutely compelling nature of the situation that forced the Western powers, beginning with the United States and Great Britain, to abandon the outward reserve they had so long and tenaciously held to—an attitude, incidentally, which was in sharp contrast to the efforts of the Russians to influence the Germans by means of propaganda.

In the area of mass media, the victors had originally

established a common policy. The Berlin press had at first been required to present without comment news concerning the actions taken by the Allied governments and developments in international politics, and to limit its criticism to matters of German internal policy. Under no circumstances were its critical appraisals to be extended to themes which might be detrimental to the Allied military government or to democracy—a formula that was obviously fraught with danger in view of the differences in the interpretation of democracy between the East and the West. The radio and press of East Berlin—specifically, the Deutschland Sender and the portion of the press that was dependent upon the Russians—took over so readily the jargon and slogans about the imperialism and monopoly capitalism of the West that in 1947 the American command was forced to set up a system of counter-propaganda in defense. It was, however, expressly emphasized that the purpose of this counter-propaganda was not to recommend the American system to the Germans for imitation, but merely to refute the insulting charges hurled against the West as a result of Russian agitation. General Hays, Clay's deputy, realized that the psychological war of the Russians against their own allies was being carried on by the same methods the Nazis used in World War II, and the common front of the victor powers was, in consequence, first abandoned over the issue of propaganda versus communication in the agencies of public information.

It must also be borne in mind that there was at the outset no attempt on the part of the people of Berlin or of their political parties to play the Russians off against the Western Allies. In spite of the terrible experiences of the conquest of Berlin, all political circles in Berlin were at first sincerely resolved to find the way to an understanding with the great Eastern victor over National Socialism as well as with the Western powers, however difficult this understanding might be to achieve.

That such a resolve did exist is apparent again and again in the history of the political parties in Berlin from 1945 to 1948.* The Social Democratic Party (SPD) as a

* The political parties authorized by the Soviet military administration in June, 1945, were the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union

whole—in accord with its tradition—held firmly to the idea of a unified working class in Germany, the indispensability of which had so recently been impressed upon it by the National Socialist persecution. It was forced to become the first party to offer resistance to the Russian policy by the poorly veiled attempt during the spring of 1946 to force it into the German Socialist Unity Party (SED). The leaders of the bourgeois parties were also cooperative with the Russian occupation authorities so long and so far as cooperation was at all possible, because they feared that any other attitude would aggravate the division of Germany and would make the separation of West Berlin from East Berlin and the Soviet Zone unavoidable. The policies of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as well, were up to the end of 1947 determined wholly by the desire to prevent a radical split between East and West in German party politics not only in Berlin but in the country at large. In accordance with the Temporary Berlin Constitution of 1946, the City Assembly of October, 1946—the first and last freely elected representative body of the entire citizenry of Berlin—was compelled to form a coalition government which included the Socialist Unity Party despite its decisive defeat in the elections. Those who are familiar with the details of the course of events know that even after 1946 every effort was made to prevent the deterioration of the cooperation with the SED, at least in limited areas such as school policy and socialization objectives. Despite the firmness of their defensive position, the Social Democrats were again and again the source of these efforts.

The political leadership of the CDU, with its Christian-socialist tendencies under Jakob Kaiser, attempted up to the end of 1947—and one can say to the outward limits of the

(CDU), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LPD). In April, 1946, in spite of an unfavorable referendum among the members of the SPD in Berlin, the KPD and the SPD were merged in the Soviet Zone to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The SED was then recognized by the Soviet military government as the only authorized socialist party in the Soviet Zone. It was also authorized as a party by the *Kommandatura* in Berlin, but there it had to compete with the SPD. In the municipal election of October 26, 1946, the SPD polled 48.7 per cent of the vote, the CDU 22.2 per cent, the SED 19.8 per cent, and the LPD 9.3 per cent. The SPD led all other parties in all districts of the city, including those in the Soviet Sector.

possible—to stem the tide towards the dismemberment of Germany. It was only at the end of that year, when its executive committee was for the second time dismissed, that the leaders of the CDU—and thereupon those of the Berlin LPD as well—felt themselves compelled against their deepest inclinations to sever their party organizations in West Berlin from the party organizations in the Soviet Zone, which were quite large in both cases at that time. In none of these issues was the initiative taken on the West Berlin side; the course of events was, on the contrary, dictated by the determination of the Russians to establish and maintain their influence in the entire city of Berlin as exclusively as it had already been established in the Soviet Zone.

In the relationships among the victor powers, the controlling factor was that the Russians arrived on the scene first, and had had more than three months, from May to August, 1945, to establish the foundation for their influence in all parts of Berlin. They set up the first civil authority, they specified the form of organization of the city administration, and they exercised influence in the establishment of the political parties, which they licensed. It was a fact of great importance that every one of these parties was compelled by the sharpest kind of pressure to locate its headquarters in the Eastern sector. The same kind of maneuvering was systematically applied to the Berlin press. The creation of a network of confidential agents by means of a renewal of the National Socialist system of block- and house-spies was another precautionary measure which assured the Russians a method for the exertion of influence.

The Western powers had the greatest difficulty in combatting the consequences of these initial Russian measures, even in matters in which, in the name of genuine democracy, they began very soon after their arrival on the scene to counter the established Russian policies. At the beginning of the Four Power administration of Berlin, the Allies had recognized the continuing legal validity of the organizations and regulations which had been established by the Russians. Thereafter, being in possession of the veto-power which was the basic assumption of all the agreements that described the authority of the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin as well as the authority of the Control Council for Germany, Russia could make the re-

peal of any established practice at least the subject of a protracted struggle.*

Even in the drafting of the Temporary Constitution of 1946, though the Western powers made strenuous opposition to Russian demands, they were finally persuaded to include a fateful "rubber clause." According to this article, not only the choice of the Chief Mayor and the city councilors, but the appointment and dismissal of all "leading officials" of the city administration, had to receive the approval of the Kommandatura. The Russians were thereby enabled to extend their own conception of "leading officials" to every branch of the administration of the city. As a result, they were in a position to make an issue of every personnel action and thus to obstruct indefinitely the development and operation of the civil government in the city.

The classic case in this "struggle of the veto" was the Russian opposition against the choice of Ernst Reuter as Chief Mayor. Although the Western powers protested from the outset against this arbitrary action, it prevented the people of Berlin, right up to the beginning of the blockade in 1948, from being led, even in their external affairs, by a man in whom they really had confidence. Even the Allied Control Council had to submit to the obstinacy with which the Russians maintained their opposition in this instance.

Thanks to this position of power, which was impregnable by any means short of armed conflict, the Russian occupation authorities systematically excluded their allies from any influence at all in the Eastern sector of the city, while, by means of their veto-power, they clung tenaciously to every position of advantage which they had established in the Western sectors in 1945. The continuation of this situation could only result in the capitulation of the Western powers, the surrender of all of Berlin to the Russians and the eventual absorption of the entire city into the Soviet Occupation Zone—or if the Western powers offered any resistance, in the splitting of the capital city. Both of these solutions stood in irreconcilable contradiction to the spirit and the letter of the agreements made at the end of the war. Nevertheless, the politics of schism spread gradually to all phases of life in Berlin.

* For a description of the nature and responsibilities of the Allied Kommandatura and the Control Council for Germany, see pp. 71-79.

In this local "cold war," which set in long before the cold war in world politics became apparent, the Russians exploited most relentlessly and unscrupulously the economic weapons at their disposal. Here, without a doubt, they had the advantage, because the city of Berlin was entirely surrounded by their occupation zone. The very fact that each occupying power had to feed and otherwise supply its own sector put that power which had the hinterland of the Eastern zone at its disposal at a great advantage over the others in Berlin and elsewhere; on the other hand, a power with a quite limited and economically not self-sufficient zone—as was the case with France, for instance—was put in an undeniably difficult position, and indeed in an almost insupportable one.

The Russians could make the normal dependence of Berlin upon deliveries of foodstuffs from the surrounding region an instrument of pressure, a lever, in an interminable "carrot-and-whip" policy. Since the Russians made the delivery of potatoes and grains, the provision of fruit and vegetables, indeed even the supplying of milk for children, a tool in the political struggle, and applied it with unhesitating purposefulness, especially in election periods, they were able to keep the people in the Western sectors in a constant state of apprehension. There were actually cases of direct political blackmail in this matter of food. In the fall of 1947, for instance, when, after a severe winter and spring, the harvests held out hope of somewhat better times, the Russians announced that the agricultural surplus of the province of Brandenburg would be used to supply Berlin only when the outstanding balance of payments for the delivery of agricultural products had been fully paid.

This kind of politics was only brought to its culmination with the beginning of the outright blockade in 1948 when the attempt to shut off the supplies from West Germany at the beginning of July was accompanied by an offer to give people from the Western sector the opportunity to secure ration cards in the Eastern sector. In every period of human history there have been instances of submission to treacherous and dishonorable blandishments. It is notable, then, that at the outset only 21,000 West Berliners out of a population of over 2 million (1.5 per cent of the total) availed themselves of this opportunity to enter into a

kind of reinsurance arrangement in East Berlin. This is a fact which the Berlin public rightfully holds in honorable memory to the present day. If this number reached a peak of 70,000 before the end of the blockade, this is understandable, for not until the late fall of 1948 was it possible to provide the people in the three Western sectors with rations which were equal to those supplied to the population of East Berlin, at least according to the figures that appeared on the ration cards.

Still another important fact in the economic sphere must be mentioned. In June, 1948—that is, immediately before the break, the final decision to impose the blockade—the general regulation of the pay scales of all the industrial and transport workers in Berlin was taken over by central offices which were controlled by the Soviet administration. Thus the most numerous and the most important group of workers in Berlin would have been forced into economic dependence on the East, had not the struggle over the blockade begun at this very moment.

While all these events were taking place, it was by no means easy to recognize in any one of them by itself the consequences inherent in the total pattern which was being established. But this almost unbelievably complex combination of events was leading toward a situation in which either permanent separation on the one hand, or total subjugation on the other, would be inevitable. Historically, however, perhaps the most significant area of interaction between East and West in Berlin may have been currency. In this question, the nature of the advantages the Russians possessed stood out very clearly. And this was also a question in which the decision to allow the break to occur was the most difficult for all participating groups, both within Berlin and outside it.

Even after the Western powers had decided to carry through the currency reform of June, 1948—a step that is said by the Russians to have caused the blockade—they were still willing to exclude Berlin from the sphere of operation of Western currency, in case the introduction of the new currency could not be accomplished in conjunction with the Soviet Union. Fundamentally, they had wished to carry through the currency reform in co-operation with the Russians, with only one modest condition—that the currency printing establishment, which was in Leipzig un-

der Russian control, be subjected to quadripartite control. This control limitation was intended to prevent the reformed currency from immediately becoming a plaything in the struggle between the East and West.

Only a small group of leaders in Berlin was fully conscious of the seriousness of the situation—Ernst Reuter, whose observation that whoever controlled the currency had the real power in his hands was an accurate summary of the problem, Gustav Klingelhöfer, and Frau Luise Schröder, who supported both of these men loyally. These leaders realized that if the moves towards a solution of the currency issue took a false direction, the struggle for the realities of power in Britain would be lost. In their warning to the Allied powers, they were successful only to the point that the American military government prepared an alternative plan for the limited introduction of West German marks in Berlin, in case the discussion with the Russians might lead to a rupture—something that did in fact take place.

At the outset, official opinion in West Germany remained just as cool and hesitant as the Allied views toward the bold suggestion to couple Berlin now, once and for all, to the West German economy. Regardless of party affiliation, even the overwhelming majority of the political leaders in Berlin itself shrank from the radical proposal to bind the city for better or worse to West Germany, which was just at the time in the act of forming itself into a state. The idea of a "Baen mark," a special Berlin currency existing between the currencies of East and West, was seriously discussed for several weeks at that time out of sheer dismay at the idea of separation and the dangers that it would entail.

III

If one brings all of this background together, it becomes a rather simple matter to find the key to the dramatic events of the blockade year of 1948, and the logic of all these preliminaries then becomes apparent. Today it seems possible to establish historically—and this is a very interesting and stimulating problem indeed—that the Russian decision to allow the struggle for the conquest of the entire city of Berlin to come to a head in 1948 probably

was determined in the last analysis by the unconsolidated position of the SED in the Soviet Occupation Zone. It is at least very noticeable that as early as September, 1947, suggestions began to appear again and again in the East German press that Berlin was really a part of the Soviet Zone. The two themes that the struggle for exclusive possession of Berlin should be carried on as a logical rebuff for the consolidation of West Germany under the direction of the Western powers, and that the "thorn" of Berlin should be removed from the body of the Soviet Zone, began to emerge openly and conclusively in SED policy and propaganda. There is no doubt that the campaign to subjugate all of Berlin was being systematically prepared by the highest authorities and organs of the SED, and that they urged it upon the Russians with the greatest zeal.

With the role of the SED in mind, the relatively non-committal personal attitude of Stalin toward the attack upon the soil of Berlin becomes more understandable. In 1948 he seemed generally to be acting in accordance with the formula that he had expressed quite candidly at the Moscow conference in 1947 when he said, "We are allies, and what we have here are only skirmishes, preliminary bouts over the differences which exist between us. That cannot prevent us from remaining friends."

All of this indicates that in 1948 the internal German aspect of the situation, i.e., the parochial interests of the satellite regime in East Berlin, played at least as important a role in the decision of the Russians to take the risk of the blockade (a maneuver that wasn't actually carried through to its ultimate consequences) as it does in the Russian policies that have resulted in the crisis we are living through today. Under this assumption, the whole history of the blockade year becomes quite simple and obvious, and all that remains is to examine the last stages of the blockade itself.

Each side had its resources. In the East there was the continuing effort to render the population of the Western sectors unreliable within its own ranks. On the other side, however, there was the entire sum of the experiences which the people of Berlin had passed through since 1945, and these proved much more powerful. The events in Berlin itself, and what could be observed from the proxi-

mity of the Soviet Occupation Zone, left the West Berliners with no doubts. The Soviet Zone was ever more rapidly being forced to submit to total absorption by the East, and the movement of refugees to the West had already begun to set in unmistakably. It became quite clear to the West Berliners that all the freedom and independence of development for political parties and trade unions, for the organs of local self-government, and for the citizenry in general which had been gained in the strenuous struggle since 1946 would be lost in case the Russian policies were successful.

To prevent this, the people of West Berlin rallied again and again around the great leaders—Ernst Reuter, Otto Suhr, Franz Neumann, Ernst Lemmer and Hubert Schwenicke—who, with more and more support from the Allied headquarters, called upon them for determined resistance in the recurrent crisis of the year of the blockade. In the famous mass demonstrations of the summer and fall of 1948, they proclaimed anew their unshakable determination not to allow Berlin to become a second Prague. They proclaimed it on July 23 when for the first time the city Representative Assembly was threatened by organized force; on August 26 at the time of the debate over the winter relief program and in connection with the decision of the Assembly to hold new elections in the fall; on September 6, when it became necessary to transfer the Assembly to the Student House at Steinplatz in the British Sector; and on September 8 when the City Hall was surrounded, nineteen officials of the city government, Berlin policemen, were arrested, and access to their own meeting place was denied to the city representatives.

It was here in Berlin that that well-known Russian tactic of intimidation through systematic terror, which in all of the satellite states had paved the way for the final collapse of all resistance, was for the first time forced to recoil in the face of the resistance of representatives of the people and the broad masses of the people themselves. On September 9 there occurred, finally, that famous rally of 300,000 people in the Platz der Republik—in sight of the Brandenburg Gate and the ruins of the Reichstag Building—which summed up the people's determination to fight back.

Hand in hand with these attempts to intimidate the city Representative Assembly, there had been a system-

atic attempt to split the city administration between Eastern and Western zones. The high point of this process was the struggle against Colonel Markgraf, the Berlin Chief of Police. On July 26 he had to be dismissed by the city government for open and notorious mutiny, but this did not prevent him from continuing his command over the police in East Berlin. This incident, however, was the occasion of a clear indication of the attitude of most of the employees of the Berlin city administration. Within a few days, 70 per cent of the personnel of the police department responded to the call to place themselves under the direction of the new Chief of Police, Stumm, in the building on Friesen Street that is today the police headquarters in West Berlin.

The same process of splitting up took place at all levels of the city administration, from the most to the least important. The rationing office was compelled in July to move its principal divisions to West Berlin in order to continue to function. The postal service had to be divided and a central office for money orders set up in West Berlin. In contrast to Ernst Reuter and his friends, who knew from mid-summer on what the final result would be and desired to prepare for it systematically, Deputy Mayor Friedensburg, who had taken the place of the ailing Luise Schröder, maintained his office in the old East Berlin City Hall as long as possible, because he did not wish to recognize the compulsion that prevented the City Assembly from holding its meetings there as final. At last, however, the reality of split became so clear that on November 20 and 21 even the fire stations in the Eastern sector of Berlin were forbidden to answer calls to help in extinguishing fires in West Berlin.

The final step in the split of Berlin took place in a meeting in the Admiralspalast on November 30 that pretended to be a special session of the City Representative Assembly. Instead of the elected representatives, however, there were some 1600 participants present. In the midst of a carefully organized mass demonstration, this rally proceeded to elect a city government for East Berlin under the leadership of Friedrich Ebert. This turn of events, however, was only the logical conclusion to a long series of maneuvers extending over a period of years. It was not a response to a challenge from the West; it was in fact staved off by the West as long as that was possible. The

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decision to accept the split was forced upon the West and was completely unavoidable if all of the values which the people of Berlin had struggled for since 1945 were not to be surrendered.

West Berlin: City and State

HEINZ KREUTZER

THE TITLE "WEST BERLIN: CITY AND STATE" MAY BE SAID to contain two major inaccuracies. In the first place, West Berlin itself is not a city. Looked at realistically, it is the *whole* of Berlin that is one city, geographically and sociologically. For centuries it existed as a single community. Before 1948 it had consistently been administered as a unit and its very nature requires this administrative unity. The implication of the title that West Berlin is one city is, therefore, only correct juridically, and only since 1948.

A second inaccuracy is implicit in the word "state" (in the sense of the German *Land*), that is, a large governmental complex embracing many communities. Traditionally in Germany, certain quasi-sovereign qualities are ascribed to a "state," which is endowed with legislative and administrative organs of its own. As it is used in our title, this designation has sometimes given rise to the assumption that this "half-city," West Berlin, has something of the character of an independent state, although any direct analogy to the status of Danzig from 1920 to 1939 is avoided because the concept of a "free city" has been rendered suspect by the more recent Soviet polemics. But the exact interpretation of "state" in this context is a bit too complicated for any such simple solution. According to the categories of German public law it is indeed true that the fragmentary city, West Berlin, is also a state, a corporate body with inherent powers of government, subject directly and solely to the larger, inclusive state within which it is contained, and with many other peculiarities, characteristics, and special rights as well. Nevertheless, it is quite unjustifiable to assume that West Berlin therefore has the character, legal or otherwise, of an *independent* state—that it is, to use the traditional terminology, a "free city." Whoever makes this assumption concedes the basic premise of the present

Soviet policy, whether that is his purpose or not—and the concession is by no means merely a terminological one. However irritating it may be to us to encounter ideas with which we disagree expressed in terms that we accept, semantic distinctions are basically unimportant. The exact legal status of Berlin, on the other hand, is a matter of grave importance.

The peculiar legal status of Berlin is only one aspect of a truly unique political situation. In order that we may understand the implications of the legal aspect more fully, I shall put it in a somewhat more inclusive setting, trusting that if we succeed in making the origins and the structure of the present legal status of Berlin clear, we shall have gained at least a theoretical understanding of the situation of Germany at large. In regard to Germany as a whole, as well as to Berlin itself, the attempt to analyze and elucidate the legal situation may contribute substantially to an understanding of the political reality. Attempts are frequently made to discredit the juristic approach, but it is, after all, the method that is best suited for laying out the fundamental features of a complicated political problem, if it is applied with technical precision. Certainly, juridical discussions of the status of Berlin, be they ever so persuasive and convincing, will not determine the actual course of political events; this is not their purpose. Nevertheless, because law does stand in a continuing and inseparable functional relation to politics, such discussions distill the essence of past political experience and, what is more, supply the most reliable preliminary data about the developments which the processes of politics will produce in the future. They may, in fact, offset the lack of clarity in the obvious factual elements of a political situation by providing a frame of reference for debates about tactics and also safeguard against snap judgments and ill-advised conclusions. At the very least, they can eliminate ambiguities about the consequences of alternative political decisions.

When the status of West Berlin is examined by the standards of law, one is inevitably reminded of a man who lies buried in the city: Pufendorf, who almost 300 years ago (in 1667) published a book, *De Statu Imperii Germanici*, under the pseudonym Severinus de Monzambano. In this treatise on the legal status of the German

Empire of his day, he came to the conclusion that from a juridical point of view the German Empire after the Thirty Years War was really *monstro simile*—a monstrosity. To recall this expression is to be made just a little envious of Herr Pufendorf, for his expression—*monstro simile*—is an extraordinarily apt description of the present legal situation of West Berlin.

It seems to me that the discussion of the legal status of this *monstro simile* is best undertaken without holding to any definite chronology, but instead with emphasis upon three separate aspects in turn: international law, the law of occupation, and German law. At the level of international law we shall have to examine the agreements entered into by the victor powers after the last war. In regard to these agreements, we shall have to bear in mind that we shall be dealing with what jurists speak of as *res inter alios actae*, that is, with things which have been agreed to among third parties and do not affect West Berlin itself directly, conferring upon the city neither rights nor duties. In particular, we shall be talking about treaties having no legal effect except upon the parties to them. Nevertheless, as background for and source of many of the directives and prohibitions that are addressed directly to us, these agreements constitute a substratum of law which must be taken into consideration.

Those regulations and orders which have been issued at the second level—the law of the occupation—do confer direct rights and impose direct duties upon us. Here we are dealing with the exercise of that supreme authority which the victor powers acquired in Germany after 1945 and still possess. The law of the occupation is actually not German law, but it is law that is in force in Germany and supersedes all law of German origin, regardless of its particular source.

The third layer of our problem—lowest in rank, to be sure, but by no means least important—is German law. It alone, as we shall see, has brought about quite extensive changes in the status of Berlin in the last ten years.

These three levels of law, which must be considered separately, are not always in harmony. They are neither identical nor congruent. Out of this circumstance a number of tensions and confusions have arisen, some of which deserve close attention.

II

When we speak of the international-law aspect of the Berlin problem, we are talking about the phenomenon that in common parlance is referred to as "Four Power status." Much about the nature of Four Power status is known to the public, but its details and consequences are not generally understood.

The first and most important basis of Four Power status in Berlin—and a document that is central to our discussion—is the Protocol of September 12, 1944, which provided for the division of Germany into zones of occupation. The Protocol was signed in London long before the end of hostilities, originally only by the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and later by France (in July, 1945). I cite now the most significant passages of the Protocol, taken from the final draft which incorporated the supplementary agreements made necessary by the accession of the fourth victor power:

Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for purposes of occupation, be divided into four areas, one of which will be assigned to each of the four Powers . . .

—and now note carefully the difference in wording—

. . . and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation of the four Powers.*

The boundaries of each of the zones of occupation are then outlined, with maps to supplement the text. The maps reveal very clearly that Berlin is not included within any one of the zones. There follows a special cartographical description of the fifth occupation area, Berlin. According to the London Protocol:

The Berlin area will be occupied jointly by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the United Kingdom, of the United States of America and of France.

The Protocol goes on to define the "Berlin area" as the Greater Berlin that was set up by the law of April 27,

* For the documentary sources of the citations in this chapter, see the Select Bibliography, p. 189.

1920, which established the unified municipality with its twenty administrative districts. Finally, it is specifically provided in this agreement that—in contrast to the arrangement in the four occupation zones—“an inter-allied governing authority” (in the Russian-language version the expression is “Kommandatura”), consisting of the military commandants of the four victor powers, should be set up in order to conduct the administration of the municipality jointly.

From this agreement among the victor powers, which in itself had no direct effects so far as Germany and the Germans are concerned, it is unequivocally evident that it was from the beginning the intention of the Four Powers to set up five areas of occupation in Germany, each clearly distinguishable from the others. In addition—to digress a little—the German area on the other side of the Oder and the Western Neisse was accorded still another treatment. At any rate, it is indisputably clear from the London Protocol that Berlin never was in any way a part of the Soviet Occupation Zone.

Now we come to the question of the Western powers' right of access to Berlin in connection with their right to be there, which—as we have just seen—has treaty basis in the agreement of September, 1944, and July, 1945. Here the Western powers rest their case quite effectively on the argument that the right of access is a necessary corollary of the right to be present. We find the same principle in civil law. Let us assume, for the purposes of our discussion, that someone has acquired a piece of land which lies as an enclave within the landed property of another; it follows not only expressly from the German Civil Code, but even according to the common law that proceeds from the nature of things, that the owner of the enclave has the right of access across the property of the other landowner—what we call the right of necessary access. In regard to the actual state of affairs, General Clay said quite positively in his memoirs that no express and comprehensive agreements concerning access to Berlin were made either at the time of the conclusion of the agreements of 1944-45 or at the time when these agreements were put into effect in 1945.

A confirmation and strengthening of the right of transit is to be found in the international legal instrument through which, years later, the raising of the Berlin blockade was

effected. The question of the Western powers' right to access as it bore upon the necessity of provisioning the population of Berlin over the highways, the railways, and the waterways through the Russian zone from West Germany was, of course, the principal legal problem. With the raising of the blockade in the spring of 1949, several agreements among the Four Powers were made that have an especial importance now. The agreements do not contain anything that is substantially new. Rather, they are essentially a confirmation of the Four Power agreements of 1944-45, and especially a confirmation of the inferences which the Western powers and the Germans drew from these agreements. The agreement made in New York that ended the blockade, the so-called Jessup-Malik agreement of May 4, 1949, says in part:

All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Western zones will be removed on May 12, 1949.

This particular agreement only specifies one settlement of one problem, and does not necessarily have any permanence. But confirmation of the permanence of the agreement was achieved at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris on June 20, 1949. The participants subscribed to a statement which reads, in part:

The Governments of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States agree that the New York agreement of May 4, 1949, shall be maintained. Moreover, in order to promote further the aims set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in order to improve and supplement this and other arrangements and agreements as regards the movement of persons and goods and communications between the Eastern zone and the Western zones and between the zones and Berlin and also in regard to transit, the occupation authorities, each in his own zone, will have an obligation to take the measures necessary to insure the normal functioning and utilization of rail, water, and road transport for such movement of persons and goods and such communications by post, telephone, and telegraph.

I believe we make no mistake in asserting that confirma-

tion is found in this Paris agreement for the legal inference that was drawn from the London Protocol by the Western powers from the very beginning in 1944-45.

The agreements that have just been cited were not denounced by the Soviet Union in its notes of November 27, 1958, which precipitated the so-called Berlin crisis, because no legitimate grounds for such a denunciation existed—and that was obviously quite clear to the Soviet experts in international law. The Soviet Union, nevertheless, made the attempt to dispose of the agreements by asserting that they are obsolete—no longer valid because of developments that have taken place since they were signed. In particular, the Soviet Union based its position on the *clausula rebus sic stantibus*, contending that a fully changed political situation had taken the ground out from under these agreements. This conception, of course, was vigorously refuted by the Western powers in their note of December 14, 1958, and it appears that the Soviet Union is no longer particularly bent upon upholding the position that it asserted in November, so far as this point is concerned. In any case, as far as West Berliners are concerned these questions are *res inter alios actae*, directly affecting only the victor powers.

It is perhaps important to ask ourselves hypothetically—as a kind of sandbox sketch of the problem—what would happen if for some reason these agreements among the Four Powers ceased to be effective. In this case, we should have to recognize that, to the existing partial suspension—I mean the discontinuance of the Four Power administration of Berlin—a further break in the legal bond had been added. We should have to recognize, also, that in such a case the Soviet Union would have given up its general responsibility to the Western powers for East Berlin, and its specific responsibility for access routes to West Berlin. Actually, these hypotheses would only be conceivable in conjunction with the Soviet Union's complete surrender of all occupation functions in the German Democratic Republic (and on this point more will be said later).

We should be justified in a further conclusion, which I think is even more important: the rights of the Western powers in Berlin would remain intact even if the international agreements among the victor powers were to lapse. The agreements of 1944-45 and 1949 that are men-

tioned above established a relationship consisting of rights and obligations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers with reference to their position in Berlin. That is, these treaties created a particular legal situation or status in Berlin in which the Four Powers participated jointly because they had created it jointly. A situation or status so created can be changed fundamentally only by new treaties among the participating powers and not simply through the lapse of the treaties establishing the status in the first place, whatever the grounds—obsolescence or others—for the lapse. Moreover, it is important to note that the rights of the Western powers in Berlin are not derived from Russian law and could not be adversely affected by any Russian action that did not have the concurrence of these powers. As the United States memorandum on the "Legal Aspects of the Berlin Situation," released by the Department of State on December 20, 1958, pointed out:

... the rights of the United States in Germany and in Berlin do not depend in any respect upon the sufferance or acquiescence of the Soviet Union. Those rights derive from the total defeat of the Third Reich and the subsequent assumption of supreme authority in Germany. This defeat and assumption of authority were carried out as joint undertakings in which the participants were deemed to have equal standing. The rights of each occupying power exist independently and underlie the series of agreements which specify the areas and the methods in which those rights are to be exercised.

From all of this it may be seen that we are justified in concluding that, even if the lapse of the agreements of 1944-45 and 1949 were assumed, the rights of the Western powers in Berlin would remain intact and that the lapse of the treaty basis among the victor powers would have no effect upon these rights at all.

III

All of this now stands in need of confirmation and substantiation through consideration of the second level of our problem, the law of the occupation. We are concerned at this level essentially with the direct application of the Four Power treaties to Berlin and its population—that is,

with the transformation of the agreements made by the victor powers into law operative upon Germany and the Germans in the form of occupation law. The measures taken, the regulations, the directives, and the prohibitions, were based upon the power of occupation, which in international law is recognized as a power similar to sovereignty—the Hague code of the laws of land warfare proceeds on this assumption. For the duration of the occupation, this power, with the precedence over all internal law, becomes operative in the same functional capacity as that of the original sovereignty existing and functioning in the occupied land up to the time of occupation.

Because the Soviet Army was in actual physical possession of Berlin at the close of the war, the occupation power there first came into the hands of the Soviet Union alone—and that is a further peculiarity of Berlin's political history. On April 28, the Soviet military commander, General Bersarin, issued the following statement, in his Order Number 1:

Today I have been appointed Chief of the Occupation Troops and City Commandant of Berlin. I have been authorized by the High Command of the Red Army to assume all administrative and political power.

Soviet Order Number 1, then, formally decreed the fact of occupation and transferred the supreme, quasi-sovereign power—or, as it was later called in the official parlance of the occupation, the "supreme authority"—in Berlin to the organs of the Red Army.

A short time after this, on June 5, 1945, joint declarations issued by all four of the victor powers transformed the London Protocols of September, 1944 (inclusive of the modifications made in consequence of the subsequent French accession) into legal rules valid for Germany. These declarations concerned the defeat of Germany, the establishment of zones of occupation, and control mechanisms. They set forth what was to be, for all practical purposes, the constitutional law of Germany for the next few years, and what remains even today as a kind of residual framework for the constitutional law of Germany as a whole.

The declaration proclaiming the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme governmental authority made on June 5, 1945, reads in part:

There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers. . . .

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority.

Specific stipulations refer to the zones of occupation and provide an elaboration of the substantive content of this fundamental declaration. These additional stipulations again define (this time with direct effect upon Germany) the boundaries of the four zones of occupation and, within the Soviet Occupation Zone but not a part of it, a fifth, separate occupation area—Greater Berlin. In the declaration concerning control mechanisms issued on the same day, the Control Council for Germany as a whole is first described, and the authority and composition of the Kommandatura are then stipulated:

The administration of the "Greater Berlin" area will be directed by an Inter-Allied Governing Authority, which will operate under the general direction of the Control Council, and will consist of four Commandants, each of whom will serve in rotation as Chief Commandant.

Through these joint occupation declarations, which created a quasi-constitutional law for Germany, the status of Berlin was fixed not only at the level of international law, but also in the realm of internal German law, even though that status was at root an arrangement made in consequence of the occupation. These declarations, addressed to the Germans, established the joint occupation authority of the Four Powers in Berlin as a whole without differentiation between the sectors, but with clear-cut exclusion from the city of the over-all occupation authority ascribed to the Soviet Union in the surrounding region of the province of Brandenburg and the other regions of central Germany. Furthermore—and this is quite important—the joint authority laid down in the declarations superseded the exclusive occupation authority held by the

Soviet Union up to that time for all of Berlin on the basis of the fact of military possession. The presence and authority of the three Western powers in Berlin, therefore, including their right of ingress and egress, which we have seen is a derivative and ancillary right, do not rest upon the basis of Soviet law at all, but rather on joint agreements voluntarily made and fully documented, by virtue of which the rights of presence and occupation of the Four Powers are fully equal.

Now, of course, the joint Four Power administration of Berlin has been disrupted. The coordinating function of the Allied Control Council terminated on March 20, 1948, when the Soviet representative withdrew after the failure of the conference of foreign ministers in London in December, 1947. This led inevitably—in view of the relationships between the Council and the Kommandatura—to a similar occurrence in the Berlin Kommandatura. On July 1, 1948, the Four Power Kommandatura for Berlin was laid to rest through the withdrawal of the Russian representative. As a result, not only the general Four Power agreements, but also the specific Four Power declarations for Berlin, which have the character of occupation law and affect Berliners directly, were to all practical purpose suspended as far as the joint administration of Berlin as a whole by the Four Powers is concerned.

The three Western powers, after vain attempts to reactivate the Allied Kommandatura, issued a statement on December 21, 1948, which says in part:

On July 1st, the Soviet Authorities withdrew from the Allied Kommandatura and thus disrupted the quadripartite administration of Berlin.

The Allied Kommandatura was established by agreements concluded between the four Governments, which can only be altered or abrogated by agreement of all the Governments which were party to them. The Allied Kommandatura has not, therefore, ceased to exist, although its work has, since July 1st, been in suspense owing to the refusal of the Soviet Authorities to attend its meetings.

The three Western powers then pointed out that the disruption in the functions of the Kommandatura had led to insupportable difficulties in the three Western sectors, and went on to say:

The Allied Kommandatura will therefore resume its work forthwith. If the Soviet Authorities, either now or at a future date, decide to abide by the agreements to which the four Powers are committed, the quadripartite administration of Berlin could be resumed. During their abstentions the three Western Allies will exercise the powers of the Allied Kommandatura, although it is realized that owing to Soviet obstruction it will only be possible for them to carry out their decisions in the Western Sectors for the present.

This statement, together with the obvious complications of the situation which prompted it, justified the conclusion that the withdrawal of the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the Four Power administration of Berlin interrupted the continuity neither of the Four Power agreements of 1944 and 1945 nor of the corresponding declarations which established the status of Berlin. In actuality, of course, the operation of the Four Power administration of Greater Berlin had been suspended, but the clear consequence was that the three Western partners, who were ready to continue to work within the original Kommandatura, could claim for themselves the complete organic continuity of the authority of the Kommandatura. They were therefore legally competent, as what we might call the residual Kommandatura, to assume, from that moment forward, with regard to Berlin and the Germans in Berlin, their own powers and functions as based upon the established status, and indeed in principle also the powers and functions of the fourth power which had in the meantime withdrawn. This legal competence was undeniably theirs because neither the agreements nor the declarations which established the status were as such denounced or recalled; nor, as has already been pointed out, could they be denounced or recalled by unilateral action in such a way as to terminate the established status.

Confirmation of the view that the actual cessation of the Four Power administration in Berlin involved merely a factitious and not a legal dissolution of the status is to be found in the agreements concluded by the Western powers in the one instance and by the Soviet Union in the other with their respective German partners on the occasion of the termination of the occupation regime. In Article 2 of the Bonn convention of 1952, as amended

by the Paris protocol of 1954, the so-called General Treaty, which establishes the relationships between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Western powers, the following passage occurs:

In view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the Three Powers retain the rights and the responsibilities, hitherto exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin or to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement.

Here a reservation is expressly set forth which reaffirms the validity of the agreements and declarations establishing the status of Berlin, and which even provides for the possibility of re-establishing actual Four Power condominium in Berlin. With reference to the all-German question, a similar reservation permits the Western powers, by virtue of the law of occupation, to dissolve the Federal Republic and to suspend German Basic Law for the purpose of the reconstruction of a united, sovereign state in Germany.

Corresponding provisions are made on the Eastern side—if not with the same clarity, at least with the same intent. The so-called Declaration of Sovereignty made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with respect to the "German Democratic Republic" on March 25, 1954, states:

The Soviet Union will retain in the German Democratic Republic the functions connected with guaranteeing security, and resulting from the obligations incumbent on the USSR as a result of the Four Power Agreement.

This declaration, it is true—in contrast to the Western declarations—does not make any express provision for Berlin. Berlin, however, is included through reference to the Four Power agreements in the specification of the powers and functions retained by the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, the surrender of active governing authority by the two sides of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, respectively, is not extended to Berlin and does not in principle effect the status of that city. The situation of Berlin as a whole and of its

two parts in respect to the law of occupation remains unchanged. Moreover, Western access to Berlin through the Soviet Zone—which, as I have indicated, is established by the Four Power agreements—is among the rights of occupation which are still reserved to the Four Powers. Furthermore, notwithstanding the actual suspension of the Four Power administration in Berlin, the framework of that administration remains and can be filled out again at any time. From 1948 on, everything that has taken place in the West or in the East as a result of the formal action of the occupying powers, or with their acquiescence, can in the future be rescinded or altered on the strength of the power of occupation; whatever has occurred stands today fully at the disposition of the occupying powers. That this is the case particularly with reference to West Berlin is stated expressly in Article 2 of the Declaration with Reference to Berlin made by the Kommandatura on May 5, 1955. This declaration remains in force today as an occupation statute. It reads in part:

The Allied administration authorities reserve the right, in case they consider it necessary, to take such actions as are necessary for the fulfillment of their international obligations . . . and for the preservation of the status . . . of Berlin.

Now the Soviet Union has questioned not only the international agreements that led to the declarations on the status of Berlin, but the declarations as well, if not explicitly at least implicitly. This brings up our earlier question of what would happen—to formulate the discussion hypothetically once again—if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were specifically to surrender its authority as an occupying power both with reference to Berlin and to the traffic routes into Berlin. What would happen if the USSR were to recall the declarations of Berlin's status—something that is legally inadmissible but is a conceivable political reality? The occupation rights of the Western powers would continue to be in force—that is the most important point—even though these have for a long time been used solely to perform protective functions and not for actual occupation purposes. They would remain in force because they are not derived from Russian law and are not based on treaties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but rather came into existence in consequence of the joint

assumption of supreme authority over the whole of Germany including Berlin. This is true also of the rights of transit between Berlin and Western Germany, because these rights remain effective as direct consequences of the power of occupation. None of these functions or particular powers of occupation would pass away from the Western nations merely because the Soviet Union surrendered its own occupation functions and powers. Such unilateral action could not affect the rights of the other three victors. All the agreements among the Four Powers and the related declarations concerned the division among themselves of particular powers and functions which belonged to all, but those agreements did not make such powers mutually interdependent.

Furthermore, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could not, under the hypothetical conditions we are discussing, transfer to the German Democratic Republic the functions and rights which stem from its power of occupation—and this is to be emphasized in refutation of certain aspects of Soviet polemics. The powers and functions of occupation, which by their very nature extend only to the occupied area, lapse—for the specific nation that withdraws them—at the moment and to the degree that they are withdrawn. If the Soviet Union were to withdraw those occupation powers and functions which it has today in the German Democratic Republic—and, by the way, also uses quite vigorously—for instance, in regard to the traffic connecting the West and Berlin, these special powers and functions would terminate completely, and for this reason could not be transferred en bloc to the German Democratic Republic. The occupation powers and functions possessed by the Western nations could not legally be disturbed and, in fact, would naturally be exercised directly upon the organs of the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, the German Democratic Republic could not legally bring its own unlimited “sovereignty” into opposition to the occupation powers and functions of the Western nations—I am speaking now only of legal possibilities.

The granting of “sovereignty” to the German Democratic Republic cannot bestow any powers of occupation or similar powers upon the officials or organs of the German Democratic Republic, even if the limitations mentioned in the Declaration of Sovereignty of 1954 were set aside by a separate treaty of peace signed by the Soviet Union and

the German Democratic Republic. It is only within the scope of such a treaty to terminate an occupation situation, and that only insofar as this situation is at the disposition of the party which terminates it. The Soviet Union has at its disposition only its zone—including the traffic routes in that zone—and only its own particular powers and functions of occupation. The particular occupation powers and functions of the three Western nations are in this sense entirely independent of the Soviet Union. Specifically, Western powers and functions consist, with reference to the German Democratic Republic, of the rights of transit. These rights no "sovereignty" can abrogate without the consent of the Western powers themselves.

IV

The complexities of the legal status of Berlin are not yet exhausted. We still have to concern ourselves with the third level of our problem—the German law. So far as this level is concerned, a change in status for Berlin took place *ipso facto* with the collapse and disintegration of the Reich, but even more particularly with the dissolution of the Prussian state (again in the German sense of *Land*). Up to that time Berlin as a municipality in the state of Prussia was related to the Reich as a whole indirectly through Prussia. With the dissolution of Prussia in 1945, however, Berlin came at the same time into the status of a separate state without losing its status as a municipality, because according to German public law the corporate territorial authority directly related to the Reich or inclusive state is by definition a "state." With the dismemberment of Prussia, Berlin became *ipso facto* a corporate territorial authority directly related to the larger German state, which continued to exist in a legal sense even though it was incapable of taking any action. There was no intermediate governmental unit for it to be attached to. The province of Brandenburg lay, of course, in the area under exclusive Soviet occupation and could not serve this purpose. The emergence of the new state of Berlin is, therefore, one of the many instances in which state boundaries in Germany after 1945 followed the lines of demarcation established for the purposes of military occupation.

All public functions associated with statehood, then, accrued to Berlin with the collapse of the regional corpo-

rate authority (insofar as such functions were accessible to German organs of government at all at that time). The status of Berlin as a state was subsequently confirmed in the Temporary Constitution of Greater Berlin issued by the occupying powers in August, 1946—incidentally, the only constitution instituted by the occupying powers in Germany after the war by direct exercise of their supreme authority. The permanent Constitution of Berlin of September 1, 1950, in effect at present, defines the city's double status—which in the whole area of German law is comparable only with that of Hamburg—succinctly in its first article: "Berlin is a German state and at the same time a city."

In connection with the controversies among the four occupying powers—especially those centering about the currency reform in June, 1948—it became apparent that the split in the Four Power administration would have consequences in the sphere of German authority also. The splitting of Berlin has already been discussed in detail. We have seen how in September, 1948, Communist-inspired rioting took place at the city hall in the Eastern sector. And we have seen how, thereupon, the constitutionally elected organs of Greater Berlin transferred their seat to the Western sectors, except that the members of the Socialist Unity Party in the City Assembly and in the Magistrat did not participate in this shift.

The functionaries of the Socialist Unity Party and the Soviet commandant concluded from the transfer—and this is a very strange conclusion indeed—that both the City Assembly and the Magistrat had surrendered their powers and functions through their shift in location and that they had become illegal as a result of it. Obviously, this was only a quibble, a weak attempt to justify the occupation order issued in the Eastern sector to exclude the City Assembly and the Magistrat from effective activity in the eight Soviet-occupied districts, and in particular to prevent the holding of new elections for the city representative assembly and the district assemblies, scheduled for December 5, 1948, in accordance with the provisions of the city constitution.

The consequence of these machinations is that, because of the interference of one of the occupying powers, a constitutional government and administration has existed since September, 1948, only in the three Western sectors.

Here alone has it been possible for a renewal of the organs of government to take place through elections held in conformity with the valid constitution—first in December, 1948, and subsequently in 1950, 1954, and 1958. Only in the Western sectors were the elected organs, the City Representative Assembly and the Magistrat, able to carry through to completion the task assigned to them by the Kommandatura of drafting a new constitution and, with the approval of the residual Kommandatura, to proclaim and implement this constitution. This is a considerable accomplishment, even though that constitution must give up its actual, if not its legal, claim to validity at the sector borders.

In sharp contrast, developments in the realm of German law in East Berlin since November, 1948, have involved the methods of the *coup d'état* and totalitarian subversion, in clear defiance of the civil and political arrangements in West Berlin. At any rate, the *coup d'état* in East Berlin in November, 1948, produced two fully separate political and administrative realms in the city as a whole. Despite their rival claims of jurisdiction over the entire city, West and East Berlin have been since that time two separate domains, politically and administratively.

The ultimately decisive question with reference to the status of West Berlin, however, was posed with the establishment of the two fragmentary republics in the West and in the East. We can here look only briefly at the founding of the Federal Republic and the place that West Berlin has within it. Article 23 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany declares that Berlin is a state in the Federal Republic. "For the time being, the Basic Law shall apply in the states [Länder] Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin. . . ." It is true that intervention under the law of occupation prevented the representatives of Berlin in the Parliamentary Council from achieving full participation, in that they were allowed to have only an advisory vote in its plenary sessions. Nevertheless, the five representatives from Berlin did play a significant part in the creation of the Basic Law.

Now we come to the question of whether the Basic Law is, in accordance with German law, binding for Berlin in spite of the fact that the Berlin representatives did not have the right to vote in the plenary sessions. This question can be answered affirmatively without hesitation, because the Berlin City Assembly accepted the Basic Law

by a unanimous vote on May 19, 1949. Furthermore, in German law the plenipotentiary participation of Berlin representatives in the making of the Basic Law was not necessary in order to allow this constitution to become effective for Berlin, because the Basic Law, as an instrument of reorganization of the legally continuing inclusive state, arose from the collective political authority of all the German people, and that is expressly stated in its preamble. The Basic Law does not have its foundation in an alliance as the federative constitutions of 1867 and 1871 did. There is, therefore, really no basis whatsoever for any talk about the lack of "accession" by Berlin to the Federal Republic. The second paragraph of Article 23 of the Basic Law is unequivocal on this score. In it certain states are specifically invited to accession, but Berlin is not one of these. The reason is that Berlin's inclusion had been established by the initial sentence of the article, quoted above. According to German law, therefore, Berlin has been from the outset an original state of the Federal Republic—regardless of the interventions on the basis of the law of occupation.

Obviously, the Basic Law could not be put into effect without limitations. It required the approval of the military governors who at the time exercised "supreme authority," and they made reservations with reference to a number of points. In a letter of May 12, 1949, in which the Western military governors give their general approval to the Basic Law, the qualifications are set forth. One of these, which appears in Point 4, is of decisive importance to Berlin.

A third reservation concerns the participation of Greater Berlin in the Federation. We interpret the effect of Articles 23 and 144 (2) as constituting acceptance of our previous request that while Berlin may not be accorded voting membership in the Bundestag or Bundesrat nor be governed by the Federation, she may, nevertheless, designate a small number of representatives to attend the meetings of those representative bodies.

This reservation concerning the applicability of the Basic Law to Berlin has been the subject of intensive discussion and constant controversy since 1949. Among the Germans, the consensus seems to be that no complete exclusion of Berlin from the authority of the Basic Law is achieved by this reservation upon German constitutional

law, but that rather, if the wording is carefully examined, there emerge only two partial restrictions which do not in principle affect the applicability of the Basic Law to Berlin nor the original membership of Berlin in the Federation.

The first restriction is that, while Berlin is represented in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, its representatives do not have the right to vote in plenary sessions. As a result of this restriction, the Berlin representatives in the Bundestag are not elected directly by the people but are chosen by the Berlin House of Representatives. They may be said to be delegates, rather than representatives in the usual sense. The restriction on voting does not extend to the Federal Convention, which elects the President of the Federal Republic. In the Federal Convention the Berliners have full voting power and did vote in the re-election of President Heuss in 1954.*

Much more important is the second restriction that Berlin "may not be governed by the Federation." The expression "govern" means in Anglo-American political terminology the exercise of all three functions of the state. On the surface of it, this restriction excludes the Federation from the exercise of its constitutional powers in Berlin through direct legislative, executive, or judicial action. However, the authority of the Federation was extended to Berlin in other ways.

The Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the possibility of this extension with reference to an important part of constitutional law in a decision in 1951. In that decision the court held that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Basic Law are valid in and for Berlin. The same is true of all the rest of the substantive constitutional law with the exception of the actual governing function—that is, the direct exercise of the traditional functions of the state. It is only the exercise of the power of the organs of the Federal government directly upon Berlin that is excluded.

The German views are not shared by the Western occupying powers who have from the outset made it quite clear that they do not subscribe to the opinion that Berlin belongs to the Federal Republic. Instead, they have

* The Berlin members also voted in the Federal Convention which elected Heinrich Lübke as President of the Federal Republic on July 1, 1959. No occasion has arisen to test the validity of their votes before the Constitutional Court.

held to the principle that Berlin is not a part of the Federal Republic juristically, even though in a great many respects as a matter of fact it is treated as if it were a state in the Federation, and indeed should be so treated. According to the Allied view, the initial reservation was intended to suspend the membership of Berlin in the Federal Republic, at least for a time, while avoiding some of the practical consequences which might have been produced by formal suspension. For the moment, all that we need to do is to point out that in this matter of the relationship of Berlin to the Federal Republic there is a distinct and fundamental difference of opinion between the Allies and the Germans. We do not need to dramatize this difference, because in practice the issue has become purely academic. It is recognized on both sides that an objective interpretation according to the concepts and methods of German law scarcely permits us to come to any other conclusion than that Berlin is an original state (*Land*) of the Federal Republic, although as a result of reservations under the law of occupation this membership still may not be fully exercised with respect to all rights and duties.

In spite of the fact that the Allies have vigorously maintained their position in principle—just a few months ago it was once again expressed in an international exchange of views—they have conducted themselves in such a way that it has been possible to bring the actual relationship of Berlin to the Federation into almost exactly the same pattern as that of the other states. On the German side, however, the assumption of Berlin's *de jure* membership in the Federation was the necessary basis for the legal processes by which this integration was achieved. The assumption is evident in the series of precedents that have given life and substance to the legal bond of Berlin's membership in the Federation, which at first was more or less only formal.

With reference to the almost complete activation of all the rights and duties of Berlin in the Federation, the law establishing the position of Berlin in the financial system of the Federation, which was introduced by Otto Suhr in 1951 and was passed as the so-called Third Transitional Law in 1952, deserves particular mention. In consequence of this Federal law, which was accepted as such by Berlin, the city was drawn into the vertical financial arrangement of the Federation. As over every other state, the Federation's

power of taxation extends over Berlin, and it receives, as does every other state, tax moneys from the Federation treasury. With this law, the so-called "restriction on governing" was to a considerable degree annulled in practice, and with it an essential number of the provisions of the Basic Law concerning the organization of Federal powers automatically came into effect for Berlin, even if in a roundabout fashion as the result of an ordinary Federal statute.

Still more important, however, is the fact that the inclusion of Berlin in the financial system of the Federation required, if it was to function properly, complete legal and economic homogeneity between Berlin and the remainder of the Federal Republic on account of the essential interdependence of economic and legal elements in modern polity. In order to insure this legal and economic homogeneity, the Law Concerning the Position of Berlin in the Financial System of the Federation had to be supplemented by a series of regulations which brought about an almost complete actualization of the previously rather formal legal membership of Berlin in the Federation. Berlin was obligated to give legal effect, as Federal law, to all the statutes of the Federation which are designated as being applicable to the city by the Federal legislature. As a result, the executive orders and administrative decrees issued by the Federal government or the Federal ministries in consequence of such statutes have the same immediate effect in Berlin as they have in the rest of the Federal Republic.

Although the final formal action which makes designated Federal statutes effective in Berlin requires the participation of the Berlin House of Representatives, those statutes have the real legal character of Federal law. They take precedence over all Berlin state law. Moreover, once Federal statutes have been introduced into Berlin by its legislature, they cannot be suspended, nor can they be altered in any way by the Berlin House of Representatives in its capacity as state legislature without the concurrence of the Federal legislature.

Though this device of introducing Federal law into Berlin by means of action by the House of Representatives was at first voluntary, after the middle of 1952 it became obligatory on the basis of the Third Transitional Law. As a result, almost complete legal unity between Berlin and the rest of the Federal Republic has been achieved. A few

exceptions have occurred when the application of certain Federal statutes to Berlin was prevented by the Western Allies. Examples of these statutes are the Federal law concerning personal identification documents, the law regulating public meetings, the law concerning the Federal Constitutional Court and the law regulating hunting in the Federal Republic, as well as, of course, all the laws having to do with defense except civil defense legislation.

Thus, for all practical purposes, the gaps which the reservations of the occupying powers left in the relationship of Berlin to the Federal Republic are filled. This filling out has taken place not only with reference to the legislative function but also in regard to the other two functions of the state—adjudication and administration—for Federal law is accepted automatically in these spheres as well. With the acceptance of the statute concerning the composition and procedure of the higher Federal courts, for instance, the jurisdiction of these courts for Berlin is automatically established, and one of them actually has its seat in Berlin. In consequence, Berlin and its population have been placed under the authority of the Federation so far as the judicial function is concerned.

The same is true in the sphere of administration, for the Federal statutes concerning the competence and procedures of the Federal administrative authorities are introduced into Berlin as Federal law. With the acceptance of the statutes concerning administration, all of the administrative powers of the Federal organs and authorities have been established for Berlin, insofar as they are valid in the rest of the states of the Federation.

Thus Berlin has been placed under the authority of the Federation in the spheres of adjudication and administration—not, it is true, by virtue of the Basic Law, but through the operation of ordinary Federal law. The *nudum jus*, the merely formal bond of membership, has been filled with substance almost entirely.

We are justified, then, in concluding that even that portion of the Basic Law the application of which to Berlin has been suspended by the occupying powers because it lies in the area of “governing” has become effective (with the exception of a very small residue) by means of the acceptance of ordinary Federal law by Berlin. It is observed and practiced in Berlin as if it became operative directly, and the subtle juridical distinction between Fed-

eral law in Berlin and in the rest of the Republic has generally been forgotten.

The fact that Berlin has "grown" into the status of a state of the Federation is tacitly recognized in the treaty concluded between the Federal Republic and the three Western powers to terminate the occupation regime. I have already cited Article 2 of this so-called General Treaty, in which the three Western powers expressly reserve their powers of occupation in Berlin over against the Federal Republic. The fact that the Western powers believed that it was necessary to make this reservation indicates their implicit acceptance of the interpretation that Berlin is a state of the Federal Republic, at least so far as German law is concerned. Otherwise, the reservation would clearly have been superfluous. In addition, a note from the High Commissioners to the Federal Chancellor on October 25, 1954, tacitly confirmed the situation as it existed at that time. In this note, the three Western powers, through their High Commissioners, recognized that Berlin should be permitted to accept the legislation of the Federation. They specified that they retained certain rights of intervention, but they imposed no substantive limitations. The Western powers have, in fact, recognized the necessity of complete political and economic homogeneity between Berlin and the other German states, in the same way that they have recognized the validity of the representation of Berlin by the Federal Republic in international legal relations, which is a matter that has presented no problems and has hardly even been discussed.

The Federal Constitutional Court, also, has expressly recognized the practical unity between Berlin and the Federal Republic in its ruling of May 21, 1957. The Court, the decisions of which are binding upon all German constitutional organs, courts, and administrative authorities, ruled that:

Berlin is a state of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Basic Law is valid in and for Berlin, insofar as its application is not limited by measures which had their origin in the period of occupation and are still in force today. Owing to the reservation of the military governors in connection with their ratification of the Basic Law, direct exercise of governing power by Federal organs in Berlin is not included, except insofar as the three powers have in the meantime permitted this direct exercise of governing power, either in general or specifically.

We can see in this a rounding out, a final confirmation of the point of view of German law in the matter. Nevertheless, there remains the open divergence between the German and the Allied opinions on the question of whether Berlin belongs to the Federation or not—and this should not be overlooked.

Contrary to recent Soviet assertions, Berlin was not originally nor is it at present part of the Soviet Zone of occupation nor, in consequence, of the German Democratic Republic. The Constitution of the German Democratic Republic, which in Article 2 asserts the contrary, is accordingly, in this respect purely programmatic.

The so-called Four Power status of Berlin has, for all practical purposes, been dead since 1948. At the present time, it is an empty shell, as is also whatever is left of the competence of the Four Powers in respect to Germany as a whole. It is an open question whether Four Power competence throughout Berlin and Germany will or can one day be made the vehicle for fundamentally new political action.

A surrender by the Soviet Union of its occupation powers would have no legal effects upon the position of the Western powers in Berlin, nor upon the routes of transit to Berlin—and I must emphasize again that I have confined myself to an examination of the legal aspects of the matters under consideration.

According to German law and with the acquiescence of the Allies, West Berlin has become a state of the Federal Republic, but with the reservation that the Allies may at any time intervene in this relationship. As a consequence, the Federal Republic and the Allies are fully responsible for Berlin, economically and politically.

I have expounded only the most essential features of the present status of Berlin. Even so, it should by now be clear that my introductory remark that the status of Berlin is really *monstro simile*, is quite accurate. This monstrous legal status is no less a monstrosity in its practical political aspects. Both theoretically and practically, then, there is a clear need for the kind of intelligent and responsible policy which may one day succeed in converting the monster Berlin into a simple, normal social organism, legally and politically—into the peaceful capital of a reunited Germany.

The Berlin Situation as a Socio-political Problem

OTTO STAMMER

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BERLIN HAS BEEN A PROMINENT CONSIDERATION IN INTERNATIONAL politics ever since the blockade and the enforced separation of the Eastern sector from the main part of the city in 1948. The patterns of Berlin's economic and social life, as well as its political and legal status, have been brought again into active controversy among the great powers and between the two parts of Germany by the Khrushchev note of November 27, 1958, in the setting of the perennial problem of German unification. In this note the government of the Soviet Union described the Four Power status of Berlin as a "dangerous anachronism" and West Berlin as it exists today as a "state within the State of the German Democratic Republic." The note goes on to speak of a "union of West Berlin with the German Democratic Republic" as the "natural and just solution," but at the same time it proposes for the present a neutralization of this community in the form of a "demilitarized free city" as a stage preliminary to the so-called normal arrangement.

The threat posed by the unacceptable features of the proposal expressed in this note has been exposed in clear terms by all the responsible organs of the Western world. The note has also been countered by the emphatic reminder that the natural and historic role of Berlin is, in fact, that of the capital of a united Germany. The note is, nevertheless, well calculated to deceive the politically and sociologically naïve because it promises to leave to the people

of Berlin the free choice of the socio-political forms under which they will live and at the same time offers them economic support.

It is obvious that the problem of the status of Berlin cannot be considered in isolation, first of all because it bears so immediately upon considerations of foreign policy and of the fate of Germany as a whole. All of the far-reaching questions of the relation of the East to the West and of the chances for German reunification come to a head in Berlin. A second reason why we should not look upon the problem of Berlin as an isolated one may be found in the city's postwar history. It has become quite obvious since the war that it is possible to preserve the life of the community and even to make it grow by means that are predominantly political, whereas the city would certainly be condemned to ruin in the present circumstances were it to become isolated and left to its own resources. This thought is fundamental to all that will be said in this discussion.

It is not my purpose to pass judgment upon the political and diplomatic aspects of the threat contained in the Soviet note. What is particularly interesting to social scientists, however, is that even this Soviet proclamation discusses the problem of the relation of its economic and social life to the political existence of the city. Although the definitions and the frame of reference employed in the note are far from adequate, we find in it the Soviet views on the patterns of economic and social life in a community such as Berlin, the types of behavior suitable to these patterns, and even the possibilities of changing these patterns and types. My plan is to trace the changes in social structure in the two parts of the city, starting from the realities of the economy and the society of this divided city. In this way I shall attempt to put what Khrushchev offers Berlin to the test.

In politics and public law, Berlin can be said to have only a provisional existence. This provisional quality is even more pronounced in West Berlin than in East Berlin which is almost completely integrated with the Soviet Occupation Zone, politically and socially. In the formalities of the law of occupation, Berlin is held together by the

ties of the "Four Power status"; in reality, however, one is confronted by two societies which have been separated now for ten years by contending political forces. This situation presents a multiplicity of constitutional and political problems that sociology cannot leave unnoticed when it turns to the question of changes in the economic and social structure. The blockade and the act of violence that created the government in East Berlin on November 30, 1948, produced a *de facto* split in public law, in administration, and in politics that neither the Western powers nor the people have recognized as legitimate. Nevertheless, these events did destroy the fiction of the occupation years that the unity of Berlin could be maintained in spite of the social and political contrasts between East and West.

The price that Berlin had to pay for the lifting of the blockade, as Otto Suhr pointed out in one of his speeches, was to submit to nearly complete separation from its eastern districts, and to the extraordinary economic debilitation and political insularity that resulted from this separation. Furthermore, Berlin was deprived, as an additional result, of those functions which could have ensured its recovery in a united Germany.

The actual union of West Berlin with the Federal Republic became the demand of the hour. The formal legal membership of Berlin in the Federal Republic was indeed established both in the Basic Law and the Constitution of Berlin, but the well-known reservation by the Western occupation powers was superimposed upon the recognition of Berlin as a state of the Federal Republic in public law. As has elsewhere been noted, with the Law Concerning the Position of Berlin in the Financial System of the Federation of June 12, 1952, the so-called Third Transitional Law, it became possible to give effective validity to all statutes of the Federal Republic which contain a "Berlin clause" by means of the device of covering legislation passed by the city itself. It is in this way that Federation assistance in the recovery of the city has been obtained.

The integration of East Berlin into the so-called German Democratic Republic, formally as its capital and actually as one of its districts, took place more or less contemporaneously. It was the direct result of the administrative reform of 1952 and of a decree which was said to have as its purpose the "democratization of Greater Berlin." As a consequence of this integration, the East Berliners were

absorbed into the planned economy of the Soviet Zone. In the past ten years, then, the two parts of the city have become increasingly different from each other in the economic and social areas, as well as in the legal and political ones.

The Berlin policy of the occupation powers up to the present has been designed to maintain the *status quo* defined in the Paris agreement of the foreign ministers in 1949. Nevertheless, even then the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was quite unmistakably directed towards weakening and endangering the position of West Berlin, which was regarded as a thorn in the flesh of the social order being developed in the Soviet Zone. Moreover, as the Khrushchev note shows, the Soviet Union looked upon the Berlin situation as a lever which could be used to influence the policy of the other powers toward Germany at large. On the other hand, the Federal Republic and its allies have supported West Berlin's struggle for political autonomy in the relative security which even the *status quo* provided. They have also fostered its sturdy efforts to strengthen its social and economic position in such a way as to be ready in the future to fulfill effectively its function as the capital of a reunited Germany.

It is quite clear that the problem of divided Berlin in public law, international law, and politics cannot be separated from the complex of questions arising from the confrontation of the two competing systems of political society prevailing in the two parts of the city and supported by the two German state-structures and the world powers. In an area consisting of scarcely 340 square miles, and containing 3.3 million inhabitants, then, it is not only two rival systems of government and administration that face each other, but two political points of view, two systems of economy, and two ways of life as well. The nonsense of the partition of Germany and of the incorporation of the parts into opposing socio-political power systems is nowhere more clearly visible than in Berlin in these days of controversy over its future status. Every variation in the Berlin policy of the world powers—whether in the direction of the *status quo* or towards revision of the agreements about Germany—inevitably produces sharp repercussions in the economic reconstruction of Berlin and in the relation between the two parts of the city. In social and political matters, Berlin is a highly sensitive

seismograph registering every political tremor and every socio-ideological shift on the European border between the competing power systems.

"Show-window," "Workshop of the Western World," "City of the Future," West Berlin is called in the West; "City of the Cold War," "Cancerous Growth on the Body-politic of the German Democratic Republic" are the epithets hurled at West Berlin by the Eastern propagandists. The Eastern sector, their own "capital," they call the "Visiting Card," "Pacemaker of the German Democratic Republic." Such slogans give some idea of what the inquisitive sociologist may learn through a comparative study of the realities in the two parts of the city.

In the present political controversy over Germany, West Berlin is particularly under attack, and for this reason deserves special sympathy and support. The Berliners and their political leaders are quite conscious of the duality of the position of their city, located as it is at the intersection of the national and the international political fronts. For years they have exerted great efforts not to allow the boundaries between the two parts to become frozen and, at the same time, to stand up strongly for reunification as the only possible means of restoring to the city the political and social functions appropriate to its geographical position. "The idea of unity," Ernst Reuter proclaimed as early as 1947, "is a question of life or death for us here in Berlin, without which we have in the long run no justification for existence." He maintained that Berlin must establish contact with the West but with the determination never to give up contact with the East. Reuter never tired of pointing out that provincialization of the city's politics and society would be unavoidable if in the end it did not win back the functions as a capital that it had been forced to relinquish under the shadow of the policy of *status quo*.

The special difficulties concerning Berlin's position and prospects that have arisen since the split in 1948 may be largely attributed to the loss of its former function as the capital. This loss had a multiplicity of political, sociological, and cultural consequences for the provisional societies that have come into existence on the two sides, East and West. In judging the present situation of the city, it should not be forgotten that, as my Berlin colleagues Bülow and Thalheim have pointed out in detail, nearly half


of the personal income in the twenties and the thirties was drawn from administrative and service jobs connected with the function of the city as capital.* The "Hydra, Berlin," so much decried by conservatives, drawing other advantages from its situation as capital, also occupied a leading position in all of Germany as a city of industry, business, transportation, and culture. As the center of industry and commerce, it drew upon the resources of every region and supplied all parts of the country with the products of its factories. Culturally, this old Berlin was not only closely connected with the surrounding countryside in the province of Brandenburg, but, as the capital, enjoyed the very best contacts with the former German territories in the East and constantly applied itself to the task of bringing these areas into social and cultural contact with the West.

On both sides it is evident, even under the cramping assumption of a temporary maintenance of the *status quo* internationally, that Berlin's survival ultimately depends upon its role as capital and that, therefore, its functions as a capital must be held in reserve and their recovery striven for in the city's social and political planning (with varying methods and purposes in the two sectors, of course). Even the powers that be in East Germany can see that Berlin undeniably must shrink to a provincial city in the long run, if it be reduced for the foreseeable future to the status of a residence of the Russian masters of the rump-Germany of the Soviet Zone. The entire reconstruction of West Berlin, so successful up to this time, makes sense only if—hopefully at the end of a short period of years—the functions of the community as a capital are restored.

II

Berlin—now divided into two parts with the Western part completely cut off from its hinterland and from its former routes of traffic, marketing, and exchange—is in an ecological sense a border region between the Western and the Eastern parts of Germany. The grotesque nonsense of the geographic and social isolation of West Berlin can be seen most vividly if one recalls that this formerly

* For the titles of these and other studies mentioned in this chapter, see the Select Bibliography, p. 189.



The effects of the splitting of Berlin. The separation of important municipal institutions and services is indicated symbolically. Map adapted from *Hauptstadt Berlin . . . Zahlenbilder aus Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur*. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1959.

united urban and rural area, stretching on the average a distance of forty miles from the center of the city and with factory sites and housing developments dotted around the perimeter, has been arbitrarily torn asunder. The history of city planning in Berlin, especially that which took place in the twenties and the early thirties, shows how much the city's functions in administration, industry, and trade influenced developments in land use and in facilities for traffic. Anyone who has studied this history carefully can understand how completely interdependent, both socially and economically, the city of Berlin and its provincial environment were, even after the collapse in 1945.

We must call to mind the comprehensive system of city and regional planning that was inaugurated in the city in the twenties, if we are to understand the peculiar difficulties that are encountered in the reconstruction of Berlin at the present time. We must also bear in mind the series of disturbing experiences which in the meantime have torn the pattern of the social and economic relationships between the city and its environment to shreds. First, there were the expedients of the war economy, and the politically motivated population movements and evacuations of the National Socialist period. Then came the massive damages at the end of the war and the loss of industrial installations inflicted by the cruel policy of dismantling. To these reductions of the industrial capacity of the city were added the loss of the former administrative organs of the Reich and the shrinkage of the demand in the service trades. Both of these were given a certain appearance of finality by the splitting of the city and its effective separation from both parts of Germany in 1948.

Furthermore, serious alterations in the population came with the influx of expellees from beyond the Oder-Neisse line and of refugees from the Soviet Zone. The population was also altered by the exodus of some "hereditary" Berliners and the return of others. The population of the city had reached 4.3 million before the war. From this figure it dropped to 2.8 million in 1945. Between 1945 and 1950 there was an influx of 537,000 people. From that time to the present the population of Greater Berlin has remained roughly 3.3 million. In the years following 1950, the most significant alteration in population has been the increased percentage of expellees and refugees in

the population of West Berlin. At the present time, no less than 7.2 per cent of the people living there are former residents of the areas beyond the Oder-Neisse and 6.1 per cent are from the Soviet Zone.

In spite of these difficulties, comprehensive plans for economic reconstruction have been revived in West Berlin and are now being carried forward. But long-term planning would obviously make no sense at all if it were not directed to the shaping of the entire region in which the community is located. It must, of course, also take into consideration the changes in social and economic relations and arrangements which have occurred in the past fourteen years. Therefore, the present reconstruction plans are, to use the words of Ludwig Lemmer, one of the experts in the field, being formulated and carried through "as if the unity of the city and its relationship to the hinterland were restored."

The changes in basic political, social, and ecological factors which affect Berlin's future may be observed now in the influences they have already exerted upon the present social structure. This is true not only of developments during the prewar and postwar period up to the lifting of the blockade, but also during the period from the first years of reconstruction in West Berlin (1950-51) to the present. The changes in social structure in both of these periods involve the familiar phenomena of horizontal and vertical mobility as well as displacements in the income pyramid, shifts in the occupational pattern, and changes in the levels of education and culture. As a result, class structure and the hierarchy of elite groups in the society have been modified in both parts of the city, albeit in quite different ways.

The delineation of all the ramifications of the process of social change in Berlin must be left to a comprehensive community study. Here I can only direct attention to some fundamental aspects resulting from changes in industrial location, production, and marketing, and to the effects of these on the occupational pattern. It may be assumed that the incidence of change in the past ten years has varied in a number of the sub-regions within the city. Differences in social and cultural conditions already existed in many areas, so the points of departure were not the same, and the adaptation to the stages of development contemplated in the reconstruction plans has not been as

rapid in some districts as in others. I allude to these minor variations only incidentally, because I must, as I have indicated, confine most of my attention to major trends and contrasts.

It will, of course, surprise no one that the changes in economic and social structure in West Berlin, which have been brought about partly by state aid and intervention and partly by private initiative, exhibit features quite different from those of the changes in the Eastern sector, which are wholly the product of central social and economic planning. It is important to emphasize, however, that out of the political situation have come contrasts in social life which grow greater year by year.

Berlin was, of course, before the war the chief center of governmental activity in Germany and at the time the largest industrial city. In 1939 no less than 46 per cent of the persons gainfully employed were engaged in service-rendering functions, in all some 877,000 people. The incomes and standard of living of this group were above the average of the Reich as a whole. The city was, as Thalheim and Storbeck have shown in detail, the seat of governmental and administrative officialdom, of the central offices of all the great social and economic associations, of the most important cultural institutions and organizations, of the publishing and bookselling business, of the newspaper and periodical press, of the most important banks, of wholesale and of many branches of retail trade, and, finally, of the motion picture industry. In consequence, the social structure was characterized by a broad segment consisting of clerical employees and officials engaged in many different occupational functions, and of many representatives of the independent professions. The proportion of craftsmen and industrial workers among those gainfully employed was also large—about 49 per cent or 900,000 persons. Thus this group was by no means smaller than the group mentioned above. It should also be noted that in such fields as the world-famous electro-technical industry, machine construction, ready-made clothing manufacture and the printing trades, an especially highly skilled type of worker was employed who was paid at rates higher than the average in the Reich as a whole. It may therefore be seen that, because of the very large group of skilled industrial workers and clerical employees in the city, the middle as well as the lower ranks in the

economic and social scale were well represented. For the same reason, the level of education and culture among the working population of Berlin was higher than in other large cities.

The factors already mentioned as contributing to changes in the social structure (war damages, dismantling, the "double" currency reform, the splitting of the city, the isolation from the hinterland, and so forth) have transformed the economic and social situation most radically in the Western parts of the city since the end of the blockade. As a result of the political events, there was a drastic shrinkage in economic activity. In 1950, the index of production in West Berlin was 22 (1936=100) as compared with the 110 which had already been reached at that time in the Federal Republic. The fundamental structure of the trades and industry in the city was still similar to that of the period before the war, except that all branches of industry were noticeably smaller, and, as a result of the division of the city, some important branches were torn apart. In 1950, the number of employees in West Berlin industry was only 40 per cent of the 1936 figure. Moreover, the former service-rendering functions had for the most part vanished, so that in addition to the large number of unemployed workers resulting from the lack of activity in industry, there were tens of thousands of former clerical workers and officials who were without means of livelihood. If the widespread temporary jobs are left out of consideration, the army of the unemployed reached its greatest number in February, 1950—309,000.

The growth of population through the influx of former prisoners of war, expellees, evacuated persons, and the steadily increasing stream of refugees from the Soviet Zone also enlarged the number of those whose social existence was precarious. The Berlin population had then—and still has—an abnormally large proportion of elderly people and women, and the statistical excess of deaths over births has remained more or less constant since 1950. The number of persons receiving pensions, annuities, or some form of public assistance had risen by the end of 1950 to 548,000, that is, to 25.5 per cent of the population. As compared with some 884,000 people who had some kind of work, there were at that time no less than 728,000 who belonged to the "crisis groups"—persons either unemployed or dependent upon pensions or public assistance.

A new group which was at a special disadvantage appeared with the splitting of the city. To it belong the people who live in one of the Western sectors but work in the Eastern sector, and those who live in the East but work in the West, the so-called "border-crossers." In 1950 this group included in all about 100,000 persons. Today the number has been reduced to about 50,000, among whom the people who come from the East to work in the West greatly outnumber the others. It is only through the establishment and operation by the West Berlin government of wage equalization payment offices that the peculiar economic and social difficulties of these workers have been somewhat alleviated.

Among those gainfully employed according to the 1950 census in Berlin, 12.3 per cent were self-employed or worked in family enterprises, while 36.1 per cent were clerical employees and 51.6 per cent were industrial workers or laborers. The radical reduction of incomes, standards of living and employment opportunities which followed the end of the war had produced a relatively uniform social situation throughout the greater part of the population, including employers, employees, and members of the "crisis groups" alike. That is to say, the contrasts between the occupational groups and the social classes were wiped away by the material need, the social insecurity, and the threat from the side of the Soviet Union. Only in this light can the behavior of the Berlin population during the blockade be fully understood.

Reconstruction set in later in Berlin than in the Federal Republic. Because of continuing difficulties in connection with the plans for financial and economic support and the many practical hardships encountered in their execution, progress has been slower in West Berlin than in West Germany. For instance, the length of the transportation routes to the Federal Republic has contributed greatly to the slow pace of recovery, as have also the search for new markets, the "slack tide" of population growth that has set in, and the imbalance in the labor market. Because the only possibility for Berlin, so long as it did not become in fact the capital of the Federation and thus win back its former service-rendering functions, lay in the reconstruction and extension of its industry, the measures undertaken to improve and modify the social

situation of its population have consisted primarily in promoting the growth of industry by political means.

The success up to this time has been impressive. I will mention only that industrial production, the marketing of industrial products, the number of firms, the number of employees, and the value of the total industrial product have all shown significant increases. The gross industrial product rose from 3.8 billion DM in 1950 to 9.036 billion DM in 1958.* The tax yield increased three fold from 1950 to 1958. The unfavorable balance of payment for goods and services had sunk to 1.2 billion DM in 1958. More than three billion DM of special European Recovery Program funds were spent in ten years solely in the financing of the economy. Pursuant to a large-scale and comprehensive Berlin Reconstruction Plan, worked out since 1955 with the support of the parliament and the government of the Federal Republic, progress is being made toward the reconstruction of Berlin as the future capital.

The social effects of the economic reconstruction in Berlin appear to indicate clearly that a development is taking place away from a mixed governmental, service-rendering, and industrial type of city and towards a city that is predominantly industrial. An obvious consequence has been a decrease in the extent, and sometimes the complete disappearance, of certain economic and social activities formerly important in the life of the city. In the present stage of the city's economic development, industrial production and marketing are the decisive factors in balancing its economy. In this connection I might point out that the proportion of industrial products in the goods exported in 1957 rose to 76 per cent. Altogether in that year, some 870,000 people were employed in 108,000 operating units in the West Berlin economy and governmental administration, of whom nearly 40 per cent were in industry. In the social structure, therefore, workers in a quite diversified industry were much more prominent than at the beginning of the reconstruction period. Some 40 per cent of these workers were employed in large factories. The number of clerical employees and officials in the public service

* After the currency reforms of 1948, carried on independently in the West and East, the old Reichsmarks (RM) were replaced in West Berlin by West German marks (DM-West) and in East Berlin by East German marks (DM-East). In these discussions, the expressions "German marks" or "DM" refer to West German marks.

has also increased since 1949. This indicates that a new administrative bureaucracy has come into existence. About 150,000 persons compose the new bureaucracy, however, so it cannot be compared to the much larger public administrative service which existed in Berlin before the war. The number of persons engaged in business and commerce has also increased in comparison to ten years ago, but still falls considerably short of the corresponding figures for 1936.

The trends which are producing increased industrialization, and a corresponding increase in the number of persons indirectly depend upon industry for their livelihood, continue to be affected by the relatively large burden of public welfare expenditures in Berlin. The number of recipients of pensions and of those dependent upon public welfare assistance is proportionately higher in West Berlin than in the Federal Republic. There were 138,000 persons in 1957 who lived by means of public assistance. Even in the best months of 1958, the number of unemployed did not fall below 60,000 persons. Some 42 per cent of these were formerly clerical employees, and the greater part of them were elderly women. The Berlin economy is not only burdened by the excessive number of older people in the population but also by a dearth of younger skilled workers. Wages, salaries, and the standard of living have risen in the past eight years, it is true. But the increased buying power of the population has been mainly directed towards more varied and more nourishing food, as is the case in the Federal Republic. Many of the unpleasant aspects of industrial society have put in an appearance in the social pattern of the municipal area, too. On the whole, West Berlin limps along even now considerably behind the prosperity and standard of living of the Federal Republic. The steady stream of refugees, of whom 165,000 had taken up residence in the Western sector by 1958, may have contributed a good deal to this.

The significant differences in economic functions, in occupational activities, in attitudes toward life, and in opportunities for upward social movement which have come to exist in present-day Berlin contrast sharply with conditions in the period previous to the reconstruction. These changes have led to new differentiations in group formation within the population. With the gradual improvement

of the economic situation, there has come upon many people even here in Berlin a feeling of relative economic and social security. Accompanying this, however, an increased sensitivity to political and social crisis has emerged.

The changes in the industrial site and production requirements of the economy, in the Berliners' attitude toward life, and in the social structure of their city have had an influence on the pattern of political organization and on the cultural and political activities of the city. These factors have affected the political parties, the labor unions, and the economic associations. They have affected certain encrustations in the inner texture of almost all of these organizations. They have influenced the kind of leadership that has arisen in the city, in some cases producing rivalry and in others cooperation.

About this complex of questions I shall observe in passing only that the harmonious cooperation among the non-Communist political parties that originally came about in response to the urgent demand for the political defense of West Berlin after the lifting of the blockade has been dissipated through a peculiarly complicated system of infighting among political groups often quite sharply opposed to each other in ideology and interests. With the change in social configuration and in the age-composition of the various political elites, the bureaucratic proliferation of the political organizations themselves, and the political and social apathy apparent in the population at large, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain the social consensus needed for the preservation of the city. Only in the face of such a blatant threat as the one expressed in the Khrushchev ultimatum is it possible to achieve political action of the unanimity and clarity of the elections on December 7, 1958.

The noteworthy efforts which the city in its isolation has made in the field of cultural advancement, and the remarkable success it has achieved in science, education, and art, do not blind anyone to the fact that precisely in this sector of social life much more needs to be done, not only to meet the competition with the cultural development in the East and elsewhere in the West, but also to establish the prerequisites for a cultural life worthy of a genuine capital. Berlin needs in this field still more material and spiritual support than it has received up to this time—with gratitude, let it be understood. It is not enough,

to mention only one example, to create excellent academic institutions provided with the most modern scientific equipment; the demand of the moment is to find in addition outstanding scholars and artists who have the courage to accept calls to Berlin even at a time when the recovery of its functions as the capital is not yet assured.

III

Were I now to attempt to draw some conclusions from this necessarily sketchy analysis of the transformation of the social structure of Berlin, they might be, first, that Berlin is a conspicuous example of a community reconstructed through political means. This young state has taken upon itself a number of important tasks in the economic, social, and cultural fields and has begun to fulfill them in ingenious ways through its principal governmental organs. Berlin can point to opportunities for more comprehensive, more successful political action than would normally fall to a city or state government in the Federation. Of course, the full record of these opportunities would amount to a history of the Berlin House of Representatives and of the city's various organs and bodies of political leadership. It suffices to point out that this political leadership has had to wield the instruments of internal and foreign policy without having independent or final control over them, and yet that, despite this impediment, the reconstruction of Berlin has been carried forward with great vigor.

Second, ever since the blockade and the final separation from the Eastern sector on November 30, 1948, Berlin's isolation has made contact with the West, and above all with the Federal Republic, indispensable. Such measures as the requirement of special certificates to accompany shipments of goods through the Soviet Zone and special passes for persons visiting the zone, and the confiscation of West Berlin landed property lying in the Eastern sector, have only intensified that isolation. The relatively small inter-zonal trade and the few remaining indirect contacts with the Eastern sector and the Soviet Zone have not eased it. Berlin turns its face to the West not only because of the community of fundamental principles with regard to the forms of political and social life, but also for reasons of pure self-preservation. The association with the West is, furthermore, necessary for Berlin in order to strengthen

its position as a "bridge" to the eastern regions of Germany and to preserve its potential functions as the capital.

Third, the spontaneous powers of the community are a decisive factor in the political and social reconstruction of Berlin. Among these I would include the creative energy and occupational skills of its industrial workers and clerical classes, the enterprise of its businessmen, the stubborn will-to-live of the members of its middle class in general, the political calmness, the sense of reality, and the consciousness of the significance of freedom in all levels and groups of its population, and the courage of its political leadership. These forces have somehow managed to forge themselves into an alignment for political action that is not without its contradictions but up to this time has always proved effective in the end. The power of this alignment was particularly apparent at the time of the blockade, but has endured in the face of repeated threats, temptations, and hardships instigated by the functionaries of the Soviet Zone, and in spite of many internal disappointments in the process of reconstruction. Seen from within, Berlin is unmistakably determined to make itself as a community capable of resistance economically and culturally, and to prepare itself to fulfill those functions as the capital which it hopes will again come to it in the future.

Fourth, Berlin, separated as it has been from all its natural connections, would not have been able to survive without the material and spiritual assistance that it has received from the outside—from the Western occupation powers, especially the United States, from the Federal Republic and the German states and municipalities, and from private and international institutions and organizations of all kinds. The difficulties of the state in the reconstruction of its economic and social life are manifold and they never disappear. Many still unsolved or inevitably only half-solved problems remain. The continuing interruption of the traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic, the necessity of caring for the refugees as they come in and assisting their transportation to the West, and the heavy obligations assumed through the extension of the social welfare laws of the Federal Republic to Berlin are good examples.

The assistance given to Berlin undoubtedly helps the private businessmen, the workers, and the merchants, but it serves primarily the social and political purposes of the

community at large by maintaining its capacity to survive. The view, sometimes expressed even in serious studies, that the purpose of the measures taken to support Berlin is chiefly to insure the competitive capacity and profitability of the business firms, and thereby to compensate for the political risks that every businessman and shopkeeper in Berlin has to accept, overlooks the more comprehensive economic, social, and cultural purposes that aid to Berlin fundamentally serves. West Berlin will not be able to survive unless it is superior to the Soviet sector and the Soviet Zone economically, socially, and culturally—and this superiority must be preserved even if its isolation lasts a long time, which may be the case. This superiority is necessary, moreover, not merely in quantitative matter, such as specific industrial accomplishments as represented by production figures, but above all in the quality of the total social and cultural achievement.

West Berlin is an artificially created community, but, on the sound basis of its own capacity to work and will-to-live, and with assistance from the outside, it has proved that it is capable of surviving. It feels the impact of an even more sharply drawn political and economic competition between the two German states—between, that is, the ways of life manifesting themselves in each of the states. Its tasks are determined by these circumstances, even to the prejudice of many of its own wishes as a political society.

Fifth, the reconstruction of the Berlin community in the past ten years is in many ways a courageous social experiment. It has by no means been true, as visitors may conclude, that the fundamental features of the rebuilding were settled in advance and that there was complete agreement about them among all the leading participants. On the contrary, there were many sharp controversies both within and without, there were many disappointments and some detours along the way, and on occasions some emergency exits had to be found. One would have to study the history of the reconstruction very thoroughly to distinguish even approximately between the fundamentally necessary features of the plan, those which were the results of unavoidable compromises, and those which were merely expedients that satisfied nobody. The reading of the pertinent contemporaneous accounts of the political and social development shows with what disappointment and difficul-

ties the road was paved along which the leaders and the groups responsible for the development have thus far traveled.

Sixth, this Berlin is, nevertheless, no heroic city and the people of Berlin are least of all the ones to think of themselves as the heroes of economic reconstruction. The high political morale of blockade times gave expression to a stubborn will to resist rather than to any high-flown political idealism. Such dreams aren't the kind of thing that can be maintained for ten years. The relative stabilization of the social and political life of the city and of the psychological responses of its people has led to the same kind of frictions and conflict situations that one finds in other industrial societies, and that are familiar to every sociologist. One of Berlin's difficulties seems to me to be that, because of the constant tension in the internal and international political situation and the sustained political vigilance demanded of every citizen, neither a well-balanced political parliamentary system with the usual interplay between government and opposition, nor any kind of clear equilibrium among the various interest groups, has come into operation. The opposing interests and political opinions sometimes confront each other with great obstinacy. Moreover, the suspicion that the representatives of some interest groups mask their real motives with what may be called ideological pretense cannot be dismissed out of hand.

IV

A study of the transformation of the social structure of West Berlin would not be complete without bringing in the relationships in East Berlin for purposes of comparison. Western political observers are inclined simply to assume the political, economic, and social situation in the Eastern part of Berlin reproduces the situation in the Soviet Zone as a whole. This assumption is not entirely accurate.

After ten years of separation from the Western parts of the city, the political, the economic, and the social aspects of life in East Berlin are quite different in many important particulars from the corresponding aspects of life in West Berlin. The basic industrial structure of the Soviet sector of the city—on the evidence, at least, of the relocation of the most important branches of industry and the reconstruction of the traffic system—indicates quite clearly a

departure from the former unity of the Berlin economic area.

Of the 3,300,00 inhabitants of Berlin, 1,130,000 live in what the Communists call the "democratic sector." In area, the difference between West Berlin and East Berlin is not so great—185 sq. mi. as compared to 155 sq. mi. Of the twenty districts in Greater Berlin, eight now belong to the East, including districts inhabited chiefly by working-class families, such as Friedrichshain and Prenzlauer Berg, and the very badly damaged inner city which has been still further deformed through the nature of the reconstruction that has taken place.

East Berlin is already more closely integrated with the so-called German Democratic Republic than West Berlin is with the Federal Republic, due to the uniformity of Soviet social planning. It claims for itself (and potentially for a Communist-controlled Greater Berlin) the functions of a capital and also of an administrative district in the "German Democratic Republic." For tactical reasons, the role as capital had not been particularly emphasized until recently, although nearly all of the central administrative offices of the state, of the Socialist Unity Party and of the "mass organizations" were located in the city. Since the beginning of the present Berlin crisis, however, all this has changed—East Berlin is now proclaimed "the capital of the German Democratic Republic" with great fanfare.

The concentration of administrative establishments in the city has led to the building up of a ramified bureaucracy, which gives to East Berlin the social configuration typical of a center of Soviet administration. In social life and political affairs, at any rate, the Eastern sector has almost fully adjusted itself to the relationships prevailing in the Soviet Zone, although some observers claim that the way of life in East Berlin differs from the more distant regions of the zone in degree of liberality, due to the indirect social influences emanating from West Berlin.

It is an important feature of the political and social reality in Berlin that all administrative functions and all institutions of any public significance are divided right down the line, with the exception of remnants, some of which are actually concealed. That is true of the political constitution and the system of law as well as of the city administration, the transportation system, and all public utilities,

of the currency and the structure of the economy, and of all of the so-called "forms of collective life."

The few administrative and public-service arrangements in which loose connections between East and West remain in effect are difficult to identify. I might point out however, that the police offices are connected by teletype, and police technical personnel still meet each other at pre-arranged places on the sector borders in cases of certain types, such as capital crimes. The postal services exchange letters and packages daily at a specified point on the sector borders. The interurban elevated railway (S-Bahn) and the subway (U-Bahn) are the only systems of public transportation that operate in both parts of the city. For purposes of drainage, West Berlin still needs the filter plants and sewage basins of the Soviet Zone. Traffic goods and services between West Berlin and the German Democratic Republic, and between West Berlin and East Berlin as well, is subject to the regulations applying to interzonal trade, that is, on both sides it can be carried on only with the use of official permits.

Officially, the constitution of the German Democratic Republic is not in effect in the Soviet sector, but the sector actually is being more and more incorporated into the body politic of the "German Democratic Republic." All laws and ordinances of the zone are put into effect in East Berlin by special ordinances issued by its own city council (Magistrat). As I have already observed, however, it is through being drawn into the system of planned economy that East Berlin is most firmly attached to the German Democratic Republic. This attachment goes so far that the yearly economic plan of the sector is included in that of the German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, since 1952 East Berlin has been included in the "unified budget" of the German Democratic Republic. Its city administration is subjected to the kind of rigid control by the central government which is usual in Soviet political organization. In administrative practice, the sector is regarded as a district of the German Democratic Republic in the fields of economic planning, labor regulation, social welfare policy, and cultural policy. The social life is, therefore, subject to the same patterns of leadership and the same compulsions that exist in the Soviet Zone as a whole. East Berlin had to take part in the "administrative reform" of 1952, with the consequent extension of governmental powers, and in

the shift to the so-called "building up of socialism." It had to adopt the "new course," just as it must submit to the current restoration of Stalinistic emphases in the Ulbricht policies.

A significant influence upon the social structure of East Berlin is that the number of industrial workers and clerical employees in the total number of persons gainfully employed is extraordinarily high. In 1956, according to the official statistics of the German Democratic Republic, there were 567,000 workers and clerical employees out of a total of 611,00 persons gainfully employed; only 4 per cent of such persons are listed in the official statistics as independent craftsmen or shopkeepers. Moreover, it is interesting to note that more than half of the employed persons are engaged in the electrotechnical, the metal, and the machine building industries, a pattern which is similar to the one which exists in West Berlin. Economic planning in the German Democratic Republic as a whole contemplates an increasing concentration in the industrial production of East Berlin. However, the changes in social structure produced by forced industrialization in the Soviet Zone as a whole are taking place more slowly in East Berlin. For instance, the number of independent tradesmen and shopkeepers has sunk less rapidly there than in other parts of the Eastern Zone. Also, the creation of producers' cooperatives among the craftsmen limps noticeably behind the corresponding development in the zone. In the fall of 1958, out of 11,000 handicraft workshops in East Berlin only 198 had been brought together in some 76 producers' cooperatives. In addition, the number of private businesses in East Berlin in 1957 was more than double the number of so-called socialized businesses, though the latter employed more than seven times as many workers as the former.

In contrast to West Berlin, the number of people gainfully employed in the Eastern sector has grown very little in the past few years, in spite of the increase in the number of clerical employees in the public service. Presumably this static condition is due to the continuing flight of East Berliners to the West, and to the extraordinarily unfavorable age-structure of the population. The population of East Berlin has steadily decreased since 1950 and, in view of the expected effects of industrialization on its composition, its quality has deteriorated in comparison to

the population of the zone at large. In May, 1958, the Magistrat of East Berlin set up a "Scientific Advisory Council for the Improvement of the Structure of the Population" designed to bring about improvement in this matter. There are, on the other hand, almost no unemployed.

The (West) German Federation of Labor Unions, Berlin District, published in October, 1955, a careful and extraordinarily informative study by Rudolf Hentschel that compares the social situation of the employees in East and West Berlin. This study shows quite clearly that the differential in wages, prices, and standards of living in the two parts of the city was in West Berlin's favor, at least up to that time. For instance, for the seven-year period, 1948 to 1955, there was in West Berlin an increase in real wages 40 per cent greater than the corresponding increase in East Berlin. Also, it appears from the study that the general earning situation of the West Berlin employees is more favorable, and above all more stable, than that of his East Berlin counterpart. East Berlin is unable to keep up with West Berlin in many aspects of economic and social competition, although the standard of living has increased there in the last few years, and, as the "show-window of the German Democratic Republic," East Berlin is considerably better off than the other districts in the Soviet Zone.

Although this lag in development in comparison to the West is not officially recognized in the Soviet Zone publications, nowadays it is quite openly admitted that in the "fulfillment of the people's economic plan" the "Berlin district" has fallen behind the other districts of the Soviet Zone. In the ranking of the various districts in this respect, East Berlin stands thirteenth or fourteenth. "The necessary resurgence of leadership in the activities of the state and the economy is proceeding too slowly," the *Neues Deutschland* of April 4, 1959, commented. The official polemicists in the sector decry the idea of a "special place for Berlin," which they say is rampant there, and demand that East Berlin become "economically, politically, and culturally the pacemaker for the entire Republic."

The difficulty that the East Berlin government apparently has in accelerating the social and political development in that community to the same tempo prevailing in the other regions of the zone is probably attributable to the division of the city, although this is never admitted, and to

the inability of the rulers over there—at least so far—to prevent human contacts across the sector borders, especially those based on kinship or friendship. In this respect, Greater Berlin is more a unit than the responsible officials of the state and city governments in the Wilhelmstrasse and the Königstrasse wish it to be.

The clear conclusion of these observations is that it would be impossible to transform this threatened island, Berlin, sensitive as it is to disturbing influences of every kind, into any such autonomous social unit, independent of Germany as a whole, as that apparently contemplated in the shabby insinuations of the Khrushchev note. Autonomy for Berlin would have no prospects of success even if a social system differing alike from the one existing in the Federal Republic and the one existing in the "German Democratic Republic" were created.

West Berlin has tried, with good success up to this time, to hold itself above water, economically and politically, in such a way as to preserve its potential as the capital of Germany. It may well claim for itself even today a place among the great cities of the world. Its political leadership has been and is today guided by the determination to withstand the serious ordeal in the present period of the city's development in the manner most beneficial to its people, and at the same time to strengthen the political mechanism and the social organism of the community for the tasks which must be faced in the future. It is notable that the social values and the political principles indispensable to a free society have never been called into question in the politics of West Berlin from the time of Ernst Reuter through that of Otto Suhr to that of Willy Brandt.

The silent tragedy, but the great hope of this city as well, lies in the idea that dominates it—the reconstruction of the unity of Germany and of the functions of Berlin in the future German social order. The soul of West Berlin is not to be found in the "economic miracle" occurring there—after all, that is inevitably only half a miracle—but in the political courage and the active will-to-be-free of its people. Through all the worry over the political and economic survival of Berlin, it seems to me that the major factor determining the course of events in the city is the

presence of these convictions in the Berliners. One can only hope that they will not slip on the slick ice of the fictitious autonomy promised by those who wish to transform them into an "independent free city," but will instead retain their calm and courage, which are naturally hostile to ideologies of all kinds.

Many intellectuals, brooding over the current situation and the various choices confronting Berlin, seem to be inclined toward a very risky experiment. "Should not we at least give the internationalized free city a try?" they say. "Perhaps this is really a way of developing in Berlin a form of free society which escapes the totalitarian compulsion of the Soviet social policy, but at the same time avoids the obvious weaknesses of the Western social order." Those who are intrigued by such vague notions should carefully consider the consequences of establishing a so-called free city under the present conditions in Berlin and the area surrounding it. The history of Berlin's struggle against domination, above all the experiences and actions during the blockade, should be most instructive. Neutralization for this city would mean complete economic, social, and political impotence and enforced dependence upon the powers that then would really have the approaches to the community at their disposal.

If Berlin ever has to give up developing itself socially, politically, and economically in the direction of its future as a capital, then it will certainly deteriorate into a provincial city. Unless it continues under the assumption that it is preparing for this future, it will lose its vigor and, as a small, weak democracy, will—in the words of a clever English journalist—be "put under tutelage" to that power that is willing to ease its poverty with alms. Even a High Commissioner of the United Nations would offer no protection against such a fate as that.

It would be an interesting task for the political sociologist to study the two examples that history offers of the consequences of a free-city solution to a complex international problem—Danzig and Trieste. The effect of international status upon the political climate of these cities, their economic situation, and their social structure, should be investigated. What seems obvious is that no "pacification" occurred in either case, but rather centers of new and dangerous political conflicts were created. Even more significant,

both cities were condemned to economic and social-political stagnation.

These two examples—even disregarding the entirely different geographical situation of Berlin as compared with two port cities—really offer little encouragement that the solution of the Berlin problem can be satisfactorily achieved in the way the Soviets suggest. The advantages of an internationalized free city of Berlin that have been proclaimed by Khrushchev and that were afterwards broadcast by the propaganda agencies of the Soviet Zone are not convincing. Such propaganda simply overlooks the fact that the problem of Berlin cannot be settled in isolation; it is intimately bound up with the conditions necessary for the survival of the city.

In view of Berlin's size, its social-geographic position and its political-social importance, Berlin can be preserved as a community capable of development only if, through the play of diplomatic forces and supported by a movement of public opinion in all of Germany, it is finally restored to its natural functions as the capital city of Germany.

The Economic Viability of Berlin

FRANZ KLUGE

THE ESSAYS IN THIS SERIES MAY BE REGARDED AS VARIATIONS upon a theme. Because they are variations, it is unavoidable that many things are said again and again. But only in this way can the interrelations of the several aspects of a complex situation be understood.

My phase of the theme, itself, is not simple, and requires that we make use of some rather complicated ways of thinking. I want to say at the outset that many of the statistics are not to be accepted as exact figures, but rather as round numbers designed to aid in gaining a general understanding of the problem. My theme is, furthermore, not one that is apt to put us into a gay frame of mind, but a somewhat serious one, for here we are concerned with a question that affects every Berliner directly. It is the question of Berlin's economic and social existence.

What does the term "viability" really mean? This is a word that appeared in the newspapers frequently in the years directly after the Second World War. The reference was to the capacity of the European countries to survive. These countries had been seriously weakened by the war and needed help from America, which was brought to them through the Marshall Plan. The objective of this plan was to aid these countries to regain their viability, that is—to put it quite simply—to put them on their own feet again, so that they might under their own power maintain a satisfactory standard of living and a normal balance of trade.

Here in Berlin we still have to cope with this problem. In order to get the sense of the particular nature of the problem in Berlin, we must look back a little, because a knowledge of the past is necessary for an understanding of the present. After all, the problems that we are

concerned with today are for the most part the problems of yesterday and the day before. A wise man once said that problems should be solved while they are still small. But he was, unlike most of us, a *wise* man, and people do not generally solve their problems when they are little, but wait instead until they are very big indeed. That will probably never change.

In 1945 Berlin was a city condemned to death. All the foundations of its life had been taken out from under it. The income arising from its functions as a capital—half the basis of its economy—was gone, for the German Reich, whose capital it was, existed no longer. Of the other half of its economic base, its industry, scarcely anything at all was left, for the factories were either destroyed or dismantled.

This city might have suffered the fate of ancient Rome. The population of ancient Rome is said to have reached 1.8 million at the highest point of the city's development, but some time after the destruction of the Roman Empire in the West the city was reduced to less than twenty thousand inhabitants because it had no longer any basis for existence. We have only to look around us to see that Berlin, and especially West Berlin, has emphatically not suffered this fate. But we did not know in 1945 that we would escape it. That year was the point of absolute zero, in which inflation was out of hand and barter-exchange was the order of the day. No one thought in terms of normal living conditions.

It was important, however, that at that time goods could be brought in from Western Germany without any return in goods or services being required. Foodstuff and raw materials, especially, flowed from Western Germany to Berlin and into the Soviet Zone. While the Soviet Union was taking reparations out of Berlin and the Soviet Zone, and was dismantling the factories and making the industry incapable of operating, the aid coming from the Western powers served in part to make this reparations policy possible. At that time, when the confiscatory tax laws imposed by the Control Council were in force, there was a flood of money into the public treasury—even in Berlin. When the first currency revaluation occurred, a sum of

1.2 billion Reichsmarks was on hand in the city treasury. The city administration, therefore, did not have any financial worries. This excess of money was naturally not well suited to bringing public expenditures into adjustment with the limited industrial productivity, an adjustment that had to be made, of course, in the private area of the economy. The situation, however, changed fundamentally as a result of the currency reform that ended the inflation. The balance on hand in West Berlin at the end of 1948—that is, at the time that the splitting of the city government was completed—was six million DM. The veil had now been removed and reality came clearly into view.

Before the split, public expenditures accounted for about half of the personal income of the people of Berlin (what is called “national income” in American parlance, applied to the city-level). The apparatus which developed in the period of inflation when plenty of money was on hand led to a top-heavy situation which still is a problem in Berlin. During the blockade the economy operated relatively well. The balance in the public treasury remained intact. The subsidies from the treasuries of the Allies, the so-called GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) assistance came to Berlin in the form of provisions. The City Council (Magistrat) sold these provisions and the proceeds went into the city treasury, which received from 55 to 60 million marks from this source each month. After the blockade was lifted, this aid was brought to an end within three months. Now the city administration had to make out on its own income from taxes.

The result of the termination of subsidies was a period of continuing deficits, which finally led to the first program of assistance from West Germany. In June 1949, a special tax for the relief of Berlin was instituted in Bizonia—the British and American zones. At the same time the states, or *Länder*, of West Germany declared themselves ready to put 37.5 million DM at the disposal of West Berlin each month. That was the beginning of the assistance which still plays an important role in maintaining the economic and social balance of our city. The sudden stopping of the GARIOA assistance indicates that the economic problem was regarded at the time solely as a matter of overcoming difficulties caused by the blockade. The significance of the fundamental change in economic structure that the city had to face up to was not as yet

recognized. People just did not see the real roots of the problem—the financial incapacity of the city to make the public expenditures that were needed for a population of millions. There was nothing in the city at that time that could be called modern industry. There were only improvised factories equipped with machinery dug from the rubble. It soon became clear that not much could come out of this “industry” to give the city the economic foundation that it required. In the fiscal year 1949-50, the public expenditures of the city amounted to 1.75 billion DM. The net social product, the so-called “national income,” reached only three billion. More than half of the “national income” thus came from public expenditure. And of the 1.75 billion in public outlay in the city, only 615 million came from its own tax revenue.

The same situation existed in the fiscal year, 1950-51. Because 60 per cent of the “national income” came directly from the public budget, the city was the chief employer. In effect, the economy depended upon official handouts for goods and services. If the city had followed the practice which is normal in private business, that is, if it had cut its expenditures to a level commensurate with the available resources, the result would have been not only a radical reduction in administrative personnel but a widespread curtailment of public contracts for goods and services as well. There were sound objections to such a policy. Perhaps the most important of them was that unemployment, which at the beginning of 1950 had reached the figure of 300,000, would have increased tremendously as a result. Consequently, to avoid additional disturbances of the economic and social equilibrium, a radical reduction in public expenditures was never undertaken. It is important to note, however, that many of the economic problems we have to cope with today, including the question of balancing the budget of the city of Berlin, have their origin in this situation.

II

As I have already pointed out, West Berlin has lost its functions as a capital. One of the results in that industry is the decisive factor at the base of its economic situation. Tourist traffic, the Federal administrative offices now located here, and a few other income sources are without

doubt important, because every bit of growth that can be achieved improves the balance of production. Nevertheless, when one looks at the total picture, it becomes clear that the economic existence of West Berlin in the present political situation can only be based upon industry—that is, upon industrial products which are marketed in West Germany and abroad. So long as Berlin as a whole cannot be the capital of our reunited fatherland, West Berlin must live as an industrial city. The recognition of this fact amounts, at the same time, to a program for the city's development. Although reassuring progress has been made, the realization of this program is by no means a simple process. The recognition that West Berlin can survive only by means of industry, furthermore, does not mean at all that it can dispense with its traditional role as the capital. We all know that. Our discussion of the possibilities and limitations of industrialization in West Berlin should be carried on with the clear understanding that this role as capital is, in the end, essential to the economic self-sufficiency of the city.

It has been clear from the outset, then, that only through the reconstruction of industry could a new economic foundation be created for West Berlin. What was done immediately after 1945, though it involved exemplary cooperation between employers and employees, had to be merely improvisation. In the early months of 1950, when credits from American counterpart funds began to flow in, a systematic and accelerated reconstruction of West Berlin industry became possible for the first time.* It is clearly the realization that under present conditions Berlin can exist only as a city of big industry that has led to reconstruction policy in which both business and government cooperate. Here is an instance which shows that commerce and government can reinforce each other—that assistance rendered by the government can foster the entrepreneurial initiative

* Under the European Recovery Program, loans were made for the reconstruction of factories, the purchase of new machinery, and other capital improvements in West Berlin from "counterpart funds"—the DM equivalent of dollar allocations made to Germany by the United States through the Economic Cooperation Administration. GARIOA counterpart funds had been used principally for relief and public works not specifically designed to improve the efficiency of the economy. See Hubert G. Schmidt, *Economic Assistance to West Berlin 1949-1951* (Historical Division, Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952), pp. 13-44.

without which no measures of governmental assistance can be effective.

In this process of reconstruction not only American credits, but the securities underwritten by the Berlin Senate, and finally the aid and development program set up by the government and the legislature of the Federal Republic as well, played principal roles.* We should also remember that it was fortunate for us that the "economic miracle" of the reconstruction boom in West Germany as a whole opened up a market that has made it possible to sell the goods produced by the increasing industrial capacity of West Berlin.

In order to appreciate the results achieved through these strenuous efforts on the part of commerce and government, it must be recalled that the beginnings were very difficult. War damages and dismantling meant that industry had lost almost all its capital. As reconstruction led to initial successes, lack of operating capital became a problem, because the credits from counterpart funds were channeled principally into capital investments, whereas operations had to be financed by means of bank credits. But the banks in West Berlin were only recently established and were relatively tender little plants. The revaluation and release of blocked accounts improved the situation somewhat.† Besides, the rates of growth of 30 per cent and more that were attained by some industries in the years of rapid expansion could scarcely be improved upon. Businesses that must begin again at the very bottom, and that are dependent chiefly upon the energy of the men engaged in them, must grow organically, and this growth takes time. Normally in such industries, production cannot be doubled from year to year.

There was yet another difficulty. In the time of the old currency and of nearly complete separation from the West, the economy of Berlin had oriented itself toward the Soviet Zone. This was unavoidable. Now the currency reform brought about the separation from the hinterland. The markets of eastern and central Germany were no longer available. It was necessary, therefore, to find new

* The Senate, composed of ministers (Senators) under the chairmanship of the Governing Mayor, is the executive organ of the West Berlin government.

† On May 5, 1945, all bank accounts in the Soviet Zone and in Berlin were blocked. Some of these were released at the ratio of 20 RM:1 DM (West) in West Berlin on December 21, 1949.

markets in western Germany and abroad in order to make the marketing of the new industrial production possible. The opening of these new markets is a commercial achievement which merits full recognition, especially because it came at a time when the psychological aftereffects of the blockade, which were only gradually overcome, were still present.

On the basis of the number of persons employed, West Berlin has again become the largest industrial city in Germany. But—and this is something of a paradox—this largest industrial city in Germany can also be regarded as an underdeveloped area, because its industry is too small to give any city of 2.2 million people an adequate economic foundation. In 1959, a production index of 133 (1936=100) had been reached. This means that the industry of West Berlin produced nearly one-third more in 1959 than in 1936.* The comparable index of industrial production for the area of the Federal Republic as a whole, however, was 255.

It is sometimes pointed out that 500,000 to 600,000 people have left Berlin and that this exodus must be taken into consideration in any comparison of the industrial development of West Berlin with that of West Germany. In 1936, the number of inhabitants in West Berlin was 2.7 million. It may be assumed that half of these, or 1.35 million, depended upon industrial production for their livelihood. Today the total number of inhabitants in the city is 2.2 million. In view of the fact that now the only source of livelihood for all West Berliners is industry, 63 per cent more people must be supported by industrial production than in 1936. What this means is that West Berlin would have to have a current production index of 163 instead of 133 to assure its population a standard of living equal to that it enjoyed in the prewar period. The standard of living in Western Germany as a whole is higher today than it was before the war. We have seen that for the year 1959 the index of industrial production in the Federal Republic was 255 (1936=100). The number of inhabitants in the Federal Republic has increased by 36 per cent. If one puts the populations in appropriate relationship, it can be seen that the degree of

* The economy of West Berlin improved greatly in 1959 as compared to 1958, the year used for this statistical comparison in the original lecture. The author has therefore supplied the latest figures.

industrialization per unit of population is 88 per cent greater in the Federal Republic than it was in 1936, whereas in West Berlin there is a deficit in comparison with 1936, in terms of the degree of industrialization in relation to the number of people that depend upon industry for livelihood.

This deficit is all the more significant because industry is the one decisive factor in determining the living conditions of the Berlin population. The favorable relation between the increase of the population and the growth of industrial production in the area of the Federal Republic has made an improvement in the standard of living possible. On the other hand, in West Berlin, because of the change in economic structure proceeding from loss of its functions as a capital, the increase in industrial production has not been sufficient to allow a prewar standard of living. The point is that a difference in living standards that is unfavorable to Berlin must be avoided. It is imperative that the standard of living in Berlin be equal to that in West Germany not merely because the people of Berlin take it for granted that it should be, but for strong political reasons as well. To achieve this end, an index of industrial production of more than 200 would be required.

Why is it that the standard of living reached in West Germany plays such a role in Berlin? Why do I emphasize the political implications of all this? The size of the population of West Berlin must at least remain constant. It cannot be allowed to diminish, because in that case the political power of the city would become smaller. It is absolutely necessary to have a sufficient number of jobs and enough income to support 2.2 million people in order to preserve the city's social and economic equilibrium. It can be said that this equilibrium has been achieved, more or less. But we must understand that it is a subsidized equilibrium—dependent upon subventions from the outside. What does it mean to have an equilibrium that is dependent upon subventions?

In June, 1952, the Third Transitional Law went into effect. This law incorporated West Berlin into the financial system of the Federation, and ensured at the same time the acceptance of Federal laws in the city, that is, legal unity with the Federal Republic. The currency reform of 1948 had already introduced a uniform currency,

and had made West Berlin a part of the West German economic area. Now came the next step, which produced the even closer connection with the Federal area that was to be of fundamental importance in the further development of the city. The Federal Government obligated itself, in the so-called German Contract, to maintain a certain level of money in circulation in West Berlin. It obligated itself, furthermore, to promote the marketing of the products of West Berlin industry.

What does maintaining a certain level of money in circulation mean? If a community such as West Berlin—which can, to a certain degree, be regarded as a national economy—pays out more than it takes in, then the money flows out. In our case the West German marks, that is DM, would flow out to West Germany. In West Berlin, consequently, there would be less money in circulation. Deflation with all its consequences, including mounting unemployment, would be unavoidable. The city would in the end revert to the considerably lower economic levels it was able to maintain on its own. The agreement in the codicil to the German Contract protects the city from just this. No less important is the obligation assumed by the Federal Republic to take measures to promote the marketing of the products of West Berlin industry. As a result of these measures, West German marks are flowing into West Berlin. Thus the two commitments of the Federal government serve the same purpose—the improvement of the social and economic equilibrium in our city.

Inclusion in the financial system of the Federal Republic means that the Federation has taken over in West Berlin, also, those functions which it performs in the other West German states, and that the Federal taxes are also collected in West Berlin. In addition, special assistance goes to West Berlin that must not be confused with the normal contributions made by the Federation to all the states. In the fiscal year 1950-51, for instance, the city received a special subsidy of 500 million DM. The Federal Republic was unable to contribute the full amount, so European Recovery Program funds were drawn upon to make up the difference. Strains upon the city treasury led again and again to difficulties that were bridged over by means of negotiations with the Federal Minister of Finance. In the end, a general agreement covering all aspects of the financial assistance of the Federation to West

Berlin was worked out, in order to stabilize the mechanism of financial support as much as possible.

The inclusion of West Berlin in the West German financial system means, in addition, that the city is drawn into the Federal system of social insurance, that it receives credits which the Federation extends to the other states, and that many other benefits accrue to it as well. These financial benefits bring purchasing power to Berlin. They are, in effect, transfers of purchasing power from West Germany to West Berlin. That is, they enable West Berlin as a whole to buy more than it is able to pay for with the products of its own industry. Moreover, since the money coming in from West Germany circulates in West Berlin, individual West Berliners can buy more of their own products, and sales and therefore employment are increased. Without this transfer of purchasing power, in short, Berlin would inevitably have either much more unemployment or a smaller population.

III

How large is the transfer of purchasing power that comes through official payments from the Federal Republic to West Berlin and West Berliners? Deducting the taxes that are paid back to the Federal Republic from Berlin, it amounts to some 1.6 billion DM yearly. In 1959 West Berlin shipped products of its industry to West Germany and abroad to the value of about 6.7 billion DM. In contrast to the transferred purchasing power, this total sum could not be spent for the things the people of Berlin needed. Part of it had to go for the purchase of raw materials and industrial equipment required to produce the goods exported. Actually, Berlin can spend on itself only that part of the yield from the sale of the goods it exports which represents the value added in manufacturing them. This "added value" is estimated at about 42 per cent of the gross industrial turnover. That means that the export of industrial products amounting to about 6.7 billion DM netted Berlin only about 2.5 to 3 billion DM in purchasing power for the needs of its population as consumers.

But the funds transferred through official channels from the Federal Republic, once taxes returned to the Federal Republic are deducted, represent pure buying power. The

principal item in this transfer is the financial aid of the Federation to the city budget. This comes chiefly as a direct subsidy but part of it takes the form of credits. For the year 1960 the direct subsidy and credits together will amount to about 1.2 billion DM.

In addition, about 600 million DM flow into Berlin each year in social insurance benefits because the unfavorable age structure of the population makes it impossible to meet these payments out of the collections made in the city. Then there are payments from the Federal Republic for certain pensions which come entirely from public funds. Moreover, a great deal of money flows into Berlin in payments of the kinds that are made to all of the states of the Federation. Together, the insurance benefits, the pensions, and the payments just mentioned amount to some 1.7 billion DM each year.

Adding up the aid provided through the city budget and the funds mentioned in the preceding paragraph gives us 2.9 billion DM as the total amount of Federal funds coming into Berlin in the fiscal year. In order to get the net amount of purchasing power that is transferred, we must, of course, subtract from this sum about 1.3 billion DM that the Federal government collects in taxes in West Berlin each year. This is how we arrive at 1.6 billion DM as the net amount of purchasing power that is transferred to Berlin through payments from the Federal Republic yearly.

The tax concessions extended to the West Berlin economy and to West Berliners are not taken into consideration in arriving at this figure. They include preferential treatment in Berlin in regard to the tax on business transactions ("turnover tax"), and partial remission of the income tax. There are also certain tax concessions to businesses in West Germany which import goods from West Berlin. As measures that tend to promote business in West Berlin, all of these tax concessions may be regarded as an indirect transfer of purchasing power. If allowance were to be made for them, the figure given above as 1.6 billion DM would have to be raised to about 2 billion DM in net purchasing power transferred.

I have spoken of the transfer of purchasing power and I have also used the word assistance. Is there a difference here? Some examples may show what I mean. If the Federal Republic subscribes a certain sum of money to the

budget of Berlin to meet the ordinary expenses of the city government, that is undoubtedly assistance. But the case of the subsidies from West Germany for pensions paid in West Berlin is somewhat different. The pensioners receive their pensions in fulfillment of legal claims according to our laws. They would receive their pensions even if they lived in the Black Forest region. Is the sum of money paid to West Berlin for this purpose, then, assistance in the literal sense of the word? Another actual example may be cited. A man who lives in the area of the Federal Republic, but who has some kind of attachment to Berlin, retires. He moves to West Berlin, builds himself a house and spends here the pension which he receives from a public insurance society in West Germany. That is certainly not assistance to West Berlin as such, but is, instead, assistance for an individual who happens to live in Berlin. Nevertheless, when the man moves, additional purchasing power flows into Berlin. The recipient of the pension buys from retailers; he uses many services. The purchasing power he has transferred to West Berlin thus raises the level of economic activity in the city. Such transfers, though they contribute to the economic strength of the city, occur within the framework of the normal execution of the accepted functions of the Federal and city governments. There exists, therefore, a difference between outright assistance and the transfer of purchasing power, and we must always make it when we can.

The problems that we are discussing have been given a particular urgency by the recent demand of the Soviet Union that West Berlin be made a "free city." It was said in the Soviet note that no one would be allowed to intrude in the affairs of the free city—neither the German Federal Republic nor the Soviet Union. If this statement is accepted literally and Berlin actually were to become a free city, then the thousands of threads which bind West Berlin to the Federal Republic would be cut. West Berlin would have to dispense with the transferred purchasing power that we have been talking about and, in order to exist without subventions, would be forced to create a substitute for it by building up its industry, by broadening the base of its economy.

It has been emphasized that the 1.6 to 2 billion DM that come to West Berlin in transferred purchasing power are a net sum, which corresponds to an industrial "added

value" production of the same amount. If this transferred purchasing power were cut off, the 1.6 to 2 billion DM in "added value" could only be created by an actual increase in the value of goods produced for outside consumption by West Berlin industry of more than 4 billion DM. This figure is based on the estimate mentioned above, that the actual "value added" in manufacture is only 42 per cent of the gross value of the city's industrial output. The handling and shipping of this additional industrial output would also have to be accommodated. To permit the firms in West Berlin doing this kind of work to expand their activities proportionately, it may be estimated that the additional industrial products consumed by this larger scale of operations would amount to another half-billion DM. This indicates that the industrial production of West Berlin would have to be increased by some 4.5 to 5 billion DM annually to replace the purchasing power now transferred from West Germany through official subventions. Even then, tax income from the additional industrial production could not be regarded as sufficient to offset the loss of direct and indirect subsidies to the city's budget.

This matter must also be surveyed from another point of view. West Berlin industry in 1959 reached a gross turnover of 7.5 billion DM. That is a remarkable achievement when one recalls that in 1950 the figure was some 1.7 billion DM. But if suddenly it became necessary to increase industrial production by about another 5 billion DM. West Berlin would find that it simply does not have the industrial capacity for this new expansion. Factories would have to be built. The pattern of employment would have to be changed so that people now working in the service trades could be shifted into industry—something much easier to talk about than to achieve. And what is even more telling, who is ready to believe that the East is in a position to absorb industrial products from West Berlin to a value of more than 4 billion DM? In 1959, the deliveries of West Berlin industry to the countries in the Eastern bloc, including the Soviet Union, reached only 161 million DM—not much more than 2 per cent of the industrial production of West Berlin. That isn't all. The question of what products would be received from the Eastern bloc countries in return is one which must be thoroughly considered. In the problem of trade with the

East, after all, the nature of the products that are to be exchanged is of crucial importance.

From all of this it appears that these are clear reservations to the assertion made in the Soviet note that the Eastern bloc countries would take enough exports from West Berlin that the social product of the city would not be reduced, but would actually be increased. The proposal that West Berlin be made a free city, accordingly, is nothing more than an attempt to weaken West Berlin by creating unemployment and distress in the city by destroying its economic and social equilibrium, and, in the end, by forcing part of the people to emigrate so that the population declines and the political strength of the city is sapped.

IV

As I have emphasized, West Berlin must live as an industrial city so long as it is not the capital of Germany. This is an object, a goal. But there are problems involved in reaching it that are not to be solved easily. If we look at the pattern of employment in West Berlin in the fall of 1959, we see that 53 per cent of the persons gainfully employed were in industrial production and 47 per cent in services of all kinds—in businesses, in banks, in insurance companies, in the transportation system, in barber shops, and the like, and also in government offices of all kinds. The distribution of the working force of the city, therefore, still corresponds more nearly to that of a city which is both a capital and an industrial center, than to that of a city predominantly industrial. That this employment structure has worked out so far in West Berlin is due directly to the subsidies the city receives. These subventions have also cushioned the impact of the difficulties that always accompany rapid changes in job structure. The variations in the pattern of employment that Berlin has undergone have meant that some people had to change their occupations—that they lost their jobs and had to seek others in different fields of work. Each one said, quite naturally, "Why am I the one?" The subventions, directly and indirectly, carried the city over into its new patterns.

Let us look for a moment at the pattern of employment in certain areas in the Federal Republic as a whole. In

North Rhine-Westphalia, 65 per cent of the persons gainfully employed are in industry; in Württemberg-Baden, the figure is 67 per cent. There you have regions in which the basis of livelihood is in industry! These figures show that in the regions of West Germany which are the most intensively industrialized, the part of the population engaged in industrial work is significantly larger than it is in West Berlin. That is why we can speak of West Berlin as an underdeveloped area, industrially. Every effort is being exerted to make progress in West Berlin. The policy which has been followed in recent years, taking advantage of a wide variety of supporting measures and programs, is directed toward the goal of making West Berlin a still more industrialized city. That 53 per cent of the working force is now employed in industry is at once an indication and a result of this development, for in past years the figure was significantly smaller. It is wise to note, however, that such a change in structure is usually likely to take place rather slowly.

Because structural change of this kind does take a long time, the measures taken to produce it involve long-term policy. Gradually this policy has developed a firm and clearly discernible pattern. We have the credits from European Recovery Program assistance that provide the foundation for revolving funds—funds that are constantly replenished through interest and amortization so that the money they contain can be lent out again and again. The measures designed to support our economy also include the income tax reduction and the preferential treatment in regard to the turnover tax. Moreover, we are able to use American counterpart funds in order to finance business transactions with West German firms under relatively favorable terms, in some instances over a ten-year period. The equalization funds for steel should also be mentioned. They are made up of contributions from the producers of steel goods, the dealers in steel, and the consumers of steel products. From these funds, reimbursements are made to users of steel in Berlin to offset the costs of freight shipments into that isolated enclave. These reimbursements have the effect of moving these Berlin firms nearer to the Ruhr area, and enable them to compete with firms closer to the source of supply.

All of these measures have the intent of improving the location factor in regard to industrial production so as to

make West Berlin investments more attractive and to increase production in the city. Now, every investment is a long-term decision, involving long-term entrepreneurial arrangements. Such arrangements hinge upon the relative stability of the plant location factors involved. Businessmen must have some reasonable assurance that the conditions on which they base their investments are not subject to sudden change. Therefore, it would be a good thing, for instance, if the remission of the Federal turnover tax in West Berlin were extended indefinitely to the day of German reunification, rather than being set up only for a stipulated time, as is now the case. The present arrangement is a residue of the idea that the help the city needed was only to get a start in order to overcome temporary difficulties. What is actually needed, of course, in consideration of West Berlin's peculiar position behind the Iron Curtain, is that conditions favorable to plant location be created and maintained in West Berlin as a permanent policy so long as this may be necessary to offset the unfavorable plant location factors inherent in the city's position.

In this connection, psychological factors must be taken into account, too, although in reality there is no such thing as an isolated political risk in West Berlin, for the city's situation must always be looked at in the setting of world politics at large. It is true, however, that if the economic foundation of West Berlin is to be strengthened, eventually some kind of political stability must be achieved. Here again, it is apparent that problems in West Berlin are never of a purely economic nature; rather politics and economics are inextricably bound up with each other.

The road to "viability" in West Berlin involves a structural change—more people in industrial work and fewer in the public and private services. The recognition of this is fundamental. The only question is how it can be brought about. In this connection the age-composition of the population is important. The number of children born in the years of the war and its immediate aftermath was fewer than normal and the economic results of this depressed birth rate have to be faced particularly in Berlin. The expectation is that the number of people capable of employment will decline in West Berlin in the immediate future, and the city has to make up for that, too.

Thus, in summary, it is clear that West Berlin cannot expect to become independent of the need for the transfer of purchasing power in the form of subventions. The peculiar situation of the city will continue to have its effects so long as it exists. What has been accomplished up to this time is the result of our own efforts and of the help we have received from the outside. The goal of our continued efforts can only be to reduce gradually the burdens of the West German taxpayers, whose contributions are recognized in West Berlin with gratitude, by bestirring ourselves to increase the economic viability of our city steadily. This is a task which requires full cooperation between business and government.

Cultural Policy on the Two Sides of the Brandenburg Gate

JOACHIM TIBURTIUS

IN MY DISCUSSION OF THE CONTRASTING CHARACTERISTICS of East and West as they are expressed in the cultural life in the two parts of divided Berlin, I shall look at the several principal fields of cultural activity one after the other. I shall begin with the schools, progressing from the elementary and secondary schools to the universities and professional schools, and the schools for adult education. Then I shall discuss the arts themselves.

A friend of mine who is engaged in educational work on the other side of the Brandenburg Gate told me recently, "Be careful! What you are saying about the situation over here may be out of date. You must bear in mind that the things you read may not have kept up with the actualities. That can be true of reports less than four weeks old." Nevertheless, I shall think myself on solid footing if I base what I have to say upon reputable studies of educational and cultural conditions, such as the interesting and informative book by Lange, and Möbus' similar study.* According to these studies, in the Soviet Zone the three familiar types of schools still exist: the eight-year elementary school, the two-year middle school, and the four-year high school with its technical and classical branches. For a while, a kind of ten-year middle school was also tried out—we would call it a technical high school—but this experiment was abandoned. As yet, therefore, there has been in the Soviet Zone no radical

* For the titles of these books and other relevant references, see the Select Bibliography, p. 229.

change in the traditional pattern of school organization.

There are, nevertheless, certain differences between Eastern and Western schools. What is most striking about the school system in the Soviet Zone is that all school policies and procedures are directed to the goal of producing politically reliable and politically active citizens. Educational advancement and every kind of assistance to students is made fully dependent upon evidence that what the student learns will be useful to the Communist state. Lack of manifest readiness to serve the Communist order on the part of a student is regarded as ingratitude to the state and punished accordingly—with the denial or withdrawal of state stipends, with hindrances on educational advancement, and so on. This is clearly illustrated in the matter of admission to the high schools that prepare students for university study. Three physicians who practice their profession in a city in the central part of the Soviet Zone, and who recently visited Berlin, told me that their children had no chance to be admitted to high school unless they went through the ceremony of consecration required by the Free German Youth, the Communist youth organization. This was necessary because of the occupation of the fathers which, although it is regarded as a useful profession, is nevertheless at some disadvantage in a society in which workers and tillers of the soil are accorded first rank. That, indeed, has produced a strange state of affairs. If the fathers in question had been in the textile business, like the father of Friedrich Engels, for instance, the lot of the children would have been much worse.

The subjects that are included in the formal school curricula are also influenced by the orientation of the political regime, the so-called German Democratic Republic, though there is some divergence between the formal and actual curricula. For instance, one is struck by the fact that Russian is always listed as the required modern language, along with Latin, or even Greek, as a classical language. I have never seen either French or English listed in the printed curriculum of any Eastern zone school. There is, however, a characteristically left-handed reference to the principle of administrative discretion, which permits the Ministry of Education to modify the established curriculum in a few schools for reasons of the

"public good" or the like. This is the only indication that French and English may be taught in the Eastern zone at all. I might remark, parenthetically, that the length of time devoted to Greek, four years, is so short that it is hard to see how any child could learn more than the sound of Greek words and a little Greek poetry. What is more to the point is that students who come to us from the Soviet Zone have confirmed that French and English are indeed taught there, though these students indicate that the method and extent of the instruction are determined by the needs of the state rather than by the needs of the students or the wishes of their parents.

Furthermore, it must be reiterated that the educational institutions are influenced by the political institutions not only through the control exerted by the Ministry of Education, which after all is unavoidable under the West as well as the East German setup, but through the presence of representatives of the Free German Youth in the classrooms themselves, "to see that justice is done." Membership in the two Communist youth organizations, the Pioneers and the Free German Youth—indeed, not only membership, but a record of active participation in organizations of the kind—is necessary for educational advancement, especially for the much coveted admission to high school.

In our school system in West Germany, on the other hand, every effort is made to give each child, regardless of the social group to which he may belong, the educational opportunities best suited to his intelligence, his particular aptitudes, and his sustained interests. In regard to admission to the several high school curricula, every reasonable effort is made to defer to the wishes of the parents. Another way in which our West German formal education differs from formal education in the Soviet Zone is our emphasis on a broad cultural content in the curricula of all schools, including the specialized trade schools. We hold that education of every kind should have as its objective the development of personality through learning; on the other side of the Brandenburg Gate the purpose of education is to minister to the needs of the state. We strive continuously to draw out the new and dynamic forces present in all sections of society; beyond the Gate, the force of education is directed to the maintenance of a particular form to society.

Educational objectives are closely related to instructional methods, as Möbus has effectively pointed out in his book. All the knowledge of psychology that has been gained since the 1920's, and all the pedagogical methods that were derived from it during this length of time, have been rejected in the Soviet Zone as "objectivistic"—and "objectivism" is highly suspect over there. The Eastern educators have completely done away with all the "rub-bish" of modern educational methods because such methods do not produce "battlers in the class-struggle" and "trustworthy" citizens of the German Democratic Republic. In the name of social progress, the schools in the Eastern zone have returned to methods long since abandoned in the West. Children over there sit quietly on their benches exactly like the children in the schools of long ago, while the teacher hands down to them, *ex cathedra*, the facts and the ideas that must be packed away in the mind like so much stuffing, but never criticized or discussed. The East German school child has to acquire certain "reliable" facts and certain "reliable" habits of thought in order to get along later as an adult member of society. The system of education now prevailing in the general schools in the East can only fill one with dismay over the kind of intellectual and aesthetic training to which the younger generation is being subjected. Even some observers who by no means deplore all that is happening in East Berlin now admit that they are unable to see that any of the humane values survive in the schools of the Eastern zone.

As might be expected, the picture in the Eastern trade schools is more favorable. The type of instruction given by these schools is determined by actual industrial requirements—and to this end 970 trades have been formally recognized as being utilized in East Berlin and East German industry. It is interesting to observe how the distribution of these trades in the over-all economic setup reflects efforts towards the socialization of industry. Some 590 of the trades are practiced only in collectively owned or state-owned workshops or industrial establishments—far more than one-half. Considerably less than one-third, 286 to be exact, are practiced both in socialized and in private industry. Only 94—less than 10 per cent—are exclusively practiced in private industry. Of course these figures do not represent at all accurately the degree

of socialization of industry in the Eastern zone, but they do give some idea of the trend.

With regard to the educational requirements for admission to these schools, for 675 (or more than two-thirds) of the 970 trades, admission to the appropriate school ensues upon completion of the eight years of elementary school. In some 210 trades, completion of the middle school is required for admission. In the remaining trades, requirements for admission vary somewhat, but it may be said of the formal pattern of admission to all the Eastern trade schools that it is much similar to the one that now exists in the West. The method of instruction in the Eastern trade schools is also basically the same in West and East—a combination of classroom instruction and practice in workshops. It is in respect to the degree of technical specialization in the training, and the related matter of opportunities for educational advancement after the completion of schooling, that the differences between the Eastern and Western trade school systems become most apparent.

West Berlin has recently completed arrangements which make it possible for graduates of trade schools to qualify themselves for admission to the most advanced vocational schools, providing only that the ability and the desire to do so are present. Under this plan, trade school graduates take a program of evening courses that include liberal studies, such as German, a foreign language, and history, as well as technical ones. If these young people prove their capacity for it through their work in the advanced vocational schools, they can then qualify themselves for admission to the universities and other professional schools in what is called the "second way" to distinguish it from the usual method of qualification through examinations on subjects taught in the regular high schools.

In the Eastern zone, on the other hand, the needs of the state demand that every young person with specialized training of any sort—and especially the young person with the more advanced skills—sticks to the job for which he qualifies as a specialist. Exceptions are only allowed for especially trustworthy workers in state industry or collectivized enterprises, and for members of the Free German Youth or similar political organizations. It is through activities of this kind, rather than through proof of ability and the capacity for independent thought,

that youth may earn the opportunity to go on to eventual training in a professional school or university.

The results of this kind of selection, nevertheless, do command respect, as far, at least, as the figures involved are concerned. The number of graduates from the engineering schools in the Soviet Zone in 1956 was nineteen times as great as the corresponding number in the Federal Republic. This selection system provided, furthermore, a distribution of qualifications in the on-coming generation of engineers which bears quite a realistic relationship to the needs of an industrial economy, because the emphasis was upon producing "operating engineers," or skilled mechanics, rather than engineers with training at the professional level.

The degree of specialization among the schools graduating these engineers and skilled mechanics is also impressive. In addition to schools specializing in light and heavy industry, there are those devoted to particular types of machines. Whereas in West Germany we attempt to provide training in engineering that is as broad as possible—and think we have done enough, for instance, if we distinguish a little between high-voltage techniques and low-tension operations in the so-called Beuth schools on the one hand and the Gaus schools on the other—the engineering schools in the Eastern zone are organized to meet the specific needs of specific industries, such as machine-building, vehicle construction, chemical, shipbuilding, and so on. This high degree of specialization makes it possible to keep a tight control over the graduates and to assign them to jobs according to the exact needs of the state. The number of those trained in the various specialties can also be closely controlled.

II

Rigorous control by the state is the rule in the Eastern universities and professional schools, too. This is indicated at first glance by the fact that in the Ministry of Education there is a state secretary for universities, professional schools, and advanced vocational schools. Admission to the universities and professional schools is based on the same kind of qualifications I have already mentioned in the discussion of the elementary and high schools. Preference is given to the children of "workers and tillers of the soil." Particularly in reference to educational stip-

ends, the result is a selective system of penalties and rewards determined by the demands of political policy. The number and value of these stipends are quite impressive when measured by our standards, particularly if we accept the official rate of exchange and equate the marks one to one. The normal stipend is 150 Eastern marks per month for the first semester and, thereafter, 180 marks per month. There are special increments for those who are deemed unusually deserving, that is, for politically active students and for the children of citizens who are looked upon with special favor. For one category of students—who come directly out of positions in industry rather than out of the high schools and for this reason are thought to have a special social usefulness—there are stipends of from 500 to 1200 marks per month. These young people can temporarily leave their jobs in industry, commerce, or transportation for university training without encountering any financial difficulties at all. A student of this type is brought into the university after at least a year of practical work at a manual trade during which he must have had direct association with the workers in a shop and not just have sat in some office.

The entire plan of Eastern university study is built upon a foundation of social science, and no field of study or professional school is allowed to exist except on this basis. In the West, a required program of liberal studies such as history, philosophy, literature, and the history of art, has recently been instituted in the several curricula of our Technical University. At first we thought of putting this program in the early semesters of university study. Later, we decided to put it into the later semesters, on the theory that in the course of their specialized studies young people come gradually to the realization that they need a broader knowledge of the world they live in and a deeper understanding of its meaning. In the Soviet Zone, however, students have to pursue their social studies without interruption from the first semester in the university to the last. The purpose of this sustained program of social studies is not the cultural enrichment of the individual, but the enhancement of his "social usefulness." The program is intended to inculcate into each student a conception of the world that those who are responsible for it call Marxism-Leninism. It lies outside the task assigned to me to point out the contradictions that

exist between Marxism and Leninism, especially when Stalinism is included along with Leninism. Eastern interpretations of Marxism-Leninism change from time to time and occasionally tend to cancel one another out. Students attending one of the universities in East Berlin or central Germany no doubt find it necessary to make efforts at the beginning of each semester to learn just what the current interpretation of social science is. Otherwise the best intentions might not prevent the student from developing in the "wrong" direction, and supporting the "wrong" truth.

After what has been said, it is not surprising to learn that the work of the professors is strictly controlled, and that their rank and salary are determined largely by considerations relating to class and political orientation. The rector has real executive authority, being charged with the duty of seeing to it that the programs of study and teaching are carried out according to plan. One vice-rector has charge of student affairs, and another presides over the work and relationships of the professors in the various faculties. The Free German Youth organization is represented in every faculty council, though the student body as such is not. Like the schools for craftsmen, the universities and professional schools in the Soviet Zone are highly specialized in fields that reflect the organization of the economy. There are schools for collectivized agricultural economies, for chemistry, for electrotechnics, for heavy machinery, and for machinery in general. At the Institute of Technology in Dresden there is a special faculty for trade-school pedagogy.

Every university must have a Workers and Peasants Faculty. This designation is one that is apt to cause misunderstanding, because it is not a faculty at all. It is a division of the university in which students drawn directly from practical work as peasants or industrial workers are given instruction designed to bring their education to a level equivalent to the normal preparation for university study. They are trained in the basic intellectual skills, such as the mastery of the language, the knowledge and proper use of a more extended vocabulary, and so on, so that they may have at least some kind of background for studies at the university level. Through methods such as these, the attempt is made to bridge the differences in educational level among the several social classes, and to

bring into the academic profession the desired admixture of "active workers."

When one reads the statutes governing the universities and the statutes establishing programs of research in the Soviet Zone, he gains the impression that much more research is carried on outside the framework of the universities over there than is the case with West Germany, and often with outstanding success. This is especially true in the fields of natural science and technology. But our conception that teaching and scientific theory should grow out of research is hardly to be found at all in the universities of the Soviet Zone as they are being developed now. It is, of course, quite true that highly specialized research is carried on in the Federal Republic, but our specialization follows lines indicated by developments in the various sciences as such and the sciences are allowed to form their own traditions. Science thus does not have to be guided by the needs recognized at a given moment by the state and revised each time there is a change of direction in policy. What happens in the East is that every university runs the risk of being designated as the special research institute for the water economy of the Black Sea area, or something like that. That is, the Eastern University always has a great pressure towards specialization and formalization bearing down upon it and much general research must therefore be carried on outside this increasingly precise framework.

III

The schools for adult education, which are very significant educational and cultural institutions existing in both the West and the East, have until recently been looked upon in the Soviet Zone principally as a means of improving vocational skills and extending practical knowledge. In conducting these schools, the principle has not been followed that each should learn what he wished to learn, but rather that each should be taught what was needed in order to carry forward the economic reconstruction and development that had been very much retarded. Farmers, for example, were taught what new fertilizers were available and how to use them, and so on. I think in this connection of the adult education schools in Sweden, which deliberately avoid vocational training for farmers,

merchants, factory workers, operating engineers, machinists, and the like. In the Swedish schools, indeed, the education of man as such is emphasized with a view towards developing a broad understanding of the problems of community life—housing and building, and recreational gardening, for instance—leaving the acquisition of vocationally useful knowledge as a kind of side-effect. In contrast, what is called “real humanism” in East Berlin and the Eastern zone has been extraordinarily practical and whatever was taught was directly applicable in the day’s work.

It is only fair to admit, however, that the idea of general cultural education through evening courses for the working people is recently receiving considerable emphasis in adult education in the East. In this connection, a so-called delegation system has been inaugurated. The large industrial shops designate workers as having the right and duty to attend adult education courses and to bring back to their fellow workers a report on what is learned. Thus education and culture take their place among the requirements of the planned society!

IV

Some interesting observations may be made in regard to museums and the fine arts in Berlin at the present time. The rebuilding and restoration of the museums in East Berlin must be recognized as a splendid achievement. The collections are rich in content and are well taken care of by competent professional people. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that they were carefully handled during the long period when they were away from Berlin. The assumption that the Russians had “stolen” all of the works of art requires emphatic revision.

If we wish to compare the collections in West Berlin with those in East Berlin, it may be said that the Italian artists are better represented in our art museum in Dahlem and that this is true also of some of the old German masters. On the other hand, they have in East Berlin some very fine German works from the nineteenth century and some important foreign paintings, including very good Rembrandts. Their collection of etchings and engravings is weak.

Really remarkable things are taking place on the other

side of the Brandenburg Gate in the field of contemporary art. At the time of the "Thousand Year Reich," there was a German painter by the name of Ziegler. He was Hitler's ideal of the naturalistic artist incarnate. The abstractionists, on the other hand, had to disappear entirely from the public view because of their sins against the "healthy sensibilities of the nation." What is now taking place in the field of fine arts in the Soviet Zone appears to be almost an exact duplication of the National Socialist conception of art, and public policy with reference to art. The question of what intellectual conditions make it possible for that kind of attitude to grow up again is worthy of a thoroughgoing sociological-psychological investigation. The results at any rate are horrible, for an art without fantasy, humor, or poetry has its wings cut off.

New music in East Berlin and the Eastern zone is shielded by the great "folk-art" taboo currently in vogue over there. It is what it is, and it must be protected from all criticism. It makes no difference whether the sound of the contemporary composition pleases the listener; it pleases those who produce it and that is enough. At the same time, classical music is being played by the great orchestras in the Soviet Zone, sometimes in very good performances.

I have two remarks to make on the subject, however. The first is that the man who recently conducted the "Preludes" of Arnold Schönberg in East Berlin is looked upon as a courageous advocate of "modern" music. The second is that I should be very happy, indeed, if the prejudices that exist on the other side of the Brandenburg Gate against our own West German contemporary composers were given up.

With regard to the theater, what Bert Brecht built up and his wife, the great Helene Weigel, has carried forward since his death, has resulted in the production of a great many worthy plays.* It is a magnificent means of artistic expression, and as such it exerts a powerful influence. In West Berlin, we fought against Bert Brecht so long as his efforts on behalf of the Communists after June 17, 1953, had any effect on us. It is not our way, however,

* The reference is to the Theater am Schiffsbauerdamm in East Berlin, established by Berthold Brecht, where his widow Helen Weigel is now the Director of Production.

to carry a grudge against the dead, and we try from time to time to produce some of his plays in West Berlin as best we can.

In the theaters of the Soviet Zone quite frequently really good plays are produced—Schiller, Goethe, Shakespeare, Kleist. However, this often leads to repercussions that are comic, but at the same time really tragic. The cloven foot of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party intrudes itself through the influence of the theater council. Taking their cue from this source, the critics began to make their pronouncements: "How long are we going to put up with this Comrade Langhoff? How can he produce such bourgeois plays and in such a bourgeois manner? How can anyone represent Wallenstein as a great general? The principal figure in Wallenstein's camp was the peasant, after all. Even the Capuchin is a quite useful character from whom a timely lesson could be drawn which might be explained to the school children on the next day by Comrade Teacher with good effect." You can read all of that in the periodical *Theater und Zeit* if you wish. On such rocky stupidities as this all the efforts of capable actors and directors are finally wrecked.

The climax of all this nonsense is the Eastern zone school for poets. In it, young people—and some older ones, too—are taught how one writes a poem, what the essence of socialistic realism in poetry is, how one lays bare the evils of the class-system, and how the degenerate consciousness is to be brought into contact with "being"! If then one chooses his materials according to the rules, if one shows how the clever pamphleteer snatches trusting and sorely tempted students in the nick of time from the brink of the abyss of capitalism, and one is careful to reveal the devilish inhibitions that must be overcome in the process, then one is well on the way to socialistic realism!

Such techniques, of course, are not restricted to poetry. Plays are written in this vein, and they have to be produced. If the public does not come to the performances, then it is not being educated and the political and economic organizations have not done their duty. The so-called mass-organizations, then, have to buy up tickets until the house is sold out. And when the house is "sold out," the theater may be empty! The explanation of this ludicrous situation can only be that the theater has lost

contact with those who should be attending its performances.

All the arts are controlled collectively. "Self-criticism" is demanded and there is some general criticism, occasionally by competent artists. But criticism and self-criticism can only be effective when they are exercised spontaneously by independent individuals responsible only to themselves. In the West, we encourage this kind of criticism, and I must say we experience as much of it as the heart could desire. I myself have had a few surprises from the directors of our theaters here in West Berlin that have not made me altogether happy. But with us the selection of plays for production, and the actual production as well, are in the hands of the directors of the theaters themselves, and not, thank God, in those of the Minister for Education and Culture of the political parties.

I would like to raise a serious question about the general cultural life of this divided city. In consideration of this juxtaposition of cultural achievements on the two sides of the Brandenburg Gate—on the Eastern side, as we have seen, chiefly in the museums and occasionally in the musical productions—isn't there a possibility that in this large area of life a union of West and East Berlin might be re-established? There might be, for instance, a mutual exchange of Dutch, Italian, German, and French masters to round out the collections over here and over there. Each of the operas could supplement the other's repertoire. The exchange of one theater production or another might be discussed.

I must point out, however, that the pursuit of this goal would encounter an insuperable obstacle, for example, if one of our theater directors, going to meet a colleague from the East for a discussion of matter of this kind, were to find instead an official from one of the East German government offices. One cannot recognize the regime which these gentlemen represent, even on the back steps. That would be a betrayal of our principles. Schiller has said:

Human dignity is entrusted to your hands. Guard it!
It sinks with you! It will rise with you!

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We are always ready to exchange whatever is good with those beyond the Gate in every honorable way. We will share genuine culture, but not the kind of "culture" that is a thin mask for political business.

City Planning in Divided Berlin

FRIEDRICH FÜRLINGER


BEFORE I BEGIN TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS THAT have occurred in planning for the future of this divided city, I think I should say a few words about the nature of city planning. Often city planning is regarded simply as a matter of laying out streets and squares, and designing buildings, and its sole concern is taken to be the outward appearance of a city. As a matter of fact, it goes much further than that. City planning is not just an isolated technique, it is a process, and, as such, requires continuous observation of the development of a city and constant restatement of programs for its growth. City planning goals are definite, but they must be redefined from time to time in the light of technical possibilities, economic requirements, and the social and cultural relationships within the community. This is a political activity of the very highest kind—not in the sense of partisan politics, but in the sense of a concern with what is useful to the city, with what is of the essence with regard to the *polis*. Inspiration and imagination are necessary in city planning, but city planners must also be conscious of the seriousness of their obligation to the people who not only must live in the city their plans produce but also must pay for it. Mistakes made through carelessness or pride can have bitter consequences in the course of history.

From the point of view of city planning in this sense, the splitting of Berlin acquires a new and larger significance, for the vagaries of politics can have a queer influence upon the economic, social, and cultural development of a city like Berlin, the two halves of which are governed and administered under regimes which are quite different in out-

look. In the face of such a difference, the question obviously arises whether it is possible to make plans with any prospects at all that the two parts of the city will go the same way, at least in regard to technical areas of development. I believe that the two parts of Berlin are developing in the same way quite fully in technical matters and that they will not diverge in this respect. There is a quite different and more difficult problem, on the other hand, in regard to the over-all direction of the city's growth, not so much in regard to architectural form, which, although unquestionably important, is often different in different parts of a city anyway, but in regard to the fundamental structure of the city. I shall come back to this problem a little later.

At this point let us look at some numbers. Berlin has an area of 340 sq. mi., of which 185 lie in West Berlin and 155 in East Berlin. The population is 3.3 million, 2.2 million people in the West and 1.1 million in the East. In West Berlin the population has grown with some fluctuations, whereas in East Berlin it has decreased steadily, even if not sharply.

West Berlin has been able to do much more in the construction of dwelling houses than East Berlin on account of the better economic conditions in the West. Moreover, in West Berlin the need for new homes was given the highest priority, and for that reason this kind of building has occurred in much greater proportion in the reconstruction of the Western part of the city. On the other hand, in East Berlin the building of dwelling houses has had to serve the purpose not only of meeting the needs of the people but of displaying the wares of Communism as well, especially on certain streets, notably Stalin Allee. Some 150,000 new residential units have been built in West Berlin since the war, most of them within the framework of the official program of home construction. Responsible for this home construction have been private owners of building sites, among them some community home-building associations and some housing companies which developed large residential areas. With a very few exceptions, the buildings themselves were designed and the grounds on which they are located were laid out by independent architects. Of course, in the restoration of many partially destroyed buildings, circumstances determined the technical and economic factors in reconstruction, as well



Schematic representation of the main arteries and important landmarks in West and East Berlin. The area around the Emperor William Memorial Church is the center of the reconstruction of West Berlin.

as the way these buildings had to be fitted into the over-all plan for municipal development.

If we call to mind the fact that 150,000 residential units provide shelter for more than 400,000 persons, we can realize that what has happened here is the building of a large city within a still larger city, and that all of this building has changed the appearance of Berlin significantly, not only in its outlying sections but right in the center of the old city itself. You have only to think of the Hansa quarter where 3200 people live today and where buildings of the most modern design rose on ground just recently cleared of rubble. Earlier, the same kind of barracks-like rental flats stood there that were to be found everywhere in the area within the ring of railway lines encircling the old city. We Berliners have become so accustomed to the reconstruction in the different parts of the city that we are not even conscious of the fact that its whole physiognomy is being radically transformed.

To get the measure of that change, imagine that you were able to observe in all their stages the changes that have occurred around the plaza at the Emperor William Memorial Church over the last fifteen years.* After the war, fifteen years ago, Tauentzien Street and Kurfürstendamm were one great expanse of ruins, none of the street-car lines were in operation, and rubble lay all about. Only later did makeshift shops appear and they did not have much in the way of wares to offer. Look at the contrast in the picture today! It is altogether different even from what it was before the war. It is not only that modern office buildings have replaced the proud old middle-class façades with their caryatids and other masonry embellishments, but rather that the whole plan of construction has been changed. The old houses in that section of the city—those on the Kurfürstendamm, for instance—were built around the turn of the century as residences. In the upper

* The Emperor William Memorial Church is located at the junction of Kurfürstendamm, Tauentzien, Budapest, Hardenberg, and Kant Streets and is adjacent to the famous Berlin Zoological Garden, which is on the edge of the Tiergarten, a mid-city park area stretching to the Brandenburg Gate along the old Charlottenburg Chaussee, now renamed the Avenue of July 17th in commemoration of the revolt on that date in 1953 in East Berlin. Beyond the Brandenburg Gate one enters the Soviet sector of the city along Unter den Linden, a thoroughfare that was the center of the city before its destruction and division.

stories, along with the residential units, there were offices for professional people—physicians and lawyers—and business concerns. On the ground floor and often on the mezzanine, there were display rooms and places of amusement.

All that is changed. The newly constructed buildings are not residences at all; they are primarily buildings for private business offices. It is true that on the ground floor there are still stores and shops, and an unobservant person, or one who visits the Kurfürstendamm area only by night, might think he is in the same old Berlin he knew before the war. That is a pleasant enough illusion, but the fact is that the area around the Memorial Church Plaza and the nearby Zoological Garden really has become a new city full of modern office buildings. The Zoo Bahnhof has become the principal railway station in West Berlin and in addition to the magnificent hotels long a feature of lower Kurfürstendamm, new ones such as the Berlin Hilton have been built in the vicinity. There we find also the finest and largest department stores and the center of the fashionable shopping district. This area, indeed, has become the show-window of West Berlin.


This change in the nature of the area is in part due to the fact that the central quarter of the prewar city is now located in East Berlin, and West Berlin has had to develop a city center in the section that is most attractive and most convenient of access. But the pattern of the city's structure would have changed even if the old inner city still belonged to West Berlin, for the requirements of the community are quite different today from what they were in the twenties.

II

The present-day plan of the city truly looks to the future. A comparison with the old pattern of the prewar period reveals vast changes. The old system of connecting thoroughfares, which comprised the main features of the traffic system does not correspond at all to the system under development in the city now. The old streets are not, of course, being done away with, but they have become less important as thoroughfares than the new system of highways the "city super-highways." The purpose of the new

system is to carry the entire traffic flow into the center of the city over modern, multi-lane speedways in safety and without delay. The radial tributary streets, which were formerly the chief thoroughfares, are in this way relieved of traffic and can develop—as indeed they had already begun to develop—as streets for local traffic, and as business and shopping centers in the various districts of the city (good examples are Schloss Street in Steglitz and Karl Marx Street in Neukölln). The ring of city superhighways, planned to handle the cross-city traffic, is already under construction. Other speedways serving cross-city traffic will form something like another ring somewhat closer to the center of the city.

Will the plan that we look forward to here be followed in East Berlin or will our streets one day simply come to a dead end at the border between the East and the West? The system of city superhighways has been in the planning stage in West Berlin for about ten years, and part of it has



The highway system of Berlin. The stippled area represents the city itself. Heavy lines indicate the city superhighways; light lines, the tributary routes. Route numbers are shown. Map adapted from *Hauptstadt Berlin . . . Zahlenbilder aus Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur*. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1959.

been put into operation so that the people in East Berlin have taken notice of the superhighway plan. As a result, they have made a similar system of speedway rings one of their own objectives—except that it is a deferred objective with them. In East Berlin at the present time, there is only a small fraction of the automotive traffic that we have in West Berlin, but the desire of the Eastern government is none the less for a higher degree of automobility. It must be said, also, that the building of the city superhighways in West Berlin has not encountered any resistance on the part of the Eastern administrative authorities. The Eastern zone railway administration controls certain lands that are needed as rights-of-way for the operation of the trunk lines that pass through West Berlin. Without raising any particular objections, it has allowed us to erect a number of bridge pilings for the superhighways on these lands, and to construct underpasses where those are called for.

Somewhat more than two miles of the city superhighway system have been completed, on the Gördenerdamm and from Halensee in the direction of Wilmersdorf. By the end of 1962, more than nine miles will be in operation. That is the rate of progress in the matter of the city superhighways. Of course, the other streets have to be adapted to modern traffic, too. That something is being done about this problem as well is attested to by the street reconstruction activities evident in the tributary streets throughout the city, and particularly around the Zoo. It is anticipated that nearly 63 miles of streets for fast cross-city and tangential traffic will be built within the "middle superhighway ring. In all, there will be in the end more than 135 miles of rapid transit highways of one form or another within the outer superhighway ring the (Autobahn) that circles Berlin as a whole.

But the traffic of the future will not be served by streets alone; there are likewise comprehensive plans for the development of the rapid-transit train systems as well. Before the war we had about 50 miles in the network of the municipal subway system—the so-called U-Bahn. Plans are to extend this to 135 miles. There is in addition, of course, the system of inter-urban elevated trains known as the S-Bahn, which is operated by the Soviet Zone railway administration.

So far as the extension of the underground system is concerned, we are guided by the idea that as far as possible

the radial lines should be extended to the sparsely populated areas on the outskirts of the city and that in the inner part of the city the net should be made thicker. With this in mind, the first major construction after the war was the stretch from Seestrasse to Tegel, which extended this radial line farther into the outskirts of the city toward the north. Another line—also designed to strengthen the inner net—is under construction and will run from Steglitz to Wedding by way of the Zoo railway station, in order to give this now increasingly important central point better connections with the southwest and the north of the city.

In the matter of planning for the development of the underground system, as in the case of the streets, no essential difference exists between the East and the West. It is only that in the East just now nothing is built. In the West we are building lines which for the present can serve only the Western traffic, but they will fit into the total subway net of a reunited Berlin. In our planning we have not allowed ourselves to be guided by an idea of making East Berlin more "distant." It seems to me that it is important to emphasize the fact that West Berlin and East Berlin have not developed away from each other so far as the technical arrangements in the city are concerned. Up to this time enough reason has prevailed that activities on both sides are carried on in the interests of Berlin as a whole.

Planning for the Berlin service of the trunk-line and long-distance railway systems presents much greater difficulties, for the city government is not in this case in a legal position to work out development plans. It can only make suggestions. The question of legal authority over the railways is exceedingly complex. The Eastern zone railway administration is the competent authority for the rights of way, that is, for all arrangements directly necessary for the operation of the trains. Other areas of authority—including railway station restaurants, storage facilities, and similar auxiliary services—fall under the administrative office in charge of the former "Reichsbahn" properties, which is, in turn, controlled by the West German Federal Railway. Who then is competent to make decisions relevant to the future pattern of the trunk lines? The Eastern zone railway administration has expressed various ideas on the subject, but no definite plans exist as yet. The only specific

thing that has been done is in connection with the attempt of the Eastern zone railway administration to route the traffic flowing to and from Berlin, especially the freight traffic, around on the outside of the city. So far as passenger traffic is concerned, it has closed all the branch stations and only one line remains in operation for passenger trains, that being the elevated line through the city in the East-West direction. We have learned recently that there is some thought of having the through trains stop only at the branch stations on the outskirts of the city. The passengers would be brought into the city by local transportation facilities. Rumors of this kind are so deceptive, however, that they cannot be taken seriously.

The West Berlin city administration, in cooperation with the appropriate administrative authorities of the Federal Republic, has worked out plans for development of the trunk lines, but, so long as the city is divided, they cannot be carried out. There is some question of the legal competence of these city and Federal authorities to proceed with the execution of these plans, even within West Berlin itself. This is because measures undertaken by the Eastern zone railway authorities may so affect the railway system as a whole as to make the plans of the West untenable. Therefore, for the time being all the sites formerly used by the railways are being kept free and not being used for new building projects. In addition, some other plots of land are being reserved for use for railway purposes if circumstances should require it. An example is a tract of land in the southern part of the Schöneberg district that may be used for a freight depot in that part of the city.

There is full agreement between the East and the West with reference to the extension of the waterways in the city. It is true that in the East very little has been done in this matter, with the exception of the construction of the Nauen-Paretzer Canal. This canal was built in order to by-pass the Spandau locks, which are located in West Berlin, but it also serves the purpose of relieving the load on the net of canals in the central part of the city. Therefore, it fits well enough into our plan for the development of the entire system of waterways. In West Berlin, the construction of the canal connecting Westhafen and Spandau has opened the Spree to craft of 1000 tons and has thus fulfilled a desire shared on both sides of the city. As to other waterway problems, little agreement between West

and East is required because in the case of most of the canals it is not so much a question of improving navigation as of economical use of water. The East can be counted upon to handle this problem wisely, since its own interest is to do so.

Let us now say something about the airports. At Tempelhof, as everyone knows, Berlin has an airport unique in all the world because of its location near the center of the city. But we also know that the development of larger and larger types of airplanes makes longer runways necessary, and that Tempelhof cannot meet the requirements of jet planes in this respect. The opinion among us at present is that an airport for such planes will have to be located outside the built-up areas of Berlin. An airport suitable for development for use by jet planes is already to be had in the Eastern zone at Schönefeld, and the runways there are now being extended for that purpose. There is much talk about doing the same thing at the Tegel Airport which is in West Berlin, but even if the runways did permit the landing of jet planes, Tegel still lies too much within a populous section where many people would be disturbed by jet traffic. The Tegel Airport, therefore, has significance in this respect only because it could be used for some jet service during the period in which Berlin continues to be divided. But it cannot be regarded as a permanent field for jet planes until they become a great deal quieter than they are now. The Tempelhof Airport is certainly satisfactory for domestic air transport, and in my opinion will remain a satisfactory base for conventional flights for a long time. In a flight between Berlin and Frankfurt or Berlin and Munich, the saving of another ten minutes of air time is not important, anyway.

III

One could derive the opinion from what has been said up to this point that fundamentally everything is in order, that somehow or other agreement has always been reached whenever it has been required, and therefore, that no danger exists that Berlin might become an unsatisfactory site for the capital of Germany, no matter how long the present division endures. There are other circumstances, however, which tend to contradict this opinion. Although we have been able to maintain unity with regard to the

technical arrangements and institutions in the city, there has been no agreement on the lines of the reconstruction and development of the inner city at the center of Berlin. This central section must have the characteristics of a capital and of a metropolis as well. It must be able to serve the organs of the national as well as city government, and it must accommodate various business and financial establishments also. In this respect the outlook in West Berlin is quite different from the outlook in the East.

In the East "the plan" is everything. As a result, the reconstruction and architectural development takes on an austere, "rectilinear" character, without life or variety. What appears to be reasonable and carefully considered in a planned economy, in execution turns out for the most part to be redolent of mausoleums and morgues. Many architects and city planners complain, on the other hand, that cities in the West have a chaotic appearance because such a variety of elements finds expression in them. For instance, there is the businessman who, after locating his establishment for practical reasons right next to that of his competitor, tries to emphasize the unique quality of his wares and the superior elegance of his shop by garish advertisements. This kind of thing is hard to control and measures to prevent it can quickly lead to a reduction of freedom for everybody. At the other extreme, all is orderly, there is no competition, there is no display of lights, and there are no advertisements, for in a system of state ownership nothing of the kind is necessary, of course.

This difference is hard to describe in a few words, but it is instantly apparent to anyone who makes a comparison between Broadway in New York and the Kowalskaja in Warsaw, which is a planned street having about it the atmosphere of a dead city. In the first we encounter the illuminated advertisements, the hurly-burly, and the raucous noises that we associate with a big city, but, at the same time, life—life that is the essence of a big city and that we true city-dwellers like. In the second there is that mausoleum architecture, there are no illuminated advertisements and there is no life. The Kowalskaja does not correspond to the spirit of our times, to our conception of architecture, or to the requirements of our society, even if it does stand there in all its stolid perfection.

We are quite willing to admit in the West that we are not perfect, and it is, in fact, questionable whether we

could stand the "perfection" of the East. I believe that I do not have to philosophize over that. It is plain enough that the way things are shaping up over there is just not suitable for us at all. The essential elements of a capital and a metropolis, and the characteristic features of big cities in general, will always be quite different in the East from what they are in the West. As yet nothing very bad has taken place in the heart of Berlin, but if the division continues much longer the old inner city will begin to receive the impress of the East. In five years all the fields of rubble over there will have been built up and the fact will be only too clear.

The configuration of a city is determined not merely by the architectonic form given it by a few professional experts, but above all by the social order and the way of life of the people. The difference between a free society and a totalitarian system is of essential importance in this connection. In the construction of cultural buildings now going on in the old inner city—the theaters, art galleries, museums, and the like—there is no great immediate danger. These are for the most part restorations of the old buildings on their former sites. But once the people in the East consciously begin construction of buildings for their new city and national governments, unity will disappear and Berlin will certainly have an Eastern silhouette imposed upon it.

The Eastern zone regime will surely center its headquarters on the site of the old Hohenzollern palace, now "Marx-Engels Platz." The chief government building will dominate the scene just as its prototypes do in Warsaw, Moscow, and other capitals in the East. Even if the government of a reunited Germany never moves into that building at all, it will nevertheless be standing there in case unification is long delayed and we shall have to wrestle with the problem of what to do with it. This must be said openly, for it is too easy to forget that the inexorable march of time subjects us to the "normative force of the actual." This is one of the many reasons why we cannot allow ourselves to become weary, but we must rather devote our entire strength to the unification of our fatherland.

The United States and the Berlin Problem: an American View

EDGAR R. ROSEN

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND Berlin is one of the most remarkable international phenomena of our time. Established in the wake of the total defeat of the Third Reich, it has outgrown the limited, politically negative military-government framework of the immediate postwar period and has developed into a positive political partnership. In evaluating the significance of this transformation, it must be remembered that even the most conscientious observer would have been hard put to discover the slightest trace of readiness for such a development on the American side in 1945. The United States rose to world leadership in two world wars, and in both of these Germany was its main opponent. To be sure, the American image of Germany during the era of the Second World War was much more complex than is generally realized, but the complexity of this image did not affect the basic anti-German, "crusading" aspect the conflict eventually acquired in the view of the American public. And when the early uncertainty in government planning for a postwar Germany gave way to a punitive intent, or what Hans W. Gatzke has called in an article in *Current History* "a rigid formula in which realistic proposals for reform became mixed up with unrealistic demands for revenge," Berlin came to be considered *the* National Socialist city of Germany, the literal embodiment of that quite misleading but highly popular equation: *Prussianism* = *Militarism* = *National Socialism*. In actuality, the National Socialists obtained in the last somewhat regular election of the Hitler era, on March 5, 1933, only 31 per cent of the total Berlin vote, the second lowest number of votes they received in any comparable area in Germany.

I

The inadequacy of its superficial image of Berlin was being understood by part of the American public late in 1946 as a result of the first postwar elections in the half-destroyed, half-crippled city. Already divided into the four occupation sectors, but still functioning as a single administrative unit, Berlin was called upon by the four occupation powers, as joint supervisors of the procedure, to elect its new city government. This election, of course, had a much deeper significance, one that went far beyond the establishment of a local government. In fact, it was a plebiscite of the utmost symbolic and practical importance, a plebiscite on the issue of political absorption by Communism, already triumphant throughout the surrounding Soviet Zone of Germany and fortified in the city's Soviet sector by every device at the disposal of the all-powerful Soviet occupation authorities. The overwhelming rejection of all Communist offers by the Berlin voters in favor of the democratic parties introduced an element of cautious reappraisal into the widely held American view (never supported by the Berlin electoral record of past decades) that the people of Berlin were predisposed by tradition and inclination to be willing tools of any totalitarian master.

But this trend was merely a first step on the part of public opinion in the United States. Besides, American policymakers, while making their first tentative responses to the Soviet challenge of the "cold war," had as yet in no way committed themselves to a possible all-out defense of West Berlin. Their final, almost suicidal, attempt at a compromise, made in the midst of the 1948-49 Soviet blockade, offered to their former allies virtual integration of Berlin into the economic structure of the Soviet Zone in return for re-establishment of unhindered Allied access to the city. It does not require much imagination to realize the political implications and consequences that would inevitably have resulted from such an integration.

The Berlin blockade marked the turning point in American relations with the city. Faced with the Soviet-engineered splitting of this gigantic and sprawling urban agglomeration that turned it into two hostile camps, and the rigid Soviet stand that cemented Allied-German unity by exposing both occupied and occupying to the same block-

ade measures, the United States made its choice. It was, in fact, a choice already made for it, although this may not have been realized by many Americans at the time. It was a choice in which the millions of people of Berlin had preceded the United States when they recognized the occupation forces as their true friends and protectors. A "front-line" atmosphere was now pervading the city, an atmosphere which, in truth, still is as characteristic of the prosperous Berlin of 1960 as it was of the beleaguered city of the years 1948 and 1949. That the spotlight in the newly developing situation was falling upon the United States was inevitable. The energy, resolution, and sacrifices of both Great Britain and France notwithstanding, it was obvious that the two Western European powers alone would not be able to withstand Soviet pressure or to shoulder the economic burden of the blockade.

Thus a new political constellation had taken shape. For the first time in history, Americans and Germans, soldiers and civilians alike, were arrayed on the same side in a major struggle, the side of freedom, on European soil. In all probability, even the United States could not have maintained its position in Berlin without the unanimous backing of the population, and the latter, in turn, would have been lost without the American determination to come to their support. A common purpose had been established, and the thoughts of historically minded people on both sides might well have gone back to the days of the American Civil War, when thousands of Germans were fighting on American soil and vast funds flowing from German hands into the treasury of the United States to help the Union cause. Out of the blockade emerged a common destiny for the United States and Berlin which would retain its vigor and world-wide significance throughout the entire sixth decade of the century. Out of this common destiny arose a new alliance, the political and military relationship between the United States and the newly established German Federal Republic, which is one of the most important hallmarks of United States foreign policy during that same decade.

When the "romantic" days of the airlift were gone, the basic crisis aspect of the Berlin situation was unchanged. Berlin remained the focal point in the East-West conflict. The capital of Germany, one of the great cities of the world—its traditional political functions temporarily

suspended—had become the capital of the cold war. To mobilize Americans in behalf of isolated Berlin was a simple task because it was generally realized that the cause of Berlin was the cause of democracy and, therefore, of the United States also. That it proved so easy for Americans to identify themselves with the people of Berlin was due primarily to their shared victory over the Soviet blockade, undoubtedly the most dramatic and tangible victory of the entire cold war. Yet a quite fundamental side of the situation in Berlin seemed to have a very strong, actually subconscious, appeal to the American public mind. Here, more than one hundred miles behind the Iron Curtain, surrounded on all sides by relentless pressure making severe demands upon the steadiest nerves, the unassuming courage and unconcerned initiative of the Berliners recalled the "frontier" spirit of America. Indeed, that atmosphere seemed to have returned to life from the remote shadows of the American past. The isolated outpost, exposed to continuing peril and periodic attack and manned by a small number of Americans against a foe vastly superior in numbers—all this had once more become a reality, if this time across the sea.

In addition, the concreteness of the Berlin situation seemed ready-made for American public opinion, which is always inclined to formulate its thinking on international issues in terms of simple, though often inadequate, dichotomies. The blind and touching confidence of West Berlin in the American shield that enabled the city to grow and prosper during the past eight or nine years had its counterpart in the manifest and not too well-informed confidence of American public opinion in the ability of the United States to provide this shield with no additional effort and without any future complications, simply because it had once been possible to defeat a Soviet siege. What the American public failed to realize was that the Berlin situation was unlikely to remain static while the political power-structure of the surrounding world was undergoing gradual but nevertheless increasingly marked changes, and certain adjustments were taking place in the relative strength of the two world powers who were watching each other, in a precarious state of co-existence, across the sector borders running through Berlin. The second Berlin crisis, artificially created for a number of reasons by the Soviet ultimatum of November, 1958, that

called upon the Western Allies to evacuate the city within six months and to assist in creating out of Berlin a politically isolated and demilitarized free city, served as drastic illustration of the fact that a state's capability to reach a certain goal or maintain a certain position does not remain unchanged, that it will either decline or increase.

II

The Soviet challenge that still confronts—although in somewhat altered *form*—the United States in 1960 has necessitated frequent evaluations of both the juridical and strategic problems arising from the American position in Berlin. Much stress has been laid on the history of United States rights and commitments there, and a considerable amount of insight has been gained on the motives of American action and inaction, as well as the connection between Allied wartime planning for the future structure of Germany and the special problems that have occurred in Berlin. But while this angle is and always will be of importance, it must not be allowed to obscure the *basic* aspects of the American presence in Berlin in the light of *present* American capabilities.

Most basic of all is the American (as well as British and French) occupation right; i.e., the right to be in Berlin at all. Discussion of this right draws attention to the special and separate legal status arranged for Berlin in the protocol of the Inter-Allied European Advisory Commission's meeting in London on September 12, 1944. The original document divided Germany into three zones of occupation and "a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation of the three Powers." The September Protocol was broadened by further agreement's in 1944 and 1945 legalizing, among other matters, France's status as the fourth occupation power in Germany and in the special Berlin area. The presence of the United States in Berlin is, therefore, protected by international law for an indefinite period. The important memorandum of the United States Department of State of December, 1958, makes this unmistakably clear. The rights of the United States in Germany and Berlin, the Department asserted, do not depend in any way upon the toleration or permission of the Soviet Union. These rights are the result of the total defeat of the Third Reich and the sub-

sequent assumption of supreme political control in Germany by the four occupation powers.

Since the Berlin area is surrounded on all sides by the Soviet Zone of Occupation, the rights of access of the three Western occupation powers to this area acquire decisive significance. Unfortunately, though, the various agreements of 1944 and 1945 do not contain any specific stipulations concerning such rights. Here the role played in the past by the United States becomes a factor of paramount importance.

The American assertion that the right of free, unhindered and unrestricted access to Berlin by road, rail, and air is included in the basic right of occupation led to a certain neglect of the access problem. Free access in this sense implies both the use of *all* available transportation and communication facilities, and the absence of *any* control, restriction, or obstruction by the power controlling the area through which such traffic has to move. When it became manifest in summer, 1945, that the Soviet Union had no intention of recognizing such all-inclusive rights of access, the American commander in Germany at the time, General Lucius D. Clay, made a legally quite logical but politically very risky decision. A few days before American occupation forces moved into the Berlin area, he agreed to a provisional allocation of certain specific lines of access by rail, road, and air, but refrained from signing a written statement outlining these routes. His argument was that this would have amounted to formal American acquiescence in a reduction of the general right of free access to a limited right of access, embracing a number of specific approaches.

The access routes of 1945 were reconfirmed by the New York meeting of May, 1949, and the Paris Foreign Ministers' Conference of June, 1949, at the end of the blockade. But once more the issue of the basic occupation and access rights was passed over in silence. Both sides obviously agreed to disagree, thus leaving the door wide open for future agreements.

Tacit acceptance by the West of specific lines of access, in turn, prejudiced the general right of freedom from control. Uncontrolled access was permitted by the Soviet Union on the specified routes only. But even there repeated attempts were made to enforce such control of Allied military trains and vehicles by Soviet military per-

sonnel at the frontier check points between West Germany and the Soviet Zone of Occupation. All these attempts were successfully frustrated, though without the benefit of any *written* agreements concerning exemption from control. The United States stand acquired particular general importance through a widely publicized Soviet-American incident on the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn shortly after the Soviet ultimatum of November, 1958.

In the American official view, the juridical position of the United States in Berlin thus results in its right to free, uncontrolled access to the city on specifically allocated approaches between West Germany and West Berlin. The State Department memorandum of December, 1958, summed up the American position by underlining the West's right of free access to Berlin as inevitably correlative to its occupation right, and of equal rank. The American position on occupation rights in, and access to, Berlin thus has remained unchanged over the last sixteen years. The question remains to be answered, however, whether American capabilities to protect these very rights have also remained unchanged.

There is some reason to believe that the nuclear potential of the United States in 1949 had considerable influence upon the termination of the Berlin blockade at that time. The crisis was ended by a Russian diplomatic move proposing direct negotiation toward a settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the situation is quite different. The American nuclear monopoly of the immediate postwar period no longer exists. In fact, the United States, in the words of a Swiss military expert, is being forced to make "unprecedented efforts to maintain the balance of strength." In a very tentative and searching way, a new American foreign policy was manifesting itself in 1959, though without any certainty of final adoption. It was the long-range result of crucial high-level decisions made in 1953 which were intended to avoid the possible crushing economic burden of continued United States military superiority by aiming at a new military status that would allegedly meet the *defensive* needs of the United States and the Western alliance.

The first Berlin crisis more than ten years ago ended in victory because the posture of the United States permitted it to counter a Soviet offensive move with a techno-political offensive of its own, the airlift. American diplomatic

reactions toward the second Berlin crisis reflected the changed circumstances of the years 1959-60. The airlift of 1948-49, after all, was supplying a war-ravaged city whose economy was still in a state of shock. It was easier to cope with such a welfare task than would be the case today. Could the tremendous import and export needs in foodstuff, raw materials, and finished products of a rebuilt and economically rejuvenated Berlin be placed back on the emergency basis of an airlift while maintaining production and employment at the high levels of recent years? The United States, therefore, found itself confronted in the second crisis with the precariousness of West Berlin's brittle communications with West Germany, which might have enabled the Soviet Union to interfere seriously with the city's entire economic life by a program of continuing harassment. This did not mean, however, that the people of West Berlin would find it impossible to rise to the occasion as they had done so splendidly in 1948. On the contrary, political morale probably was sturdier and the people were less worried about the Soviet Union in Berlin than anywhere else in the Western world.

III

At this point it is of the utmost importance to clarify the basic meaning of the new crisis in Berlin. Stripped of the torrential verbiage, the questionable moralizing, the confusing legal arguments, and the utterly misleading political propaganda, the Soviet threats and demands regarding West Berlin had a single purpose: Allied recognition of the permanence of the division of the city, or, more specifically, international recognition of the present East-West demarcation line running through Germany as a permanent frontier. This was a policy, simply, of divide and conquer, but first the division had to be accepted. Thus, fundamental Western concessions on the status of West Berlin, and, concomitantly, on Greater Berlin's still existing Four Power status, were to be the prelude to the city's eventual "sovietization" and its disappearance behind the Iron Curtain.

After the Soviet Union's Berlin program was outlined to the world late in 1958, the American position shifted from indignant rejection of any negotiations whatsoever to acceptance first of lower-level and, finally, of summit

talks on the Berlin issue. Within the general area of this altered attitude toward negotiations, the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference of summer, 1959, revealed a certain degree of American flexibility on such highly debatable and potentially explosive aspects of the situation as the size of Western military forces in Berlin and mutual limitation of questionable propaganda activities. The significance of this flexibility lies, on the one hand, in the very fact that it indicates a willingness to make concessions in the first place, and on the other in the possible implications of these concessions for the future. Reduction of Western troop strength may seem unimportant from an over-all military point of view. It is, however, terribly important within the special Berlin situation, since such forces are the only defense against indirect aggression such as large-scale armed civilian infiltration from the Soviet sector. Limitation of propaganda activities in the Western sectors might conceivably result in the long run in the liquidation of freedom of opinion there, and it should be pointed out that even the most optimistic observers thought that it would probably be impossible to apply such a limitation in the Soviet sector. It must not be forgotten that any non-Communist political activity is questionable propaganda in Communist eyes.

The American stand, though, remained completely inflexible on the really decisive issue of occupation and access rights, and their reaffirmation in any Berlin agreement. The Soviet refusal to give this vital matter any realistic consideration at all made it more than clear that the Soviet Union was interested in a "compromise" only if it would entail a radically altered status for West Berlin which eliminated occupation rights altogether and with them the one unassailable foundation of American (and other Western) presence in Berlin under international law.

IV

The refusal by the United States to sacrifice its occupation rights in Berlin underlined three basic motives behind the American position. Reduced to essentials, these motives can be defined most accurately in terms of Berlin's geopolitical significance for Germany and Europe, of the specific German problem, and of the future of the Western alliance.

To view the rise of Berlin in modern times to the rank of a world metropolitan center merely as the product of the power diplomacy pursued by the Hohenzollern dynasty over the centuries would be a serious misinterpretation of this historical phenomenon, as well as of its economic and social implications. Berlin developed into the city it is today because of its extremely favorable central location within the German and European economic regions, and its key position as the hub of the European transportation system. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, Berlin had become, in addition, the leading industrial center of Germany, a place which West Berlin alone has regained and has occupied since 1955. The actual and potential strength of this vast urban powerhouse—an interesting combination of location, climate, and the character of the population—is a far from negligible factor in the general European picture. Besides, Berlin is in many respects one of the most modern cities of the continent, with an outstanding system of public transportation. The American financial contribution to the rebuilding of Berlin has been an impressive and sustained effort, symbolized by such ultra-modern public buildings as the Kongresshalle near the Brandenburg Gate, and the American Memorial Library deep in the heart of the former inner-city. No thorough evaluation of the Soviet challenge can overlook the large implications of Berlin's economic power and cultural influence, since it is intimately related to the significance of the second Berlin crisis.

The Soviet Bloc, despite its size and resources, is poor in geopolitically favored urban areas. True, Moscow is today, numerically speaking, one of the leading capital cities in the world. Nevertheless, its location on the eastern edge of Europe considerably reduces its geopolitical potential. It goes without saying that the capitals of the eastern and southeastern European satellite states lack almost all qualifications in this respect.

Berlin, for the reasons just mentioned, belongs in a very different category. Here, too, is the only urban center in Germany marked by a truly metropolitan atmosphere, its present difficulties and isolation notwithstanding. If it could obtain full control of all of Berlin, the Soviet Union would acquire for the first time a powerful and geopolitically ideal stronghold in the very center of Europe. It would be the first European city of really ma-

for significance to fall into Soviet hands. The long-range consequences perhaps can best be formulated by paraphrasing an assertion once made by former Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov: "What happens to Berlin, happens to Germany; what happens to Germany, happens to Europe."

This variation upon Molotov calls attention to the other motivations of the American attitude toward the Berlin crisis. On the basis of its postwar policies regarding Germany and its responsibilities in helping to solve the German problem in a positive way, the United States is fully aware of the key role played by the German question in Central Europe. It is precisely the pivotal nature of the German issue that (all the eager Soviet claims to the contrary notwithstanding) is bound to defeat all hope of a lasting international settlement unless the problem of Germany's future has been dealt with in realistic, and that means positive, terms. Such a realistic policy demands restoration of Berlin to its former functions within the German body politic. For this reason, the United States has come to consider its role in Berlin for the duration of the German partition to be that of a trustee for the entire German nation, a role to which the Soviet Union cannot aspire as it has violated this very trusteeship by transforming its own occupation sector in Berlin into the capital of its German satellite, the "German Democratic Republic," in violation of all the Four Power obligations assumed by it at the end of the war. The most authoritative voice in the Soviet Union, in fact, has been raised to recommend the continued division of Germany, a state of affairs with which the world, it was said, could live very well—at least, one might add, until a Soviet-controlled reunification could be achieved.

The key position of Berlin has in yet another way brought the special aims of United States foreign policy and German aspirations into harmony. As far as the United States is concerned, the entire policy of containment, cornerstone of the American diplomatic structure throughout the world, is at stake in Berlin. For more than a decade, the United States has pledged itself again and again to defend the freedom and the right of political, social, and economic self-determination enjoyed under its protection by the more than two million people of West Berlin. Perhaps a retreat from this city would not cause the immediate disintegration of Europe's foremost

defense, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but it *would* mean the loss of its vitality, which is based on an American pledge that most countries would in this case hesitate to trust. To Europe, therefore, American presence in Berlin is an indispensable guarantee of American determination to remain on the Continent in strength.

The most representative and honored voices in the United States have been speaking out during the past eighteen months in behalf of the defense of West Berlin—a defense, however, that is feasible at all only as an “offensive defense” in the political sense. The American people have hardly begun to realize how profound an impact Berlin has already had on their national existence. The *formal* relaxation of tension following the meeting at Camp David was first felt with reference to the Berlin crisis. The Berlin problem compelled American diplomacy to shelve a policy aimed at eventual liberation of the satellite peoples that had long been out of step with the military policies simultaneously pursued by the United States. The Berlin problem forced the President of the United States onto the paths of summit diplomacy and caused him to use all of the country’s diplomatic resources in an unprecedented experiment aimed at creating international good will through world-wide travel and state visits.

It is quite unlikely that even the most striking Soviet achievements in space exploration would alone have had this effect. But the Berlin crisis and all that followed represented a significant departure in American international experience. For the first time in the history of its modern foreign policy, the United States found itself compelled to cope with a critical international issue from a position of relative material weakness at the point of decision. This, in itself, is no reason for defeatism so long as it serves the purpose of helping to mobilize the hidden reserves of American national strength.

That such a trend has begun was demonstrated in 1959 and 1960 through the numerous examples of ruthless national self-analysis and self-examination undertaken publicly by prominent Americans for the benefit of their fellow citizens. And when scores of warning voices resounded from American platforms to picture the seriousness of the

Soviet challenge to America on earth and in space, the name of Berlin, even when unspoken, was never far away. If Americans come to realize through the Berlin crisis how much of their easy-going devotion to material comfort, of their reluctance to develop and honor their great intellectual potential, of their unwillingness to discipline themselves economically and socially into a nation equal to the immense world responsibilities thrust upon its shoulders—if they realize how much of all this they will have to discard, then Berlin will have served a political purpose of great significance to all mankind.

In this case, indeed, an even stronger link would be forged between the United States and the beleaguered city, and Americans could take further pride in their fidelity to Abraham Lincoln's wise words, "Be sure you put your feet in the right place and then stand firm."



Berlin — Pivot of German Destiny

HANS REIF

FROM THE FIRST, IT HAS BEEN CLEAR THAT THE THREATS contained in Khrushchev's note of November 27, 1958, were directed at Berlin not because of Berlin itself, but because Berlin has a special significance in the context of the present situation in world politics. The very fact that a new diplomatic offensive was launched by means of an attack upon the position of Berlin is a justification of the theme of this series of essays.

It is certain that this free Berlin within the area of the Soviet Occupation Zone is an annoyance to the Soviet Union and probably even more so to the East German regime in Pankow. So long as democracy is practiced in an enclave within the territory of the "German Democratic Republic," and so long as the spirit exists that was evidenced in the elections in 1946 and has been confirmed by the blockade and every election that has taken place in West Berlin since that time, just so long is the Iron Curtain not fully drawn, just so long is the protest against the totalitarianism of the so-called German Democratic Republic kept alive, and that within its very heartland.

It is for this reason that Herr Ulbricht has been so eager to discuss a Berlin "settlement." It is interesting, though, that the masters in the Kremlin for a long time warned against bringing the Berlin question out into the open, because they thought that to do so would be inadvisable diplomatically. That they have at last decided to raise the issue indicates, I believe, that they have a motive that lies somewhat deeper than the desire to help henchman Ulbricht out of an uncomfortable situation. For a

variety of reasons, the German Democratic Republic is more important to the Kremlin than one might have thought at first.

The assumption that the Soviet Union has made the risky diplomatic move of raising the Berlin question merely out of embarrassment is also quite mistaken. One hears from time to time remarks to the effect that the German Democratic Republic is, so to speak, at the end of its rope. I believe that this opinion is altogether false. On the contrary, it is quite evident for all who will to see, not only that economic conditions in the German Democratic Republic have improved greatly, but also that the importance of this area within the orbit of the Soviet economy has increased impressively.

I think that if we wish to get a picture of the outside world as it is viewed from the Kremlin, we must distinguish among several groups of states. First there are the satellites, whose loyalty the Soviet Union has been sure of for a long time. Then there are the former colonial areas, whose impulses toward national independence the world-revolutionary ideology of the Kremlin interprets as class warfare. Finally, there are the countries of Free World where the Soviet Union is quite convinced that it has no chance of gaining sympathy, even among the industrial workers. It comforts itself with the explanation that these workers have lost their class-consciousness, that they have given it up in favor of prosperity, and that they have thus become traitors to the world revolution. This brings the masters of the Kremlin to the conclusion that it has now become important to show that the Soviet system is able to produce the same kind of prosperity, the same standard of living, indeed an even higher standard of living, than that which is possible within the capitalist world. It is within this context, I believe, that the significance of the Berlin question is to be found.

The economic potential of the German Democratic Republic is essential to the Soviet Union in its efforts to increase the productive capacity of its system. Therefore, the potentialities of this territory for increased production become more and more important in the Kremlin's plans for world revolution. Because that is so, the Soviet Union has at last arrived at the conclusion that the recognition of the German Democratic Republic by the Free World can no longer be delayed. It is for this reason that we could be

sure from the outset that the threat to Berlin was thought of in the Kremlin as a preparation for international negotiations, the purpose of which—be they brief or extended—would be as a minimum the express or implicit recognition of Pankow. We have seen this confirmed in the conference at Geneva. I may remark parenthetically that the delegation of the Federal Republic there was in a very difficult situation because it consistently had to be very careful not to take any step that might be automatically duplicated by the other side in a devious attempt to achieve in one way or another the status of a partner with equal rights. In all of this interplay it is most important to recognize clearly that an attack upon West Berlin was chosen as a means of precipitating the discussion of *de jure* recognition of the German Democratic Republic, and that this recognition is at present a major objective of Soviet foreign policy. This is an indication of the importance of the city in the calculations of the Kremlin.

Mentioning these calculations leads us easily to the question of the reaction of the Western world to these efforts of the Soviet Union. Fortunately, we can answer this question with considerable confidence. We need not doubt that the people of the United States, as well as of France and Great Britain, know what an important place in world politics the Berlin question has come to have. It is almost superfluous to emphasize the importance of keeping the Berlin issue from ever becoming isolated in the continuing negotiations over international issues. It is equally important that the Western powers maintain as a principle in such negotiations not only that Berlin is the pivot of Germany's destiny, but that it is the pivot of the destiny of Europe and of the whole world as well. I believe that the Western powers have the insight to stand firm on this issue, even if the result is that every new conference only leads to another, and that no tangible progress is made.

I might remark that I also believe that in its desire for the latest summit conference the Soviet Union had motives which go beyond those I have mentioned and are not directly related to the immediate aspects of the Berlin question. So long as we can assume that these motives are still in existence, I believe that the efforts of the Soviet Union not to allow anything to happen that might prevent a new summit conference will continue. At any rate, it is evident that, as has so often been pointed out in these essays, the

chief actors on the stage of world politics have chosen the question of the status of Berlin in international law as the cue for a discussion of the problems of the world.

II

I have already referred to the significance of a free Berlin, whose citizens repudiated the Communists in the first election of the City Assembly in 1946 (and thereby showed that they rejected every form of totalitarianism) and demonstrated during the blockade that they were ready to endure the greatest hardships for the sake of political freedom. Their attitude contradicts an assumption so important in Soviet calculations—that people can be bought by means of a standard of living. Berlin has demonstrated that people are instead prepared to accept the greatest sacrifices when political liberty is at stake.

We know what an impression this demonstration has made upon the minds of the people of the United States and how the behavior of the people of Berlin has rehabilitated Germany in the respect of the world not only in the United States but throughout the West. It is said that even in the Soviet Union itself these developments have occasioned some reflection, and I am convinced that this is the case. Here in Berlin it has been proved that people are willing to make a sacrifice for freedom. That came, too, at a time not very long after the collapse of our state, our economy, and even our morale, and the disintegration of respect for us throughout the democratic world. Here once again, hope has come into the world that the Germans are capable of democracy. This hope is inseparably bound up with the name of Berlin. Berlin has conducted itself in a way that is significant for Germany's destiny. I am not a native of Berlin and I do not say this in sentimental praise of the Berliners. I do believe, however, that the world has seen here on German soil a demonstration of civic virtue that calls to mind the best days of the Roman republic. What has already been done in Berlin places upon Berliners a great responsibility not to jeopardize the confidence of the world in the democratic virtue of our people by internal political strife.

Berlin has, one may say, opened the way into the community of free nations for the German people in their foreign relations. I do not hesitate to add that this was

the necessary and the right way, and that none of us—and surely nobody in Berlin—would think of giving it up. We know that we will preserve the freedom we now enjoy only as members of the community of free peoples and we are therefore determined never to put that community in jeopardy. That may be taken for granted, absolutely.

Berlin has made its decisions for democracy in its free elections. Moreover, so long as Berlin remains in its present situation, there will also be what has been called the permanent plebiscite of the refugees, the powerful declaration of those who find the dictatorship of a party-dominated state so unbearable that they leave their homes to escape it. Berlin has an influence in the Soviet Zone not only through its demonstration of democracy in operation, but also because it makes this plebiscite of the people who reject Pankow and all it stands for possible. An election by emigration. This is indeed one of the most important aspects of the situation in Berlin.

Much of what I have said about Berlin has been true for years. It is quite plain, also, that people in the West realize full well the significance that a surrender of Berlin would have for the prestige and future effectiveness of the policy of the Western powers in the whole world, but especially in the satellite states. The peoples of the satellite states need not give up the hope that they are not forgotten in the West so long as Berlin remains in its present status. If Berlin falls, this hope will have to be written off.

I may sound as if I advocate a policy devoted to preserving the *status quo*. Therefore let me add at once—and I know that this is not what we could call a “scientific” conclusion, but it is simply my own political conviction—that it is not Berlin as an enclave within the territory of the German Democratic Republic that presents the real anomaly of the German and European situation today, but rather the anomaly is the split in Germany and in Europe. Every serious discussion of the Berlin question must start from this point. Consequently, there is no Berlin solution without a German solution, and no German solution without a European solution. Furthermore, I believe that it makes little sense to offer the Kremlin an advance payment—even if it is a very small advance payment—or to make any concessions in diplomatic negotiations, unless by this means some concessions are obtained from the other side looking toward the solution of the German problem as a

whole. The two problems are indivisible and should not be permitted to become separated by diplomatic finesse.

I go, however, a step further, and say that it is not enough to recognize that Berlin in its present situation has an almost symbolic significance for Pankow and the Kremlin, and in another way for the people of the satellite states and the Western world, if the conclusion is drawn that nothing should therefore be allowed to change. The issue that is really at stake will not be settled until we at long last face it, and summon the courage to pursue a positive policy toward the East, indeed, an aggressive policy—aggressive in its conception, its central idea. This is the real mission of Berlin. It is not the historic mission of Berlin to be a "thorn in the side of the Soviet Union." The historic mission of Berlin is to be a bridge to new solutions, solutions in which the West does not shrink from declaring that a society of free peoples is its goal. Up to this time, all the suggestions we have discussed for the solution of international problems have come from the other side. We even find ourselves discussing which of the so-called achievements of the so-called German Democratic Republic are perhaps on the whole discussible. The present situation of Berlin will not have any productive significance for the solution of the German problem or the European problem until the decision is made that it shall have such significance.

Berlin is not under a military threat. It is probably also not under military protection. It is, instead, protected by the peace which has resulted from the equilibrium in armaments. This equilibrium came into existence when the Soviet Union succeeded in putting the manufacture of intercontinental projectiles on a mass-production basis. The equilibrium means that the United States would probably be in just as much danger if it came to war as the Soviet Union. But I would like also to emphasize the fact that the Soviet Union has not in the least reduced the risk of being itself attacked with mass-produced missiles. The risk of attack remains the same as ever. Furthermore, we may well say that in this situation of equilibrium in armaments, with the possibilities of projection and of threats it contains, certain questions that until recently seemed most decisive have somewhat retreated into the background. I am of the opinion that the question of military disengagement was until fairly recently the most acute aspect of the German problem. Disengagement has not lost all if its importance

under the conditions that have since developed, but it is by no means any longer the issue of decisive importance. The significance of disengagement is now dependent upon the success of the efforts to bring about disarmament in the field of the most modern weapons.

III

The problems that are now of greatest importance are in quite another field, it seems to me. At the beginning of my essay I pointed out that the Soviet Union knows that it can only reach its world revolutionary goals by increasing its productivity and raising its standard of living. This gives to many problems that formerly had a secondary relevance an acute importance today. I have already said that in my opinion the new Soviet emphasis is what has given the matter of the recognition of the Democratic Republic such urgency in the policy of the Soviet Union, and I insist again that, if I am right, it is Khrushchev who is demanding something from us and for himself—something that he needs if he is to carry through his plans of world revolution. When I say “us” I mean the West, not just the Berliners or the Germans or the Americans. And please do not misunderstand me when I say that Khrushchev’s ultimatums must be rejected, but in a way that goes far beyond merely maintaining the *status quo*. As I have told you, I am in favor of an offensive in which we declare to the East quite fully what kind of a world we visualize in case of reunification. That I believe is a better way of handling the matter than to theorize about what possibly might be thought acceptable by the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic. Thus I am not talking in terms of a policy based on the *status quo*. Nevertheless, it is true that in the present situation it is only the Kremlin that has changed its tactics suddenly, for the reason that it wished to create a situation advantageous to itself. Under the circumstances, it seems to me that the policy of the West in regard to the Soviet threats can only be to take the firm stand that there is no Berlin question, but only a German question.

But I must warn against one suggestion that is offered with the pretense that it fuses the Berlin question with the German question. Let us not be deceived by the proposal of confederation with the German Democratic Re-

public. So long as parity is demanded and so long as it is left to each of two governments to decide whether it is willing to accept any specific proposal looking toward reunification—and this is the form of the suggestion made by the Soviet Union—the German Democratic Republic will have a double veto power. It could, of course, veto every suggestion made by West Germany. Furthermore, it could offer such unrealistic suggestions of its own that West Germany would be forced to say “no” again and again, and would thus be made to appear not to want reunification.

In regard to this kind of proposal, we must also not forget the existence of the Socialist Unity Party. Whether it is *de jure* or implicit, the recognition of the German Democratic Republic involves much more than accepting as a legitimate government the regime which actually exercises power in that particular territory. The present government of East Germany, or perhaps it is better to say the political system of East Germany, has two elements. The official one is the government at Pankow and the other is the Socialist Unity Party. We should have learned already what this means because all of us experienced a situation of the kind in the Third Reich. We know what kind of manipulations a state-party can contrive, even to the point of imposing its will upon states that supposedly are allies. As a matter of fact, when I was in Italy during the Third Reich era, I was able to observe what it meant to be in alliance with a government that a state-party had transformed into a totalitarian tyranny. Such a party not only has a monopoly on the formation of the public will, but it also can do many things that the government and the foreign office will not do on their own. Political organizations of the kind can bring about a *fait accompli* from which it is often impossible to become extricated.

I wish to say this here quite frankly and emphatically, although for us Berliners the problem of which I speak is quite evident and well understood. From what I read in the West German and foreign newspapers on the negotiations at Geneva, and the developments, suggestions, and discussions incident thereto, I got the impression that people outside Berlin are not keenly conscious of this danger any longer. I am convinced that this matter is of decisive importance because the state-party is the essence of a totalitarian state. It acts for the state and it acts for the

citizens as well. That is the characteristic of the totalitarian state. In this matter Berlin can contribute a great deal to a clearer understanding of the nature of the problems that the West must face.

It is true that people everywhere, inside and outside of Germany, understand that the destiny of Berlin is not only the destiny of Germany also, but of Europe and, indeed, of all of the Western world as well. We have believed, from the first years of our efforts to win the understanding and the cooperation of the West, that the solidarity of Europe which became evident in the operations of a number of regional institutions meant a better chance for our cause. Certainly we in Germany have not supported the European movement merely to accomplish our national purposes in this round-about way, through the back doors of European politics, as it were. It would be entirely false to say that. On the contrary, the conception of European solidarity arose spontaneously. From the outset it has been quite evident in the Council of Europe and elsewhere that Europeans are openminded and that they understand readily the tragedy of a nation in our situation. This means that the view that European integration and German integration are interrelated problems and two elements of the same policy is one that has for a long time seemed quite sensible to many people.

Yet, political integration attitudes and policies based upon the *status quo*, whether they arise among the Western powers or in West Germany, are not compatible with the interests and spirit of us Berliners. That is especially true of what may be called a Little-Europe policy. A Little-Europe policy, especially if it is founded on some sort of ideological division of Europe, would be the most ill-advised and futile kind of policy based on the *status quo*. Acceptance of a Little-European solution would mean, in actuality, acceptance of the permanence of the extension of the Soviet Communist orbit into Central Europe and Central Germany. It is easy to see what the implications of this "solution" would be so far as the survival of West Berlin as a "free city" in the Western sense is concerned. Nevertheless, there are those who allow themselves to be deceived by the idea that the Little-European solution would prepare the way for a larger and more comprehensive solution of the problems that have given rise to East-West tensions. We must reject that idea emphatically.

There were people in Germany in the nineteenth century who were bitterly disappointed with the Little-Germany solution brought into effect by Bismarck with the establishment of a national state which excluded Austria. I do not wish to go into that, and I am not competent to say whether there was a way to German national unity other than that which Bismarck chose. One thing can be said with certainty, however, and that is that just as Prussian dominance was not the road to a "Large Germany," so Little-Europe is not the road to a solution of the large European situation.

The only European-wide solution that is genuine and honorable consists in supporting—not only in the interest of our people, our city, and our fatherland, but in the interest of the Western world as a whole—the objectives we now pursue in Berlin. A Little-European policy is an acceptance of the permanent division of Europe along the Iron Curtain, and a *de facto* justification of the *status quo*. I have serious fears of this development, the dangers of which are apparently not understood by large groups in our fatherland.

For the sake of the Free World I hope that Europe will not remain divided but will be brought together in a new unity, whatever the form may be. We of the Free World can just as little dispense with the traditions of the old guild democracies, which mean so much to Europe, as with the legacies of Roman culture and Roman law, which are especially significant for Western Europe and Southern Europe. We cannot afford to lose either.

But we should also declare emphatically that the world of the Slavic states also belongs to Europe. That is not aggression; it is a statement of fact. It is unrealistic not to be willing to see that Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and so on, are integral parts of the European cultural area—unrealistic from our point of view and from the Kremlin's as well. Perhaps we Germans can play the role of mediators in the task that lies ahead.

There are people who are of the opinion that because of our central position we are called upon to create a middle way between the collectivism of the Soviet Union and the economic, cultural, and social system of the Free World. But that is not our task, and indeed would consti-

tute a betrayal of our real historic task. The task that falls to us is one of integration—integration for those peoples who belong to Europe, for those peoples who are anxious about their own freedom and turn their eyes hopefully to the West. The fate of Berlin will be of decisive significance for the aspirations of these peoples.

IV

I have attempted to set forth the significance of our theme in a series of reflections rather than in a scientific and scholarly analysis. What I have said has been selective rather than exhaustive, for that is all that is possible in an essay of this kind. For us here in Berlin, it is scarcely necessary to belabor what becomes increasingly obvious as time goes on. Never before has it been so self-evident that the Berlin question is a question of life or death for Germany; never before has it been so clear what posture we must assume and what posture we must recommend.

But how does the matter stand in Germany itself? We West Berliners have found our way into the Federal Republic with some difficulty. It was not altogether easy for us to secure recognition as a state in the Federation, nor was it in the beginning generally regarded as self-evident that certain of the administrative offices and courts of the Federation should be located here. I can tell you, however, on the basis of my experience in the Parliamentary Council and for eight years in the Bundestag, that the difficulties were not created by the Allies. I would like to say expressly that the Western Allies raised no objections at all against the Third Transitional Act, which provides the strongest legal and constitutional link between Berlin and the Federal Republic, nor did they object to our holding the second Federal Convention in Berlin.* They did not advise against the choice of Berlin as the seat of sections of the Federal Supreme Court and of the Federal Administrative Court (and, I may add, neither did the Russians). We made the difficulties for ourselves.

It is for this reason that we must ask ourselves what

* The Federal Convention elects the President of the Federal Republic. The first such election was held in Bonn (1949), and the second (1954) and third (1959) were held in Berlin. See above, pp. 83-84.

role Berlin plays in the consciousness of the Germans. If we inquire into the traditional focus of German national feeling, we find that the existence of Germany as a state has been somewhat ambiguous. This central European area was the last to establish a national state, and then it was on a small-German basis. Moreover, the question of German unity and freedom has always been a subject of concern among our neighbors from the point of view of their own policies as states. It is perhaps not too much to say that the generation at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was dominated by the idea that German unity had been attained by force on the battlefields of the Franco-German war, that the victory over Napoleon III was the decisive event in procuring that unity. I do not believe that the flowering of German intellectual life at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the national idea of the Germans was fused with a cosmopolitan spirit, played any role whatsoever in the consciousness of the average German of that period. The same may be said of the National Assembly at the Pauls Church in Frankfort in 1848. So far as there was any historical consciousness among ordinary Germans or any impact of history, it was only the sense that a national war had been won. It was from such stuff that the Wilhelminic patriotism was evolved, and it apparently had no place for a genuine national feeling, with roots much deeper than victory in war. This kind of national feeling, of which the French, perhaps, give a good example, simply cannot come into existence without—to use an old saying—a drop of democratic oil. I am of the opinion that democracy must be the foundation of it.

I do not have to tell you how hard it has been for us Germans to develop the security of the national sensitivity, of the national feeling, of the national posture that is taken for granted by others. I do not have to speak of the excesses which the Third Reich brought to us in this connection. I also do not need to say that in the collapse of 1945 so much was broken to pieces, especially for our young people, that it is very, very hard to find any starting point for the recognition of values which in earlier times were regarded as self-evident. Who can reproach these young people for whatever difficulty they have in

developing this national sense? Certainly, no one who is realistically and sympathetically concerned about their future or the future of Germany.

It is entirely possible that the plight of the German capital city now provides the starting point that is needed. The historic situation of Berlin may be very well suited, indeed, to give the Germans the feeling that they have a capital, that this capital actually exists, even though it is not so designated constitutionally and it does not exercise the functions of the seat of the government. It is not self-deception, I think, that leads me to express the opinion that such an attitude towards Berlin is now putting in an appearance in West Germany. I make this statement cautiously. However, I am a member of the governing board of the organization Germany Indivisible, and have taken part in many of its rallies in West Germany. I wish to say here in Berlin that I have gained the impression that the threat to the city precipitated by Khrushchev's note of November 27, 1958, has produced a new consciousness among the citizens of the Federal Republic. We Berliners have often had to ask ourselves whether the understanding of the tragedy of the division of our nation was really as strong as we expected it to be among those in West Germany itself, who are bound to us with so many ties. I believe that the Soviets, who often make psychological errors in their politics, have done so once more in the Khrushchev note. What was planned as a threat to Berlin and a shock to Germany has resulted in a strengthened consciousness of the role of Berlin among the Germans, and thereby a greater appreciation in the Federal Republic of the significance of the idea "Berlin and reunification."

There do exist, therefore, some grounds for hoping that out of the Berlin situation, out of the struggle for existence, independence, and freedom carried on by the citizens of a city that has become a symbol for the Free World and for the oppressed peoples of the Eastern world, a new kind of German national feeling has emerged. Not an Irredentism—that would be altogether mistaken—but perhaps the feeling of a task to be accomplished.

Let me return in this connection to what I said at the outset. The historic significance of Berlin for Germany,

and even beyond that for Europe as a whole, lies in the fact that Berlin's relation with Germany and Europe implies such a task. The Germans need to find some point of orientation, some commonly recognized goal, if they are going to be able to conduct themselves as citizens in a manner that is national in the best sense of that word. Berlin may be the means of finding that goal. I say this in full consciousness of the fact that this task implied by the situation of Berlin has not in the past been accepted outside the city in the proper way. Berlin was at first regarded as an emergency area and received aid from the Federation on this basis. Later, through the provisions of the Third Transitional Act, the city was placed in a framework of special financial equalization so that—to use an expression drawn from the phraseology of social welfare—whereas formerly it had been a recipient of relief, it now has a legal pension. So far, so good. But still the realization is lacking that, over and beyond this, a positive political program of aid to Berlin is necessary. This aid cannot be altogether concerned with helping Berlin to exist and to maintain its standard of living, but must manifest the determination of the Federal Republic to make a living reality of that provision of the Basic Law which anticipates the re-establishment of German unity. Where better than in Berlin can the Federal Republic make this determination evident?

You can see that we are not yet out of the woods. We have not yet come so far that assuring the future of Berlin as the capital of a reunited Germany is accepted as the great national program of the Federal government from which no political party can exempt itself. We Berliners have a right to use our influence to see that more is done in this matter, because it is not just a matter of helping our economy. So much more is involved than that. "Show-window" is an inaccurate expression, but it is the one that comes to mind. We Berliners are called upon to show that Germany wants Berlin, that Germany wants a free Berlin, and that it is preparing itself and Berlin for a future role as the capital of a reunited Central European nation. We must bend every effort towards making all this unmistakably clear.

I have no desire at this time to attempt to develop a theoretical or ideological framework for our role as Ber-

liners. I will say just one thing on this score. Professor Fischer-Baling, in his book *Besinnung auf uns Deutsche*, has pointed out that Germans have a tendency to strive for completeness. He means, I believe, that the Germans always find their role most satisfying if they are engaged in a task of integration, that is, if they are conscious that their particular work has its place in the service of some whole. If this is so in our professional and vocational work, may it not be so also in our politics?

Berliners have been entrusted with the task of keeping the idea of unity alive under quite sobering circumstances. In 1946 I made a trip to Bavaria for the first time since the war had ended, and talked there with some of the political leaders. I said then we Berliners were extraordinarily favored by fate because we alone had Four Power administration under the occupation. At that time, the idea of making Germany as a whole one single economic unit administered by German civil officials under the supervision of the occupation powers had not yet been abandoned. I said that we in Berlin were a sort of proving ground for German self-government under the control of the Four Powers, and that what was necessary in order to govern a unified Germany in the status that was then under consideration could be learned from our experience. It was for that reason that I said we were favored by fate.

We are still in a favored position. It has been reserved for us; destiny has assigned us a task and we have discharged it calmly and without sentimentality, through elections and through our behavior at the time of the blockade. We have also discharged it through our sense of unity, exemplified by the action of our Berlin representatives in the Bundestag at Bonn, who have stood together on every matter that affected Berlin and have thus shown the other Germans where the real issues lay.

Berlin has asserted its claim to be the capital of the Germany that will be reunited in the future. We say "pivot of German destiny" because on the task destiny has given us the fate of Germany turns. It is our firm determination to discharge that task in the future as well as we have discharged it in the past.

"Destiny"—it is a proud word. World history makes its assignments to individuals and groups sometimes in

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one way, sometimes in another. Perhaps, however, because Berlin has accepted its task—here I close with what I have said before—the German nation as a whole may come to find a quite concrete and yet a genuinely democratic national goal.

The Authors

Dr. (philosophy) Wolfgang Haus is a member of the research staff of the Berlin office of the Assembly of German Cities (Deutscher Städtetag). Trained in historical research at the Free University in Berlin, he is a specialist in the history of city government and administration.

Dr. (philosophy) Hans Herzfeld is Professor of Modern History and Director of the Friedrich Meinecke Institute at the Free University in Berlin. He is the author of numerous books including: *Die moderne Welt, 1789-1945*, 2 vols. (New ed., 1957); *Demokratie und Selbstverwaltung in der Weimarer Epoche* (1957); *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und die Auflösung der nationalen Einheitsfront im Weltkrieg* (1928).

Dr. (jurisprudence) Heinz Kreutzer is Administrative Director of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Berlin Senate, the executive branch of the city government. He has served a number of semesters as Lecturer in Public Law at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik.

Dr. (political sciences) Otto Stammer is Professor of Sociology and Political Sciences and Director of the Research Institute for Political Science at the Free University in Berlin. In the academic year 1958-59, he was Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences. In 1954 he was Guest Professor at Columbia University in New York. He is a co-editor of *Die neue Gesellschaft* and a contributor to other sociological journals.

Mr. Franz Kluge is Director of the Economics Section of the Berlin Chamber of Industry and Commerce.

Dr. (philosophy) Joachim Tiburtius is Senator (Minister) for Education and Culture in the Berlin government and Emeritus Professor of Political and Social Economy at the Free University. As Senator he has been the responsible head of the executive department administering educational and cultural policy in West

Berlin since 1951. His publications include: *Christliche Wirtschaftsordnung, ihre Wurzeln und ihr Inhalt* (1947) and *Lage und Leistungen des deutschen Handels in ihrer Bedeutung für die Gegenwart* (1949).

Chief Building Inspector Friedrich Furlinger is Head of the Division of City and State Planning in the Department of Building and Housing of the Berlin Senate.

Dr. (philosophy) Edgar R. Rosen was a Guest Professor at the Otto Suhr Institute of the Free University in Berlin in the academic year 1959-60, and served previously in a similar capacity there in 1954-55. He was born in Berlin shortly before World War I as an American citizen and was educated in the schools of that city, the University of Berlin, and the University of Leipzig, from the last of which he earned his doctorate in Modern History in 1933. He came to the United States in 1936 and has been a member of the faculty of the University of Kansas City since 1948.

Dr. (political sciences) Hans Reif, Professor of German Government and Politics at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik since it reopened in 1948, was during the years 1946-48 a member of the City Assembly of Berlin and afterwards a member of the Berlin House of Representatives. He was one of the Berlin representatives in the Parliamentary Council which framed the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany at Bonn in 1949. Thereafter, he served for eight years as a Berlin delegate in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic. He is a member of the German Advisory Council of the European Movement and of the Executive Committee of Germany Indivisible.

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